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Credit has proven to be a necessary tool for economic development affecting 
positively the welfare of households and individuals. However, one major area in 
which rural households lack is access to financial markets including credit. The 
studies included in this thesis contribute to the access to credit literature and the 
credit constraint/unconstraint impact on some welfare outcomes. The first empirical 
VWXG\H[DPLQHGIDUPKRXVHKROGV¶DFFHVVWRFUHGLWLQUXUDO0DODZL8QOLNHSUHYLRXV
empirical studies, particular attention is given to discouraged borrowers who are 
mostly ignored in such studies. Using the 2010/2011 household survey data from 
Malawi the study determines the demographic and socio-economic characteristics 
that distinguish farm households who need credit, who are the discouraged 
borrowers and who are rejected applicants. A three-step sequential estimation model 
following a trivariate probit model with double sample selection was adopted. The 
findings revealed that there were over 7 times more discouraged borrowers than 
denied applicants. Women were more likely to be discouraged from applying for 
credit but, if they applied, they were more likely to be successful in obtaining credit 
than males. This shows WKDW ZKHQ H[DPLQLQJ IDUP KRXVHKROGV¶ Dccess to credit 
discouraged borrowers should be given special consideration. 
Capturing discouraged borrowers as also credit constrained, the second empirical 
study employed a switching model to estimate the impact of credit constraint status 
on farm productivity for each credit constraint regime. The study further compared 
the expected production under actual and counterfactual conditions for a household 
being credit constrained or unconstrained. The findings suggest that a household 
that is constrained is less productive than a randomly selected household from the 
sample would but that for the unconstrained household is inconclusive, however, the 
counterfactual arguments as seen from the analysis shows that being credit 
unconstrained was beneficial to the increase in productivity. 
Studies have shown that undeveloped financial markets have been a major 
contributing factor increasing inequality, especially in developing countries. The 
third empirical study examined the impact of household credit constraint on the 
consumption inequality of rural households in Malawi. Factors that explain the 
within and between credit constrained and unconstrained status of consumption 
inequality were examined. The General Entropy (GE) Index and the Regression-
Based Inequality 'HFRPSRVLWLRQ 0HWKRGV )LHOG¶V  DQG %OLQGHU-Oaxaca 
Decomposition were employed. The findings show that inequality was more 
prominent within the groups than between them. Also, the size of households and the 
value of assets were the major contributors to the within-group inequalities for 
credit constrained and unconstrained households. Further, only the endowment 
component was important in explaining the consumption inequality gap between the 
credit constrained and unconstrained households. Adjusting the level of endowments 
of constrained households to that of the unconstrained households increased their 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
Malawi is a landlocked country situated in the East of Africa sharing boundaries with 
Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania. It occupies a total land area of 118,484 km2 with 
59.2 percent used for agricultural purposes. The capital city Lingogwe is located in the 
central region of the country while the countries second city, Blantyre, viewed as the 
commercial centre of the country is located in the south. The estimated population of 
Malawi is about 17,964,697 (July 2015 estimate) with a population growth rate of 3.32 
percent (Cia.gov, 2016). According to the 2008 population and housing census, the 
southern region of the country holds the largest population of about 45 percent, followed 
by the Central (42%) and then the north (13%) (National Statistical Office (NSO), 
2008). It is an example of a typical rural sub-Saharan nation with about 85 percent of 
total population living in the rural areas. 
Malawi is one of the poorest countries ranking 174 out of about 187 countries in the 
2013 Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
2015). About 50.7 percent of the population are poor (those with total consumption 
below the poverty line of 37,002 Malawi Kwacha) with a rural poverty of 56.6 percent 
compared to urban poverty headcount of 17.3 percent (NSO, 2012; World Bank, 2015). 
Apart from the obvious urban-rural disparity in development, the country is easily 
divided into three regions; northern, central and southern regions. The southern followed 
by the central region are the most deprived regions. About 49 percent of the poor 
population live in the southern part of the country and 38 percent of the population in 
the central region (NSO, 2012).  
The economy of Malawi is agriculture-based, employing almost 80 percent of the total 
labour force in the country with about 90 percent of this population in the rural areas. 
The export earnings from agriculture are about 90 percent of total export revenue whiles 
the sector contribution to GDP is about one third (Cia.gov 2016). The real GDP growth 
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in Malawi was estimated at 5.7 percent in 2014 and this was mainly attributed to the 
agricultural sector (Mwanakatwe and Kebedew 2015). This makes agriculture the most 
important sector in Malawi. However, farming in Malawi has remained largely 
traditional. As noted, majority of farmers are rural and are smallholders who use simple 
farm tools, such as hoes and cutlasses, for cultivation. They also depend on rainfall for 
cultivation with about 95 percent of the rainfall occurring between December and April.  
Further, the high rural economic dependence on agriculture provides a challenge to rural 
households who are often unable to diversify their source of income. In addition, the 
highly seasonal nature of agricultural work, mainly due to the limited rainfall, leaves 
many rural people underemployed during a large part of the year. This could further be 
attributed to the inadequate economic and infrastructural development which makes 
rural areas unattractive location for formal institutions including formal financial 
institutions and key trading enterprises to be established. This makes access to formal 
financial services, such as access to credit and savings programs, very limited.  
Financial sector development and financial inclusion programmes according to the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2014) has been 
seen as an important economic development tool including poverty reduction. The 
government of Malawi has recognised financial inclusion, which includes making credit 
available at low cost to the deprived and the low-income groups, as an essential tool for 
improving agricultural productivity, increasing micro and small enterprises, creating 
jobs, raising income of households and to also smooth consumption of households (MF 
Transperency, 2011). This is especially important for the rural areas which are the food 
basket of the country. With the rural sector characterised by high levels of poverty, 
access to credit enables farm households in particular to overcome the capital 
FRQVWUDLQWV 7KLV KHOSV WR UHGXFH KRXVHKROGV¶ YXOQHUDELOLW\ WKURXJK LQFUHDVLQJ
productivity and yields (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008 and Ali et al., 2014), increasing 
technology adoption and income (Zeller et al., 1998), increasing nonfarm and farm 
income, and food security (Diagne and Zeller, 2001), reducing poverty (Zaman, 1997; 
Khandker, 1998; Obisesan and Akinlade, 2013) and also reducing inequality (Beck et 
al., 2004 and Clarke et al., 2006). Furthermore, access to credit allows for efficient 
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intertemporal transfer of household resources and helps to cope with risk. This enables 
rural households to overcome the consequences of their low and volatile incomes by 
smoothening consumption throughout the year (Diagne, 1999). Thus, households are 
able to enjoy a more stable level of consumption throughout the year without having to 
forgo current or future productive capacity. As a risk mitigating strategy, access to credit 
can also be used to manage unexpected shocks in the household and/or on the farm, 
without which these rural households would be pushed further into the poverty trap. 
The importance of credit has also been seen in its diverse usage. According to the Third 
Integrated Household Survey (IHS3) data, households in Malawi usually access credit 
for agricultural-related and or non-agricultural related purposes. Luboyeski et al. (2004) 
has identified that agriculture-related purpose of taking credit is very dominant and is 
mostly in the form of in-kind inputs of fertilizer and seed. The agriculture-related 
purpose of taking credit constituted 46.4 percent of total borrowing in rural Malawi 
(NSO, 2012). Credit was applied for to finance the purchase of land and inputs for the 
production of food crops, tobacco and other cash crops. Purchase of input for food crop 
production alone was about 31.1 percent of total purpose for borrowing. About 34.5 
percent of households borrowed to finance a business start-up with 10.1 percent 
borrowing to purchase a non-farm input. Due to the importance of credit, the 
government of Malawi has included finance programmes including microfinance to its 
National Social Support Programme (NSSP) so as to increase the outreach capacity of 
poverty-focused microfinance institutions and further improve on the efficiencies of the 
operations of microfinance institutions.  
Despite the well-acknowledged importance of, and potential demand for credit, financial 
markets are less developed in rural areas of developing countries implying a credit 
market failure. Credit market failure exists where credit allocation is not efficient 
(Besley, 1994). In an ideal world, credit is traded competitively by the forces of demand 
and supply which determines the cost of borrowing (that is interest rate) (Besley, 1994). 
It is argued that borrowers use the credit effectively and are able to pay back leaving 
neither the borrower nor the lender worse-off. However, in a world characterised by 
uncertainties, not all information about borrowers is known (information asymmetry) 
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and therefore, it would be difficult for the lender to ascertain that a borrower will use the 
credit efficiently or direct it towards the purpose for which it was borrowed, raising the 
issues of adverse selection and morale hazard. This increases the probability of credit 
defaults and also increases the risk for financial institutions. Furthermore, where cost of 
monitoring a borrower and also cost of enforcing legal processes on defaulted borrowers 
are high, lenders will be unwilling to provide credit to borrowers or provide smaller 
amounts. Besley (1994) is accordingly of the view that, asymmetric information and 
high monitoring and legal enforcement costs lead lenders to associate greater credit 
provision with a high probability of default. To reduce the risk inherent in lending, 
financial institutions use screening processes, interest rate and collateral requirements as 
WRROV IRU LGHQWLI\LQJ µJRRG¶ERUURZHUV IURPµEDG¶ERUURZHUVZLWK some consequences 
RISUHYHQWLQJVRPHKRXVHKROGVIURPDSSO\LQJRUWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHµVRFDOOHGFUHGLW
XQZRUWK\ DSSOLFDQWV¶ UHMHFWHG .RQ DQG 6WRUH\  ,Q DQRWKHU DUJXPHQW SRRU
households in rural areas are not able to access credit due to their demand for small 
amount of credit. They engage in small economic activities and hence do not have the 
potential to demand large credit. Financial institutions bear huge cost in providing small 
credit to borrowers in such transactions which usually has a lower return. Also, as rural 
households live in areas with poor infrastructure, it is therefore expensive or 
unprofitable for financial institutions to establish in rural areas. It is equally expensive 
for poor households to also reach financial institutions due to the cost involved in 
reaching a financial institution. Hence, this transaction cost borne by both lenders and 
borrowers limits credit supply or denies access. 
Some households opt not to apply for credit even when they have a productive use for 
the facility. This may be due to the fear of being denied or possibly because they fear the 
consequences of their project failing or the prospect of default. With financial 
institutions being very cautious of the type of borrower they lend to, it is not surprising 
that even good borrowers could be denied credit due to screening error, hence these 
borrowers are less likely to apply for credit in future. Also, it is very likely that bad 
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borrowers are instead given credit. Both situations lead to Type I and Type II errors1 
which are as a result of an ex-ante screening test.  
In remote rural settings where interaction and communication between households are 
important and influential leaders are given reverence, individuals who have had bad 
experiences with financial institutions or other lenders are very likely to advise their 
peers against dealing with financial institutions. This peer influence increases the 
likelihood that households receiving such negative information may be discouraged to 
apply for credit.  
Also, households who need credit would have to overcome some hurdles. These may 
include providing collateral which is usually inadequate, distance and transactions costs 
involved in applying for credit and also having to provide personal information to 
someone they do not know. These and other factors could prevent some households 
from applying for credit. 
Jappelli (1990) and Kon and Storey (2003) define borrowers who do not apply for credit 
due to the fear of being denied as discouraged borrowers. According to Kon and Storey 
(2003), this group of borrowers are ignored in the credit constraint studies because they 
do not make applications. Further, because they do not add to bank risk, they are in 
these studies unobserved. However, this group of borrowers have been identified as very 
important in measuring the importance of credit constraints as they potentially lack 
credit that could usefully be deployed. Levenson and Willard (2000), Brown et al. 
(2011) and Freel et al. (2012) identified that there are at least twice as much discouraged 
borrowers as denied applicants through studies of some developed countries, including 
Eastern Europe. As noted in the theoretical study by Kon and Storey (2003), 
discouraged borrowers could be even more prevalent in developing countries than in 
developed ones. This makes this group of borrowers as important as denied borrowers in 
the study of access to credit. Ignoring this group makes the measurement of credit 
constraint underestimated. 
                                                 
1
 Type I error is the situation where a bad borrower or credit unworthy borrower is given credit by a 
lender, while a Type II error is where a good borrower is denied credit. 
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1.2 Credit market in Malawi 
Financial markets in the rural areas of Malawi still remain under-developed leaving the 
majority of rural households excluded from formal finance. Some explanations are that 
the majority of rural households are poor and illiterate. In addition, much of the 
population are located in remote and sparsely populated areas which increases the cost 
of operation, making rural areas unattractive to formal financial institutions (UNCTAD, 
2014). Other explanations emphasise the lack of collateral and assets which could be 
used as security for borrowing. Missing insurance markets contribute to the exposure to 
high default risks borne by lenders which, combined with the covariant risks associated 
with agriculture makes the rural areas relatively unattractive to financial institutions 
(Rao, 2012). The high transaction costs borne by financial institutions in supplying 
small amount of credit to poor households which is not met with enough returns to cover 
the cost is another disincentive to establish in rural areas. 
In response to these inherent problems, several financial sector reforms and policies 
have been implemented in Malawi to help develop the financial market and to increase 
the provision of financial services, including access to credit, in the rural areas. The 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), which was implemented in 2007 with 
technical support from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), was the 
first financial assessment done in Malawi. Though the assessment recorded some 
development in the financial sector, it concluded that not all components of the sector 
had improved and hence required more efforts to see larger improvement. In the same 
year, the Financial Inclusion in Malawi (FIMA) was also implemented by the 
government with the support from the United Nations Capital Development Fund 
(UNCDF). This aimed to develop an inclusive financial sector. This paved the way for 
the implementation of the National Strategy for Financial Inclusion (NSFI) implemented 
between 2010 and 2015 (UNCTAD, 2014). 
The Malawian government and other development partners have also benefited from 
information gathered by the FinScope Consumer Survey on financial inclusion in 
Malawi (2008 and 2014). This has revealed the extent to which individuals in Malawi 
are constrained in accessing financial services including credit. Although the report 
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observed some improvement between 2008 and 2014 in access to credit, access to credit 
increasing from 20 to 29 percent, much still needs to be done given that 71 percent of 
the sampled population had no access to any form of borrowing. According to the 2014 
report, out of these 29 percent only 1 percent used bank credit products and 3 percent 
used other formal credit institutions. The rest, 25 percent, borrowed from relatives and 
friends (10 percent) and other informal sources (15 percent) (FinMark Trust, 2014). 
Following the FinScope 2008 report, the government established a Financial Sector 
Development Strategy (FSDS) to address the issues arising highlighted by the report. 
Some of these issues included: limited access to financial services, high transaction cost, 
crowding-out of the private financial sector, capacity constraints and lack of 
coordination between the initiatives of the public and private financial sector. With 
support from the World Bank, DFID and USAID, the FSDS of the government of 
Malawi developed the Financial Sector Technical Assistance Project (FSTAP) and 
Financial Sector Deepening Trust (FSDT). These were commissioned with the end goal 
of increasing access to financial services in rural areas and largely increasing financial 
inclusion (UNCTAD, 2014). 
Data from the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) shows the existence of 
several formal financial institutions that support rural households through provision of 
agricultural credit or credit for non-farm economic activities (MIX 2014). Table 1.1 
presents some of these recognised formal institutions in the country reporting their 
mission statements, gross loan portfolio and number of active borrowers. The Malawi 
Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (MUSCCO) is an apex organisation that 
oversees the operations of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) in Malawi with 
over 58 members as at 2010. Similarly, the Malawi Microfinance Network (MAMN) is 
a legal association of financial institutions of which MUSCCO is a member. It is 
currently made up of 26 members. It has as its mission to create an enabling 
environment to develop a sustainable microfinance industry in Malawi through the 
participation of every stakeholders. A look at Table 1.1 reveals that some financial 
institutions like Concern Universal Microfinance Operations (CUMO) and FINCA have 
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clear mission reaching the poor and to improve their livelihoods with special focus on 
women. 
Some of these MFI credit programmes have faced some challenges which include 
financial mismanagement. For example, the government-owned Malawi Rural Finance 
Company (MRFC) was reported to be facing liquidation (Malawi Voice, 2013) and this 
could be attributed to evidence of an accumulated debt of about 2 billion Malawian 
Kwacha (MWK) 2 (Nyasa Times 2012). 


















To improve the lives of the rural poor by taking 
financial services to the doorsteps of remote and 
difficult to reach communities, with special focus 
on women. Vision: To create a viable regional 
rural microfinance network with capacity to meet 
the diverse financial needs of remote 
communities, as part of efforts to reduce poverty 





To provide fair credit to the social/economically 
disadvantaged and marginalized women, men, 
youth, churches, church groups and cooperatives 
for sustainable developments in witness to the 
Christian faith. 
2003 0.40 1.50 
FINCA FINCA provides financial services to the world's 
poorest families so they can create their own jobs, 
raise household incomes and improve their 
standard of living. We deliver these services 
through a global network of locally managed, 
self-supporting institutions. 
2015 9.36 51.41 
Finance Trust 
for the Self 
Employed 
(FITSE) 
To improve the standard of living and quality of 
life of the poor in Malawi through the provision 
of credit and training to enable them to establish 
and run viable businesses and through the 
promotion of microfinance services. 




To use microfinance to significantly reduce the 
depth and breadth of poverty in the communities 
within which we operate 





To provide quality financial services to the widest 
range of customers in a financially sustainable 
and responsible matter. 
2008 23.78 52.71 
Malawi Union 
of Savings 
To develop, promote and safeguard a safe and 
sound network of Savings and Credit 
2008 3.25 56.14 
                                                 
2
 Equivalent to £4.8m using an exchange rate of 1MWK = £0.0024 for 29 June 2012 (Exchange rates UK, 







Cooperatives (SACCOs) in Malawi capable of 
providing quality and affordable services to 
members in accordance with International 
Cooperatives Principles. 
NBS BANK We undertake to add value to all our stakeholders 
by offering an innovative range of banking 
products through efficient business processes and 
empowered and caring staff. 






Opportunity Bank Malawi is a commercial 
microfinance bank in Malawi.  








To develop a solid microfinance company that 
will provide premier financial services to its 
clients, delivered by committed and well-
motivated staff thereby creating value for its 
stakeholders. 
2009 2.24  
 Source: https://www.themix.org/mixmarket/countries-regions/Malawi   
One credit programme that is also being practiced in parts of Malawi is the Village 
Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA) (Ksoll et al., 2016). Village Savings and Loan 
Association (VSLA) is a collection of individuals who pool their savings together so as 
to have a lending fund for members. VSLA activities are based on the rotating savings 
and credits associations (RSCA) model which are practiced in many developing 
countries including rural Malawi. In this model individuals meet regularly, make 
contributions to a common pot which is then awarded to a different member of the 
group at each meeting making all members both lenders and borrowers (Ksoll et al., 
2016). The aim of VSLA is to provide simple savings and credit in communities with 
little or no access to formal financial services. As an improvement on RSCA, VSLAs 
give credit to members who repay the credit taken with interest after 1 to 2 months. 
After 10 to PRQWKV WKHDFFXPXODWHG IXQGLVVKDUHGRXW LQSHUFHQWDJHRIPHPEHUV¶
contributions. One successful credit group in Malawi is the Sanambe village savings and 
loans club which have supported several enterprises and job creation. Self Help Africa, 
an NGO in Malawi, has also provided training and technical support to several of such 
loan groups including Sanambe VSLA. According to Self Help Africa, individuals who 
have obtained credit through this village groups have been supported to buy livestock, 
process farm produced goods and establish small shops and stalls. The VSLA which has 
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come to be known as the Malawi savings and loans programme has accumulated a loan 
ERRNRIDOPRVW¼E\WKHHQGRf 2015 and continued to provide thousands of loans 
to help members with starting their own business and finding job opportunities at the 
village levels (Self Help Africa, 2016). 
Some projects have also been identified that specially target women to improve their 
financial literacy and access to credit among other objectives. One such project is 
carried out by CARE Australia, an international humanitarian aid organisation helping 
to fight global poverty with particular focus on women and girls. According to CARE 
Australia, women produce about 70 percent of food consumed by the household in 
Malawi, however, they lack access and control over their level of agricultural education, 
credit and improved technologies as compared to men (Footprints Network, n.d.). 
Footprints Network conclude that improving the financial literacy of women and linking 
them to financial services and institutions would lead to a general increase in their 
income and welfare translating to an improvement in the nutrition, healthcare and 
education of their households +HQFH &$5(¶V ILQDQFLDO OLWHUDF\ Sroject has aimed to 
train about 20,000 women in financial knowledge and business management by also 
linking village savings and loan associations in rural communities to banks, improve 
mobile phone banking technology and coverage in the beneficial districts (i.e. Lilongwe, 
Dowa and Kusungu) and also increase radio and video recordings to ease agricultural 
extension in remote areas in the districts (Footprints network, n.d.). 
However, credit sources in Malawi can be described as dualistic, which includes formal 
financial institutions, as discussed earlier, and informal lenders3. VSLA could also be 
regarded as an informal source of borrowing as this is not regulated by any financial 
                                                 
3 Formal loans according to the NSO report include any money borrowed from financial institutions which 
come with interest, security and conditions for payment that is well-laid down while informal loans may 
refer to borrowing from friends, relatives, private money-OHQGHUV PRVWO\ NQRZQ DV ³.DWDSLOD´ DQG
communal groups which have no formal agreement describing the terms of payment (NSO, 2012). The 





authority or under any formally recognised financial associations like MUSCCO. 
According to the IHS3 data and report, only 8.3 percent of households obtained credit, 
and among them over 44 percent of households borrow from relatives and neighbours, 
and 8.9 percent from money-lenders, but in general 57.4 percent borrow from the 
informal sector. Credit from the formal banks reached about 33.1 percent of households 
in the urban areas compared to only 6.4 percent in the rural areas. Further the Malawi 
Rural Finance Company limited which is a government owned institution meant to 
provide financial services to rural communities provided credit to just about 4.3 percent 
of the total borrows. This implies a lower outreach of the formal financial institutions in 
the rural credit market in Malawi despite the credit programmes mentioned above. 
The limited credit access in general poses several challenges to farm households 
including having to face low farm investments (Carter and Olinto 2003) leading to low 
farm output (Feder et al. 1990) and hence low farm profit (Carter 1989) which creates a 
vicious circle. For this reason, increasing access to financial services and markets will 
enable agriculture to become a viable economic activity for the long term (RSC 2012). 
1.3 Causes of credit constraint 
Conditions under which credit constraint may occur have been identified and explained 
in the credit market literature. These include the presence of information asymmetry, 
high application cost, high monitoring cost and demand for collateral assets (Ghatak and 
Guinnane, 1999; Levenson and Willard, 2000; Kon and Storey, 2003; Guirkinger and 
Boucher, 2008). According to the modern contract theory, formal institutions like banks 
usually decline giving credit to farm households in developing countries in the presence 
of the aforementioned problems (Petrick, 2005). These issues have been found to create 
market imperfections which adversely affect productivity and economic growth 
(Mushinski, 1999). The characteristics of rural farm households make it extremely 
difficult for banks and other formal lenders to operate efficiently in rural areas.  
Usually, formal lenders lack the necessary knowledge about their clients necessary to 
identify their credit worthiness. These could lead to issues like adverse selection, moral 
hazard, costly borrower verification and enforcement problems (Ghatak and Guinnane, 
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1999). As Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) explain, under moral hazards, borrowers tend to 
have unobservable characteristics which affect their likelihood to pay back loans. In 
DGGLWLRQ ERUURZHUV¶ DFWLRQV RU LQDFWLRQV GHWHUPLQH WKH OHYHO RI UHWXUQ RQ WKHLU IDUP
production as they could misappropriate the loan received if there was no collateral 
UHTXLUHPHQW )XUWKHU XQGHU FRVWO\ ERUURZHU¶V VWDWH YHULILFDWLRQ EDQNV GR QRW RIIHU
credit irrespective of worthiness. Finally, lenders may be faced with credit contract 
enforcement issues when borrowers default. Lenders usually are limited in their ability 
to impose contract sanctions on defaulters and this also prevents them from giving out 
loans. 
1.4 Impact of household farm credit on rural farm household outcomes 
It is a well-documented fact that rural farm households have inadequate capital and also 
have limited access to credit. As Feder (1985) states, agricultural output is only realised 
at the end of the cultivation period but before then capital and variable inputs are 
required for the various farm activities. In the absence of adequate capital, access to 
production credit could be essential for farm productivity. Consequently, access to credit 
GRHV QRW RQO\ DIIHFW IDUP SURGXFWLYLW\ EXW DOVR YDULRXV UXUDO KRXVHKROGV¶ HFRQRPLF
outcomes such as consumption, health, education, income, food security, poverty and 
inequality. It is also likely that the improvement in one household outcome could lead to 
improvement in another; they are often interlinked, for example poverty and inequality 
or productivity and food security.  
Several studies have examined the effect of credit access or household credit constraint 
on rural farm households in developing countries. There is evidence of the positive 
impact credit have on some outcomes, though the opposite has also been found. This 
section reviews some relevant and recent empirical studies to reveal what has been 
documented. The outcomes are mainly focused on farm productivity, consumption and 
inequality as they are the main issues tackled by this thesis; although in some cases 
some broader studies are reviewed as well. 
Khandker and Faruqee (2003) examined the impact formal credit (specifically from the 
Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan), has on the welfare of rural farm 
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households in Pakistan. The study employed a two-stage method to solve the issue of 
endogeneity in borrowing before estimating its impact on household welfare. The 
household welfare outcomes that were examined included annual consumption, crop 
production cost, net production output, non-land assets, male and female labour supply. 
The results showed that an increase in formal borrowing increased the welfare of four 
out of six of the outcomes. Consumption increased by 0.04 percent, production cost, 
agricultural production and female labour supply all increased by almost 1 percent as 
borrowing was increased by 10 percent. On a whole, smallholder farmers had a higher 
welfare gain than the medium and large holders. Given that majority of farmers in 
Malawi are also smallholders, it could be argued that some positive impact could also be 
realised as a result of improved credit access of farm households in Malawi. However, 
some difference still exist as the Pakistani study only looks at a formal source of 
lending; also, smallholders cultivated on average up to 5.1 hectares of land compared to 
less than one hectare of land cultivated by smallholder farmers in Malawi.  
6LPLODUO\ *XLUNLQJHU DQG %RXFKHU¶V  VWXG\ LQ 3HUX VRXJKW WR LQYHVWLJDWH WKH
impact of credit constraint on farm productivity. Their study uses a panel data and 
applies a switching regression model to solve the problem of selection and unobserved 
heterogeneity. It uses an expanded definition of credit constraint (quantity rationed, 
transaction cost rationed and risk rationed credit) in their analysis. They found that 
FRQVWUDLQHG KRXVHKROGV¶ SURGXFWLYLW\ ZDV DIIHFWHG E\ KRXVHKROGV¶ HQGRZPHQW RI ODQG
and liquidity, while these endowments had no or little positive endowment effect for 
unconstrained households. Further, they found that credit constrained households were 
about 26 percent less productive. Given that households are poor and cultivating on 
average about a hectare of land, it is expected that any extra endowments would play a 
significant role in the productivity of both constrained and unconstrained rural 
households in Malawi. However, it is expected that unconstrained households would be 
more productive than the constrained households. 
Using a switching regression model, Freeman, et al. (1998) investigated the impact of 
credit on productivity of dairy farms in Ethiopia and Kenya. They used excess demand 
for loans and rejection of borrowers by the lender as the definition for credit rationing. 
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They concluded that farmers benefitted from the formal source of credit as they were 
able to invest in crossbreed cows which enhanced their milk productivity. The study 
proxy credit with investment in crossbred diary and found that for unconstrained 
households the marginal return of a 1 percent increase in credit increased productivity 
by about 0.4 percent in Ethiopia and 0.9 percent in Kenya. Hence, credit is evidenced to 
be an essential tool for milk production in these countries. Ayaz et al. (2011) in their 
study using a dummy variable to capture whether a farmer had obtained credit or not, 
found that among other variables, access to credit increased the technical efficiency of 
farms by about 0.039 percent in Pakistan.  
Using direct elicitation of information on semi-formal credit market access and 
participation from households, Ali and Deininger (2012) were able to categorise 
households into credit constrained and unconstrained households in rural Ethiopia. 
Households that were found to be quantity rationed, transaction cost rationed or risk 
rationed were categorised as credit constrained. With location being an influencing 
IDFWRU KRXVHKROGV¶ SURGXFWLYLW\ ZDV DIIHFWHG LQ VXUSOXV SURGXFLQJ DUHDV VXFK WKDW
productivity could increase by 11.4 percentage points if credit constrained was 
eliminated. However, households in drought prone areas as well as food insecure areas 
were unaffected by their credit constrained status as they rather practised livestock 
rearing than crop production, and credit was only for crops. In a similar study, Ali et al. 
(2014) examined the effect of a household credit constraint status on their choice of 
income diversification and on agricultural productivity in rural Rwanda. Removing 
household credit constraint increased agricultural productivity by 17 percent. This was 
based in the semi-formal credit sector of rural Rwanda. 
A common observation from most of the microeconomic studies mentioned above is 
that a qualitative approach of defining credit rationing was used since households were 
directly asked to provide information about their credit market involvement. Further to 
WKLV GHILQLWLRQV RI µFUHGLW FRQVWUDLQW¶ GLIIHUHG IURP RQH VWXG\ WR WKH RWKHU DQG WKLV
complicates comparison of results. This thesis utilised a qualitative research approach 
which defined a household as credit constrained if that household had been denied credit 
or discouraged from applying. Majority of studies have been based on formal and/or 
15 
 
semi-formal credit sectors. This may make comparison to the findings of this current 
study challenging as there is no differentiation between formal, semi-formal or informal 
credit in this study. There is no differentiation in this thesis because households that are 
discouraged from applying for credit do not state which sector they would have applied 
to. The potential problem of endogeneity caused by the selection process that leads to 
the characterisation of credit constrained and unconstrained households is recognised in 
the majority of previous studies and the researchers have resolved this issue through the 
adoption of an appropriate econometric method. The endogenous switching model was 
the most commonly used method of estimation. It is also employed in the research 
reported later in this thesis to investigate the impact credit constraint has on farm food 
productivity and consumption (in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively). 
In a cross-country study, Kai and Hamori (2009) examined the effect of microfinance on 
inequality in 61 countries. They concluded that while credit constraints were a major 
cause for high levels of income inequality in most developing nations and that credit 
provision had the influence of reducing inequality. This makes it a useful tool in 
bridging the gap between the poor and the rich. In a related study, Hermes (2014) again 
found that credit reduced income inequality among the rich and the poor in developing 
countries; albeit a small impact. This was also a cross-country study of a large number 
of developing countries. Clarke et al. (2006), using credit as a proxy for financial 
development, also concluded that in the long run inequality falls with the improvement 
in financial development. Beck et al. (2004) came to a similar conclusion that financial 
development was capable of lowering income inequality. 
A limited number of studies have been carried out in Malawi on the impact of access to 
credit on income, welfare, food security and technology adoption. Diagne and Zeller 
(2001) examine the effect access to credit has on farm and non-farm income and also on 
household food security. The findings from the study, however, did not identify whether 
an improvement in the access to credit is an effective way of reducing poverty. One 
main reason was that the portfolio of the credit given was limited to providing high cost 
fertilizers for the production of hybrid maize. Other reasons were because of insufficient 
rainfall and scarcity of cultivable land. The study, therefore, drew some conclusions 
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calling for a more equitable distribution of land and to encourage the use of the available 
lands efficiently. Further, financial institutions were encouraged to diversify their loan 
portfolios to incorporate other crops and also provide off-farm activity loans. Financial 
institutions in providing loans should take into consideration household constraints and 
demands, so that the contribution of credit to household welfare would be effective. 
Thus, for any impact to be made, lenders should also look at the other needs and 
concerns of farmers, and design credit programs that meet their needs.  
In an earlier study, Diagne (1999) found that access to formal credit had a marginal 
effect on household income. The access to formal credit was complemented by a 
reduction in access to informal credit. The paper concluded that the environment needed 
for a formal credit sector to have a significant impact on the rural population of Malawi 
was absent. Using a stochastic frontier analysis, Diagne (2002) also examined the 
impact of credit access on maize and tobacco production in Malawi. The study revealed 
that current household borrowers had lower yield per hectare of hybrid maize compared 
to previous borrowers despite the increase in input intensity. This could be because 
previous borrowers could have had higher return the year they borrowed and reinvested 
it in the current year. This may be seen as a dynamic gain. However, comparing to those 
who never accessed credit, current household borrowers obtained higher yields.  
In another related study, Hazarika and Alwang (2003) examined the effect of access to 
credit and size of plot on the cost efficiency among smallholder tobacco farmers in 
Malawi. The study adopted a stochastic frontier analysis to estimate the farm-specific 
cost inefficiency. They found that cultivation of tobacco was less cost inefficient. 
+RZHYHUXVLQJKRXVHKROGV¶FUHGLWOLPLWDWFUHGLWRUJDQLVDWLRQVDVWKHPHDVXUHRIFUHGLW
they found that access to credit had an undesirable effect on cost efficiency which was 
rather inconsistent to a previous study done by Diagne (2002) and Zeller et al. (1997) 
who found a positive impact of the access to credit on the tobacco growing smallholders 
in Malawi. Hazarika and Alwang (2003) noted that the valuable outcome of a higher 
WREDFFR SORW VL]H RQ FRVW LQHIILFLHQF\ ZDV HURGHG E\ WKH KRXVHKROGV¶ DFFHVV WR FUHGLW
although it was likely to improve tobacco cultivation along the extensive margin. 
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Matita and Chirwa (2009) examined the causes of the differential in the rural-urban 
welfare inequalities in Malawi. The study uses the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) and Nachado-
Mata (2005) methods to decompose welfare gap between the rural and urban areas of 
Malawi using the second round of the Integrated Household Survey of Malawi. Among 
their findings, they found that socio-economic and demographic characteristics 
influenced household welfare in both rural and urban areas. Further, the difference in 
household endowments contributed more to the welfare inequality gap between the two 
locations. However, in an important finding related to the rural area, they identified that 
a dummy variable capturing access to credit contributed to a welfare increase of about 
9.38 percent. This showed that credit was significantly important in improving 
household welfare including smoothing consumption.  
Those studies which have focused on Malawi, with the exception of that by Matita and 
Chirwa (2009), are based on data collected by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) in 1995 from 404 households in 45 villages in 5 districts in Malawi. 
This makes evidence from these studies not representative of the entire country and 
quite old for advising current policy. Financial inclusion and development policies have 
EHHQLPSOHPHQWHGHYHUVLQFHDQGWKHVHFRXOGVXUHO\KDYHDIIHFWHGKRXVHKROGV¶DFFHVVWR
credit and impact. Hence, there is a need for further research to provide new evidence 
using a national representative survey which most of the previous studies lack which is 
done in this thesis.  
1.5 Data 
The study uses data from the 2010/2011 wave of the Malawi Living Standards 
Measurement Survey (i.e. Malawi Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3)) collected 
by the National Statistical Office (NSO) of Malawi from March 2010 to March 2011. 
The first survey was carried out in 1990 and was known as the Household Expenditure 
and Small Scale Economic Activities (HESSEA). The second (IHS1) and the third 
(IHS2) of these surveys were conducted in 1997/98 and 2004/05 respectively. The 
objective of the IHS3 was to collect and provide comprehensive information on key 
welfare and socio-economic indicators to monitor the progress of the Malawi Growth 
and Development Strategy and that of the then Millennium Development Goals. Data 
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collected included information on education, health, labour, agriculture, food security 
and credit among others. 
The IHS3 is a nationally representative household survey. According to the IHS3 
reported, the survey was statistically designed to be representative at the national, 
district, urban and rural levels. This therefore enables the provision of reliable estimates 
for these levels. The sampling frame used for the IHS3 was based on the listing 
information and cartography from the 2008 Malawi Population and Housing Census. 
This consist of the North, Centre and South of Malawi which are the three major regions 
of the country and these are further stratified into the rural and urban strata. The urban 
stratum was made up of 4 cities (namely Lilongwe city, Blantyre city, Mzuzu City and 
Zomba Municipality) and 27 districts from the rural stratum. The target population for 
the survey included individual households and persons living in those households within 
all the districts except Likoma and those in institutions such as hospitals, prisons and 
military barracks.  
The survey adopted a two-stage stratified sampling design. The first stage involved 
selecting the primary sampling units (PSUs) which were the census enumeration areas 
(EAs). Due to the variability in the number of households for each EA, probability 
proportional to size (PPS) was used to select the EAs within each district at the first 
sampling stage. The PSUs were in total 768 enumerations areas (EAs) across the 
country. After the selection of the IHS3 sample EAs, household listing was done in each 
sample EA which provided the sampling frame for the second stage selection of the 
households. To select the households, a random systematic sampling was used to select 
16 primary households and 5 replacement households from the listing of households for 
each sample EA. These households were replaced due to reasons such as dwelling not 
found or destroyed, or some households refusing not to partake in the survey among 
other reasons. Though the original sample design meant that 12,288 households were to 
be selected, 17 households were not recovered during the second visits of the field 
teams. Deleting these households implies that a total of 12,271 remaining households 
were obtained implying a response rate of 99.9 percent. 
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Four types of questionnaires were designed for the IHS3. These included the household 
questionnaire to gather socio-economic data at the household level and individuals 
living in this households, agricultural questionnaire, fishery and then the community 
questionnaires. The household and community questionnaire were designed after the 
IHS2 and IHS1 questionnaire. The agriculture questionnaire however expanded on that 
of the IHS2 agricultural modules. Data was collected through a face to face interview 
using the questionnaire guides.  
For the purpose of this thesis, the sample was narrowed to rural farm households. There 
were 9,477 rural households who lived in the rural areas and were also agricultural 
households. This accounted for about 77 percent of the total sample and 94 percent of 
rural households. 
1.6 Description of variables 
Table 1.2 presents all the variables from the IHS3 data included in the three empirical 
studies including those that were derived from other variables. These include 
characteristics of the household head, the household, farm and community 
characteristics. These variables are further explained into details in the various chapters 
in which they are used especially on how they relate to the dependent variables of the 
respective chapters. Among these variables include: 
1. Gender of the household head. This is binary variable which is equal to 1 if the 
head of the household is male and 0 if a female. 
2. Age and age-squared of the household head. The age is a continuous variable 
capturing the age of the household head in years at the date of the interview 
whiles the squared of the age is meant to capture the life-cycle effect. 
3. Household size is measured as the number of members within a particular 
household. 
4. Dependency ratio captures the ratio of the number of dependents aged between 0 




5. Illness is obtained from the health section of the data. This is a binary data 
grouped as 1 if any member of the household had suffered any sickness or injury 
in the last two weeks and 0 otherwise. 
6. Location captures the geographical division of the country. This is a categorical 
variable with 1 if household is in the rural north, 2 if located in the rural centre 
and 3 if located in the rural south of the country. 
7. Agro-ecological zones are meant to influence farm production. Malawi is 
divided into 4 ecological zones and this is categorised as 1 Tropic-warm/sub 
arid, 2 Tropic-warm/ sub humid, 3 Tropic-cool/semi-arid and 4 Tropic-cool/sub 
humid. 
8. Educational level is the level of formal education that the head of the household 
had obtained. This is also a categorical variable with 1 if no education, 2 primary 
level of education and 3 higher level of education, that is secondary or tertiary 
level of education. 
9. Network or social group is a continuous variable capturing the number of social 
groups that the members of a household are involved in. While the agricultural 
network is a binary variable measured as 1 if the household is in any agricultural 
group or 0 otherwise. 
10. Land or farm size is the hectare of land that the household cultivated during the 
raining season. The study used the Global Positioning System (GPS) 
measurements of land provided in the data. 
11. Land tenure captures the type of land ownership or acquisition of the land 
cultivated by the household. Land tenure is captured as 1 where the land is 
inherited or purchased, and 0 where it was rented or granted by local leaders for 
cultivation. 
12. Home assets are the value of the consumer durable goods of the households 
measured in Malawi Kwacha. This includes the value of goods such as 
mortar/pestle, bed, table, chair, television, sewing machine, bicycle, etc. 
13. Farm assets are the value of production assets such as farm implements, 
machinery and structures or buildings used on the farms of the households. 
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These include the values of hoe, axe, sprayer, ox cart, tractor, livestock kraal, pig 
sty, etc. 
14. Livestock is the total value of livestock owned by the household. 
15. Remittances is the total value of all food, in-kind assistance and cash received by 
the household from their children living outside the household. The binary form 
of the variable was also used, but not in the same chapter, and captures whether 
the household had received any help in the form of food, in-kind assistance and 
or cash from their biological children residing outside the household. 
16. House type is a categorical variable that captures the general type of construction 
materials used for the dwelling of the households. This is categorised as 1 for 
permanent (mostly modern materials like iron sheets and concrete), 2 semi-
permanent, and 3 traditional materials (such as grass and mud). 
17. Distance to an MFI is defined as the distance to the nearest place where there is a 
micro finance institution. This is measured in kilometres (km). 
18. Distance to Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) 
is also measured as the distance to the nearest permanent ADMARC market 
measured in km. 
19. Financial institution is a continuous variable that captured the number of formal 
financial institutions in each district. This variable was however, taken from the 
microfinance exchange laboratory website. 
20. Three dummy variables are used to measure whether households faced any form 
of shocks. The first is natural shocks which include droughts, floods, bushfires 
etc. The second is agricultural shocks which include pest and crop diseases, hike 
in input prices, etc. And finally, household shocks which include the break-up of 
a household, death of a bread winner, theft, etc.  
21. Hired labour is a continuous variable. This was the number of individuals from 
outside the household that were hired by the household to help in the various 
aspect of the land cultivation and harvest. 
22. Extension officer was captured as a dummy variable to capture the presence of 
an extension officer in a community. 
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23. 7HPSHUDWXUH ZDV REWDLQHG IURP WKH ³JHR-YDULDEOHV´ VHFWLRQ RI WKH GDWD ZKLFK
contains bioclimatic variables derived from monthly temperature and rainfall 
values. Temperature seasonality (standard deviation *100) used in this study 
captures the coefficient of variation of mean monthly temperatures. Temperature 
is a good influence on crop productivity. 
24. A dummy variable was used to measure whether a farm household cultivated any 
other crop apart from maize which is the main staple in Malawi. 
25. Two dummy variables were used to identify whether a household used organic 
fertilizer or inorganic fertilizer respectively.  
26. Total value of inputs used for crop cultivation was also measured. The inputs 
considered included fertilizers, seeds, weedicides and pesticides. The value of 
the inputs was divided by the hectare of land cultivated hence the variable cost 
per hectare.  
27. A dummy variable was also used to capture whether the household borrowed 
from a formal or an informal lender. Formal lenders were captured as formal 
financial institutions including banks, microfinance institutions (MFIs), 
cooperatives and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Informal lenders 
included families, friends, church, business owner, traditional money lenders 
SRSXODUO\NQRZQDV³.DWDSLOD´LQ0DODZL 
28. The main dependent variables used in the first empirical chapter of the thesis 
included; need credit, apply credit and denied credit. These were dummy 
variables generated from a set of questions from the credit section of the data. 
The dummy for need credit was measured as 1 if the household was discouraged 
from applying for credit or applied for credit and 0 if they did not need credit. 
Apply credit was captured as 1 if the household applied for credit and 0 if the 
household was discouraged from applying. Denied credit was also measured as 1 
LI WKHKRXVHKROG¶VDSSOLFDWLRQZDV UHMHFWHGE\ WKH OHQGHURU LI WKHFUHGLWZDV
obtained. Details of the construction of these variables are presented in the data 
section of Chapter 2. 
29. Credit constrained was also one of the dependent variables in both the Chapter 3 
and 4 of this thesis. A household was credit constrained if they were discouraged 
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from applying or their applications were rejected. While credit unconstrained 
household was a household that did not need credit, or was successful in 
obtaining credit. 
30. Output/yield per hectare was the second dependent variable in the second 
empirical chapter which was the ratio of the total value of food crops harvested 
per household to the hectare of land cultivated. It represents the productivity of 
the household.  
31. Consumption was the second dependent variable used in Chapter 4. The 
consumption variable was measured as the ratio of total real annual consumption 
per household (already calculated in the data) to household equivalent ratio. The 
total real annual consumption variable was calculated from obtaining the value 
of both food, including beverages, and non-food items that were deemed to 
contribute to welfare. The non-food component included consumption of 
alcohol, tobacco, clothing, footwear, imputed housing rent, per capita utilities, 
regular maintenance of housing, health, education, entertainment, personal care, 
transport, communication and the use of durable goods.  
Table 1.2: Description of variables 
Variable name Variable type Description 
Gender of head Binary Gender of the household head (1= male, 0=female) 
Age of head Continuous Age of household head in years 
Head Age-squared Continuous Age squared captures the life cycle effect. 
Household size Continuous Number of members in the household 
Dependency ratio Continuous Ratio of the number of dependents aged 0-14 and 
over 65 to those between 15 and 64 within the 
household 
Marital Status Binary 1 Married, 0 otherwise 
Illness Binary 1 suffered illness, 0 otherwise 
Location Categorical 1 rural north, 2 rural centre and 3 rural south 
Agro-ecological zones Categorical 1 Tropic-warm/sub arid, 2 Tropic-warm/ sub humid, 
3 Tropic-cool/semiarid and 4 Tropic-cool/sub humid 
Education level Categorical 1 no education, 2 Primary, 3 Higher education 
Network/social group Continuous Number of networks households are involved in 
Network (agric.) Binary 1 if belong to an agricultural network, 0 otherwise  
Land size  Continuous Total land size cultivated in the rainy season in 
hectares. 
Land tenure Binary 1 = land title (secured) 0 = no land title 
Home assets  Continuous Value of home assets in Malawi Kwacha (MWK) 
Farm assets Continuous Value of farm assets (MWK) 
Livestock Continuous Value of livestock (MWK) 
Remittance Continuous Remittances sent to the household by children living 
outside the household 
Remittances  Binary 1 = Receives remittances, 0 = otherwise 
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House type Categorical 1 = Permanent structure, 2 = Semi-permanent 
structure and 3 = Traditional structure. 
MFI Distance Continuous Distance to the nearest microfinance in km 
ADMARC distance Continuous Distance to the nearest Agricultural Development and 
Marketing Corporation in km 
Financial Institutions Continuous Number of financial institutions in each district 
Shock (natural) Binary Experienced natural shock (floods, drought, etc.) 
Shock (agric.) Binary Experienced agricultural shock (price increase in 
inputs etc.) 
Shock (household) Binary Experienced household shock (death or birth, etc.) 
Hired Labour Continuous Head count of labour hired onto farm 
Extension officer Binary 1 if there is an extension officer in the community, 0 
otherwise 
Temperature Continuous Temperature seasonality (standard deviation*100): 
the difference between the annual maximum and 
minimum temperature  
Other crops Binary 1 if other crops apart from maize was cultivate, 0 
otherwise 
Organic fertilizer Binary 1 if organic fertilizer was used, 0 otherwise 
Inorganic fertilizer Binary 1 if inorganic fertilizer was used, 0 otherwise 
Variable cost per hectare Continuous Total cost of inputs including fertilizers, seeds and 
cost of transporting these inputs in Malawi Kwacha 
Need Credit Binary 1 discouraged borrowers, rejected borrowers or 
successful borrowers, 0 no need for credit 
Apply Credit Binary 1 rejected or successful borrower, 0 discouraged 
borrower 
Denied Credit Binary 1 denied borrower, 0 successful borrower 
Output per hectare Continuous  Output per hectare (value of all food crop cultivated 
per hectare of land cultivated in raining season) in 
Malawian Kwacha (MWK) 
Consumption Continuous Real annual household consumption per adult 
equivalence in Malawi Kwacha 
Credit Constrained Binary 1 = Credit constrained, 0 = Credit Unconstrained 
 
1.7 Outline of the thesis 
The outline of the study will be as follows: The next chapter, Chapter 2 begins the first 
of the series of empirical studies presented in this thesis. Due to the importance of the 
discouraged borrowers explained earlier, the objective of the first empirical study in this 
thesis is to identify the demographic and socio-economic factors that explain the 
importance of discouraged borrowers. A model is constructed to provide an 
understanding of households need for credit, discouragement or decision to apply for 
credit and lastly, characteristics of those who obtained or are denied credit. The analysis 
uses a three-step sequential estimation model to identify the characteristics of these 
borrowing decision outcomes. This follows a trivariate probit model with double sample 
selection for the econometric analysis. The analysis contributes to the rethinking and 
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expansion of the definition of credit constraint to include those discouraged from 
applying for credit. Further, there are limited studies that consider discouraged 
borrowers in the access to credit literature in sub-Saharan Africa. This study therefore, 
brings to light the prevalence of discouraged borrowers based on a case study of Malawi 
and contributes to filling this gap in our understanding. 
Improving the productivity of farm households, access to credit has been recognised as 
one important tool for relieving the binding liquidity constraint of farmers, as noted 
earlier. The second empirical aspect studied in the thesis, that is the third chapter, 
therefore determines the effect of farm household credit constraints on crop 
productivity. An endogenous switching model is employed to simultaneously determine 
household credit constraint status and the impact on farm productivity. In defining credit 
constraint, the study takes into consideration discouraged borrowers setting this work 
apart from other recent studies on the topic that have been conducted on Malawi.  
Different liquidity constraints and productivity bring about inequalities among farm 
households. The objective of the research reported in third empirical analysis, which 
happens to be the fourth chapter, is to determLQH WKH HIIHFW RI KRXVHKROGV¶ FUHGLW
constraint on household consumption inequality. This study employs three 
decomposition techniques in order to provide analyses of the factors that contribute to 
differential consumption patterns both within and between credit constrained and 
unconstrained groups. Firstly, this novel empirical investigation helps to identify where 
consumption inequality is more prevalent, that is, whether between the groups or within 
the groups and to assess the degree to which these outcomes are a consequence of 
discrimination, in its most general form, in underdeveloped credit markets. Secondly, 
since a multivariate regression analysis is used in two of the decomposition analyses, 
major factors that contribute to an increase or decrease in consumption inequality are 
identified for the within group inequality and between group inequality. This generates 
insights that may help policy makers to focus on the most important factors that could 
be taken into consideration when drawing policy to reduce the consumption inequality 
gap in Malawi.  
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Chapter 5 presents the general conclusions of the study. It summarises the main insights 
of the study and their policy implications and underlines some limitations and 





CHAPTER 2  
)$50+286(+2/'6¶$&&ESS TO CREDIT: WHO NEEDS AND WHO 
GETS? EVIDENCE FROM MALAWI 
2.1 Introduction 
Credit has proven to be a necessary tool for economic development affecting positively 
the welfare of households and individuals (Atieno, 1995). Studies have laid down three 
main paths through which credit can affect the welfare of households. Firstly, reducing 
the capital constraints whereby farmers could have access to agricultural inputs at the 
right time of production; secondly, making farmers able to cope with and manage risky 
choices which they would not have considered in the absence of credit; and lastly 
making it possible to smooth consumption throughout the year without rationing (Zeller 
et al. 1997; Diagne and Zeller, 2001). 
Malawi is among the poorest countries in the world; it moved down the Human 
Development Index from the 160th position in 2009 to the 170th in 2012 out of 185 
countries (UNDP, 2013). Household access to income opportunities, services and assets 
are extremely unevenly distributed across the country, translating to the high level of 
poverty in the southern part of Malawi while households in the central part of the 
country are comparatively less poor. 
It has been established that farm households, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Malawi in particular, are credit constrained (Diagne and Zeller, 2001). Shocks to 
household livelihood forces households to take adverse decisions such as sell their 
assets, withdraw children from school and also reduce their food consumption (IFAD, 
2011). In the rural areas of Malawi, where nearly 90 percent of households are 
employed in agriculture with little economic diversification, only 12 percent manage to 
access credit (IFAD, 2011). This percentage does not indicate whether those who had 
access to credit obtained the full amount they had applied for. 
Data from the Malawi Integrated Household Survey for 2010/11 shows a slightly higher 
proportion of successful borrowers than denied borrowers, about 3.1 percent. Further, 
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there are a greater number of farm households who need credit but are unable to borrow 
due to, among other reasons, the fear of being denied. These non-applicants are termed 
as discouraged borrowers (Kon and Storey, 2003). According to Jappelli (1990), 
ignoring this group from the definition of credit constrained households bias their 
estimation downward.  
0RVWHPSLULFDO VWXGLHV WKDWKDYH ORRNHGDW IDUPKRXVHKROGV¶DFFHVV WRFUHGLWRUFUHGLW
constraints in sub-Saharan African have generally focused largely on those who actually 
apply for credit (Diagne and Zeller, 2001; Diagne et al., 2000; Hazarika and Alwang, 
2003 and Hazarika and Sarangi, 2008). Others have also looked at the source of the 
credit, whether it is from a formal or informal source (Diagne, 1999; Jain, 1999; 
Chakrabarty and Chaudhuri, 2001 and Khandker and Faruqee, 2003). The policy 
implications of these studies are therefore ignoring households that are discouraged 
from borrowing. Considering the potential bias in these studies it is necessary to attempt 
to include discouraged borrowers in studies on access to credit.  
This study, considers farm households who need credit; those who are discouraged from 
borrowing; and those who receive or are denied credit. The objective of this paper is to 
identify demographic and socio-economic factors that distinguish these groups. In 
particular, firstly, to identify the factors that explain why some farm households need 
credit while others do not; secondly, to investigate the factors that determine 
discouragement versus credit application; and lastly, to identify the characteristics of 
successful and unsuccessful borrowers. The study uses data from the 2010/11 wave of 
the Malawi Integrated Household Survey adopting a three-step sequential estimation 
technique. The study follows studies by Cole and Sokolyk (2016) and Brown et al. 
(2011) who study small business in the US and across Europe respectively. 
The rest of the study is organised as follows: the next section looks at theories and 
empirical liWHUDWXUHRQIDUPKRXVHKROG¶VDFFHVVWRFUHGLWDQGGLVFRXUDJHGERUURZHUVWKH
third section focuses on data and methodology. The fourth section presents the results 
and the final section concludes with some recommendations. 
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2.2 Previous studies on rural credit 
2.2.1  Access to credit 
7KHUHKDYHEHHQVHYHUDOVWXGLHVRQUXUDOKRXVHKROGV¶RUIDUPKRXVHKROGV¶GHPDQGIRU
or access to credit. The review of previous studies has shown two main approaches that 
have been used in the measurement of the access to credit (Diagne et al., 2000). The first 
is when there is violation of the life cycle hypothesis brought due to the credit constraint 
(Hall, 1979 and Deaton, 1992). These studies have often used data on household 
consumption or income to test for the existence of householGV¶FRQVWUDLQWWRFUHGLW+LJK
dependence on transitory income indicates that the household is credit constrained 
(Browning and Lusardi, 1996). According to Jappelli (1990), among other limitations of 
this approach, consumers who were credit constrained were unobservable. 
The second approach is through a direct collection of information on credit from 
households. This is done through a survey whereby households directly answer 
questions on their credit activities in terms of access and participation, thereby drawing 
inference on the possibility of a household being credit constrained (Diagne et al., 
2000). Several studies using data from household surveys have used this approach to 
GHWHUPLQHKRXVHKROGV¶FUHGLWFRQVWUDLQW (Jappelli, 1990; Feder et al., 1990; Zeller, 1994; 
Schrieder and Heidhues, 1995; Zeller et al., 1997 and Barham et al., 1996). However, 
such studies are not without limitations. They are unable to provide or predict the extent 
to which households are credit constrained (Diagne et al., 2000). The study by Diagne et 
al. (2000) extended the direct approach with information on how much farm households 
receive against how much they applied for, thus attempting to find the level of credit 
constraints. 
Following this empirical approach, previous studies have found some factors that 
determine household access to formal or informal credit. Household demographic and 
economic characteristics were found to play an important role in explaining access to 
credit. A study by Mohammed (2003) which looked at access to formal and quasi-
formal credit by small farmers and fishermen in Zanzibar, found factors such as sex, 
age, education and income level to be important in explaining access to credit. The study 
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concludes that there is limited access to credit in Zanzibar and that women are 
discriminated against in the credit market. 
Similarly, Okurut (2006) found significant effects of factors such as age, sex, education, 
household size, location, race and expenditure on the accessibility of informal, semi-
formal and formal credit over the period 1995 and 2000 in South Africa. He argues for 
an improved access to a credit market that is organized in a way that the poor and blacks 
could have easy access. Shimamura and Lastarria (2010) also noticed that female 
household heads were less likely to participate in credit programs in rural Malawi. The 
age of the household head, a larger household size and residing in an area with a credit 
program increased the probability of participation. They found that smaller household 
size which meant limited household labour supply was unable to stimulate credit 
activities limiting the availability of credit to the poor. 
In addition to some household characteristics, Vaessen (2001) found that the purpose of 
taking informal credit, access to information and recommendations through networks 
were significant in explaining access to credit in the northern part of Nicaragua. 
Dallimore and Mgimeti (2003) also noticed the negative influence of application cost 
ZKLFKLQFOXGHVORQJGLVWDQFHVDQGWUDQVSRUWFRVWRQUXUDOKRXVHKROGV¶DFFHVVWRIRUPDO
financial services since these services are mostly situated in urban areas. 
 In general, this study includes most of these factors in the analyses of those who need 
credit, discouraged borrowers and those denied credit. 
2.2.2 Discouraged borrowers 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argued that credit rationing will still persist even in an 
equilibrium loan market mainly due to information asymmetry. Banks do not have all 
the information on all of their customers, and especially potential customers, so they use 
screening methods such as increasing interest rates and/or collateral requirements to 
detect bad borrowers from good ones. Three situations may occur from this: (1) 
potential borrowers may borrow less than they initially wanted; (2) some borrowers may 




Until recently, studies on access to credit have given little attention to discouraged 
borrowers because they do not make any loan application and also because they do not 
add to bank loan portfolio risk (Kon and Storey, 2003). However, through the review of 
available literature, studies on discouraged borrowers have become essential for three 
main reasons (Han et al., 2009). First, As found by Levenson and Willard (2000), 
Brown et al. (2011) and Freel et al. (2012), discouraged borrowers were identified to be 
twice as many as denied applicants. This, therefore, increases the number of credit 
constrained borrowers if discouraged borrowers are considered as credit constrained. 
Second, being discouraged may vary across some demographic characteristics of 
borrowers (Vos et al., 2007). Demographic characteristics such as gender or race may 
give information on discrimination in the credit market. Lastly, viewed as a positive 
effect mainly for lenders, discouragement is regarded as a self-rationing process 
whereby those who do not apply for credit upon self-assessment (concluding that they 
may not qualify) may be considered as bad borrowers (Kon and Storey, 2003). 
Jappelli (1990), in his study on credit constraint among households in the US economy, 
was probably the first to use the term discouraged borrowers. He identified discouraged 
borrowers in the presence of application cost as consumers with a high likelihood of 
being denied credit who do not apply because of the perception that they would not be 
successful. Kon and Storey (2003) attempt a theoretical study on discouraged borrowers 
and found that the magnitude of discouragement within an economy may depend on the 
following assumptions: screening errors of banks, magnitude of application costs and 
the degree by which formal interest rates charged by banks differ from what money 
lenders charge. However, their study restricts the definition to only creditworthy firms. 
Han et al. (2009) do not make any distinction between creditworthy and non-
creditworthy firms with the argument that it is empirically difficult to do that and 
therefore include both in their empirical study. Following on that, this study does not 
also distinguish between creditworthy and unworthy borrowers.  
Empirical studies on discouraged borrowers have mostly focused on households 
(Jappelli, 1990) or on small non-farm enterprises (Cole and Sokolyk, 2016; Freel et al., 
2012; Brown et al., 2011; Han et al., 2009 and Levenson and Willard, 2000). Cole and 
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Sokolyk (2016), using a bivariate probit selection model, find that discouraged firms are 
small in size, have very poor credit quality and are in urban areas. Concerning owner 
characteristics, owners of firms that were discouraged were much younger, had very 
poor credit quality (using owner bankruptcy and delinquencies as a form of measure) 
and had less wealth.  
Freel et al. (2012) identify the importance of increasing firm size and family ownership 
of business as factors reducing the likelihood of small and medium size firms being 
discouraged from borrowing in the UK. But on the other hand, discouraged firms were 
serially owned, were in the industry sector, provided knowledge-intensive service, had 
no banking relationship and had cost-focused strategies. 
Using US data on small firms, Han et al. (2009) examined the causes of discouragement 
and further tested the hypothesis that discouragement is an effective self-rationing 
mechanism. Using logit estimation, the study found that the owner and business 
characteristics affected discouragement. Factors such as firm size, use of financial 
VHUYLFHV RZQHUV¶ DJH DQG ZHDOWK ZHUH LGHQWLILHG WR EH VLJQLILFDQW LQ H[SODining 
discouragement. Further, they found that risky borrowers were more probable to be 
discouraged from applying therefore concluding that discouragement was a good self-
rationing tool. 
Other studies, such as Jappelli (1990) and Petrick (2004) combined denied applicants 
with discouraged borrowers as credit constrained borrowers with the assumption that 
they are homogenous. Jappelli (1990), using a probit estimation model, found that 
increase in age, income and wealth reduced the probability of being credit constrained. 
Also, being married, white, owning a home, possessing savings and residing in the 
North-Central USA reduced the probability to be credit constrained. However, an 
increase in the family size increased the likelihood of being credit constrained. With a 
similar estimation process, Petrick (2004) DOVRIRXQGWKDWWKHERUURZHUV¶UHSXWDWLRQDQG
individual characteristics of the household were important in determining credit access 
among farmers in Poland. 
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From this brief literature review it is clear that most of the studies analyse developed 
FRXQWULHV¶ VLWXDWLRQ $ QRWDEOH H[FHSWLRQ LV WKH VWXG\ E\ 5DWXUL DQG 6ZDP\ 
which analyses manufacturing firms in Zimbabwe. This leaves a gap in the literature on 
developing countries, especially on rural farm households. 
2.3 Data and method of analysis 
As already stated in Chapter 1, the study focused on only rural farm households. There 
were 9,477 rural households who lived in the rural areas and were also agricultural 
households. This accounted for about 77 percent of the total sample and 94 percent of 
rural households. Accounting for missing data for some households and excluding data 
on households who were still awaiting response on their credit application reduced the 
data from 9,477 of total rural farm households to 8,230. The sampling weights were 
applied to each descriptive statistics and econometric estimations so as obtain the right 
standard errors and estimated coefficients reliable.  
The key variables for this paper were extracted from the credit section of the survey. 
This section of the questionnaire contained, among others, three main questions on 
which this paper is centred which are similar to the questions used by Brown et al. 
(2011). These questions are: 4 
1. ³62YHUWKHSDVWPRQWKVGLG\RXor anyone else in this household borrow 
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2.3.1 Identifying Household Borrowing Status 
Following Cole and Sokolyk (2016) and Brown et al. (2011), three dependent variables 
were generated from the above questions, after categorising farm households into non-
borrowers, discouraged borrowers, rejected (denied) borrowers and successful 
(approved) borrowers: 
1. Non-borrowers (no-need) are farm households who did not take credit on the 
reason that they did not need credit. 
2. Discouraged borrowers are categorised as farm households who require or need 
credit but did not apply due to the following stated reasons: believed would be 
refused, too expensive, inadequate collateral, too much trouble for what is worth, 
and do not know any lender5. 
3. Rejected borrowers are farm households that applied for credit but were denied. 
4. Successful borrowers are farm households that applied for credit and were 
approved (either received the full amount or part of it). 
The dependent variables that were therefore generated from the above categorization 
include: 
- need credit: a dummy variable which equals one (1) for households that are 
discouraged borrowers, rejected borrowers or successful borrowers and zero (0) 
where the household is a non-borrower. 
                                                 
5
 Those who did not borrow because they did not like to be debt were dropped from the sample. Further, 
XQOHVVRWKHUZLVHVWDWHG WKRVHZKRFKRVH³RWKHU´ UHDVRQVZLWKRXWVSHFLI\LQJ WKHDFWXDO UHDVRQZHUHDOVR
dropped out of the sample as it was difficult to categorise them under any group. 
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- apply credit: a dummy variable equal to one (1) if the farm household is a 
rejected or successful borrower and zero (0) if the household is a discouraged 
borrower. 
- denied credit: a dummy variable equal to one (1) if the household is a denied 
borrower and zero (0) if a successful borrower. 
2.3.2 Modelling who needs and who gets credit 
The problem of the study can be conceptualised through a sequential decision process, 
where a rural farm household first desires (needs) to take credit, then either proceeds to 
apply for credit or may be discouraged from applying. Applicants may be either 
successful in their application or denied credit by the lender. The problem of this study 
is therefore conceptualised by a three-step sequential process represented by a binary 
response at each stage. The issue of sample selection is dealt with at the second and 
third stages. Therefore, this involves modelling a trivariate probit with double sample 
selection (TPDSS). This is conceptualized in Figure 2.1 below.  
The issue of selectivity bias may arise if a specific outcome of a unit of analysis (in this 
case rural farm households) is to be examined while ignoring the decision process they 
went through that resulted in the outcome (Fishe et al., 1981). In this case, the 
estimation of the denied-approved equation for households that applied for credit should 
also incorporate the decision of whether they needed credit or not. It is postulated that 





Figure 2.1: A sequential break down of credit access 
Following Terracol (2002) and Rosenman et al. (2010), the study considers three binary 
outcome variables ݕଵǡ ݕଶandݕଷ, whereby ݕଵכ is the unobserved expected utility that a 
rural farm household obtains from desiring or not needing credit,ݕଵ; ݕଶכis the 
unobserved expected utility obtained from applying for credit or being discouraged,ݕଶ; 
and lastly the unobserved expected utility obtained from being approved or denied 
credit,ݕଷ, isݕଷכ. The trivariate probit model is represented as: 
 
ݕ௝כ ൌ ௝ܺߚ௝ ൅ ௝߳ ǡ ݆ ൌ  ?ǡ  ?ǡ  ?  
 ݕଵ ൌ ൜  ?݂݅ݕଵכ ൐  ? ?݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ሺ݊݁݁݀ܿݎ݁݀݅ݐሻሺ݀݋݊ᇱݐ݊݁݁݀ܿݎ݁݀݅ݐሻ  
 ݕଶ ൌ ൜  ?݂݅ݕଶכ ൐  ? ?݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ሺܽ݌݌݈݅݁݀ሻሺ݀݅ݏܿ݋ݑݎܽ݃݁݀ሻ ǡ ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ݕଵ ൌ  ?  
 ݕଷ ൌ ൜ ?݂݅ݕଷכ ൐  ? ?݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ሺ݀݁݊݅݁݀ሻሺܽ݌݌ݎ݋ݒ݁݀ሻ ǡ ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ݕଵ ൌ  ?ܽ݊݀ݕଶ ൌ  ?  
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൭߳ଵ߳ଶ߳ଷ൱ ՜ ܰሺ ?ǡ ߑሻ 
For the scalar identification problem, the variances of the epsilons,߳௜, (i.e. the error 
terms) are assumed to be equal to 1. Also, at least one variable enters into ݕଵ equation 
which does not appear in ݕଶ and a second variable is also excluded in ݕଷ. These 
variables are chosen such that they are correlated with the dependent variable they 
appear with but not directly correlated to the equation from which they are excluded. 
Going by this process resolves the issue of identification in the selection process. 
Further, due to the sample selection issue, it is not possible to identify ܲሺݕଷȁݕଵ ൌ ?ሻǡ ሺܲݕଶȁݕଵ ൌ  ?ሻor ܲሺݕଷȁݕଵ ൌ  ?ǡ ݕଶ ൌ  ?ሻǤA close look at the model reveals two levels 
of sample selection and two levels of outcomes implying four types of categories. These 
include sequentially: 
1. Households that do not desire/need credit;  ݕଵ ൌ  ? 
2. Households that desire/need credit but are discouraged; ݕଵ ൌ  ?ǡ ݕଶ ൌ  ? 
3. Households that desire credit, apply and are approved; ݕଵ ൌ  ?ǡ ݕଶ ൌ  ?ǡ ݕଷ ൌ  ? 
4. Households that desire credit, apply but are denied; ݕଵ ൌ  ?ǡ ݕଶ ൌ  ?ǡ ݕଷ ൌ  ? 
Following this, full information is obtained for two types of the observation which 
include those who need to take credit, actually apply and are approved or denied. 
However, information is lost on those who do not need credit and those who are 
discouraged. 
With the assumption of normal distribution between ݕ௝כand ௝߳ the trivariate probit model 
needs to be consistent and asymptotically efficient given full maximum likelihood 
estimation. The likelihood function is therefore expressed as: ܮሺሺߚଵߚଶߚଷሻȁሺݕଵݕଶݕଷሻǡ ሺ ଵܺܺଶܺଷሻሻ ൌ ܲሺݕଷȁݕଶǡ ݕଵǡ ܺଷሻܲሺݕଶȁݕଵǡ ܺଶሻܲሺݕଵȁ ଵܺሻ 
The conditional probabilities corresponding to the four categories are as follows: 
1. ܲሺݕଵ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ  ? െ Ȱሺ ଵܺߚଵሻ 
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2. ܲሺݕଵ ൌ  ?ǡ ݕଶ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ Ȱሺ ଵܺߚଵሻ െ Ȱଶሺ ଵܺߚଵǡ ܺଶߚଶǡ ߩଵଶሻ 
3. ܲሺݕଵ ൌ  ?ǡ ݕଶ ൌ  ?ǡ ݕଷ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ Ȱଶሺ ଵܺߚଵǡ ܺଶߚଶǡ ߩଵଶሻ െ Ȱଷሺ ଵܺߚଵǡ ܺଶߚଶǡ ܺଷߚଷǡ ߩଵଶǡ ߩଵଷǡ ߩଶଷሻ 
4. ܲሺݕଵ ൌ  ?ǡ ݕଶ ൌ  ?ǡ ݕଷ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ Ȱଷሺ ଵܺߚଵǡ ܺଶߚଶǡ ܺଷߚଷǡ ߩଵଶǡ ߩଵଷǡ ߩଶଷሻ 
Where, Ȱሺכሻ is defined as the cumulative distribution function (CDF), Ȱଶሺכሻ is the 
bivariate CDF with correlation coefficient ߩଵଶ ൌ ሺԖଵǡ Ԗଶȁଵǡ ଶሻ and Ȱଷሺכሻ is the 
trivariate CDF with correlation coefficients as ߩଵଶ ൌ ሺԖଵǡ Ԗଶȁଵǡ ଶሻǡ ߩଵଷ ൌሺԖଵǡ Ԗଷȁଵǡ ଷሻ andߩଶଷ ൌ ሺԖଶǡ Ԗଷȁଶǡ ଷሻ. Estimation of the likelihood function 
demands the computation of trivariate normal integrals, estimating three integrals jointly 
to find the factors that explain each equation. This can also be solved by some 
simulation techniques.  
The GHK (Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane) maximum likelihood simulator has been 
developed to estimate large models such as the problem faced in this study (Geweke, 
1989; Hajivassiliou and McFadden, 1998 and Keane 1994). Nevertheless, the estimation 
of the simulation model is computationally intensive and reaching convergence may be 
time consuming (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003, p. 282) and when ߩ௜௝ approaches 1 the 
estimation may not converge (Rosenman et al., 20 S  8VLQJ +HFNPDQ¶V ) 
correction techniques according to Rosenman et al. (2010) may help to overcome these 
computational problems.  
This paper follows Fishe et al. (1981) ZKRH[WHQGWKH+HFNPDQDQG/HH¶V
two-stage modeling procedure to a situation where there are several types of self-
selection bias in the data. For this study, the biases are composed of two decisions (i.e. 
need±no-need credit and applied±discouraged decisions) with the final outcome 
equation being denied-approved credit which is a dummy variable. The difference is that 
Fishe et al (1981) had a continuous dependent variable outcome.  
In support of the Heckman-Lee two-stage process being extended to a trivariate case, 
Nicoletti and Peracchi (2001) perform a Monte Carlo simulation in the case of a two-
step estimation with sample selection and conclude that this could be easily extended to 
the situation of a trivariate or multivariate probit model. Arendt and Holm (2006) and 
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Rosenman et al. (2010) actually extended it to a trivariate model and they found it to be 
a viable alternative to the complicated trivariate probit model. This alternative is 
therefore adopted in this study. 
In summary (see Arendt and Holm (2006) and Rosenman et al. (2010) for a more 
detailed explanation), one alternative is to estimate the three equations separately, 
generating an inverse Mills ratio (IMR) in the first two equations (selection equations) 
and adding it as an extra explanatory variable in the subsequent equations. In the case 
where there is a suspicion that the first and the third equations are correlated, the IMR 
from the first equation can be added to the third equation.  
In another approach, a bivariate probit model with sample selection6 can be estimated 
either on the first two equations and a probit estimation on the last one or a probit 
estimation on the first equation and a bivariate estimation with sample selection on the 
last two. An IMR is calculated in each case and added to the subsequent estimation. 
While in the first alternative, an IMR is generated from only the second equation where 
the first equation is not expected to affect the third stage7 and added as an extra variable 
in the probit estimation of the third stage, in the second alternative, the IMR from the 
probit estimation of the first stage is included in the second equation. For this current 
study, only the IMR generated from the second equation is included in the probit 
estimation. This is because we do not expect a household needing credit to be correlated 
with a household obtaining credit or not. 
2.3.3 Independent variables 
The independent variables used in the estimation are presented and defined in Table 2.1. 
The choice of the independent variables was informed by various studies on access to 
credit, where it is hypothesised that households need for credit, applying or discouraged 
from applying and being rejected or successful depend on household demographics, 
socio-economic and farm characteristics, assets and community level characteristics. 
                                                 
6
 This is also known as a probit model with sample selection and it is estimated by using the heckprobit 
command in STATA. 
7
 Where the first stage is also expected to affect the third stage, an IMR is also estimated from the first 
stage and added as an extra variable in the third stage.  
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Table 2.1: Description of independent variables used in the model 
Variable name Variable type Description 
Gender Binary Sex of the household head (1= male, 0=female) 
Age  Continuous Age of household head in years 
Age squared Continuous Age squared captures the life cycle effect. 
Household size (hhsize) Continuous Number of members in the household 
Location  Geographical location of the households  
     Rural North Binary 1= rural north, 0 = elsewhere 
     Rural Centre Binary 1= rural centre, 0 = elsewhere 
     Rural South Binary 1= rural south, 0 = elsewhere 
Education level  Educational levels of household head 
    None Binary 1= no education, 0 = otherwise 
    Primary Binary 1= primary education, 0 = otherwise 
    Higher Binary 1= secondary/tertiary, 0 = otherwise 
Network/social group Continuous Number of networks households are involved in 
Land size  Continuous Total land size cultivated in the rainy season in 
hectares. 
Land tenure Binary 1 = land title (secured) 0 = no land title 
Home assets  Continuous Value of home assets in Malawi Kwacha (MWK) 
Farm assets Continuous Value of farm assets (MWK) 
Livestock Continuous Value of livestock (MWK) 
Remittance Continuous Remittances sent to the household by children 
living outside the household 
Bank Distance Continuous Distance to the nearest bank in km 
ADMARC distance Continuous Distance to the nearest Agricultural Development 
and Marketing Corporation in km 
Financial Institutions Continuous Number of financial institutions in each district 
Shock (natural) Binary Experienced natural shock (floods, drought, etc.) 
Shock (agric.) Binary Experienced agricultural shock (price increase in 
inputs etc.) 
Shock (household) Binary Experienced household shock (death or birth, etc.) 
 
2.3.3.1 Age of household head 
Following the life-F\FOH K\SRWKHVLV LW LV H[SHFWHG WKDW KRXVHKROGV¶ QHHG IRU FUHGLW RU
participation in credit market would be a concave function of the age of the household 
head. Thus, younger household heads are more likely to borrow to meet their 
consumption while older household heads are more likely to depend on their past 
savings and hence less likely to borrow to meet their consumption (Mpuga, 2010). Gibb 
and Ritchie (1982) further argue that an increase in age is correlated with a continuous 
LQFUHDVH LQ RQH¶V H[SHULHQFH DQG DVVHWV DOO RWKHU WKLQJV EHLQJ HTXDO 1RWLQJ ERWK
arguments, though younger household heads compared to the older ones may need 
credit, they are restricted by their experience and especially assets which could have 
been used as collateral. Hence, it is expected that younger farm household heads will be 
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more in need of credit but less successful in their loan applications because of their lack 
of or inadequate experience (Freel et al., 2012). It is argued by Fabbri and Padula (2004) 
that borrowing increases with age but also has a quadratic relationship implying a fall in 
borrowing after a certain age. Hence it is also expected that an increase in age will 
increase participation in the credit market thus increase application of credit or decrease 
discouragement. However, this turns negative at a certain age beyond which 
participation in the credit market falls. 
2.3.3.2 Gender of household head 
Females are often characterized as lacking self-confidence, have lower capability of 
managing risk, believe that borrowing brings higher risk and also perceive that banks 
discriminate against them (Watson, 2006). Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013) identify a 
gender gap in borrowing in favour of men which could be explained by legal 
discrimination and gender norms. Thus, they explain that in an environment where 
women face legal issues of being unable to work, inheriting assets and legally required 
to obey their husbands, they are less likely to borrow. Further, most female-headed 
households cultivate for household consumption and spend much of their time on 
household chores while their male counterparts cultivated for the market and spent much 
of their time on productive economic activities (Ilahi, 2001). It is therefore expected that 
female-headed households would be more discouraged from applying for credit. Also, it 
is expected that female-headed households who apply for credit will be discriminated 
against in the credit market and therefore denied credit. Despite this, some studies have 
also found the contrary. Since women have been seen to be vulnerable and 
GLVDGYDQWDJHG LQ WKHVRFLHW\1*2¶VDQGRWKHUGHYHORSPHQWRUJDQLVDWLRQVKDYHGUDZQ
credit schemes to target women as they are seen to be more credit-worthy than their 
male counterparts (Akudugu, 2012). Implying from this, female-headed households are 
more likely to receive credit than the males. 
2.3.3.3 Education level of household head 
Education as a tool for human capital development is expected to be positively 
associated with firm growth (Storey, 1994) and some knowledge of bank loan 
application procedure. Higher levels of formal education are mostly restricted to non-
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poor households hardly found in the rural areas of Malawi. It is expected that household 
heads with higher level of education would less likely need credit as they are more 
likely to have higher levels of income and also engage in other income generating 
economic activities. However, educated household heads are more likely to participate 
in the credit market and therefore will apply for credit and not discouraged as they are 
more likely to have assets that could be used as collateral. Further, household heads with 
higher levels of education are more likely to receive credit as they could be viewed to be 
more reliable to properly manage resources in comparison to those with no or lower 
level of education. 
2.3.3.4 Location 
Discrimination in the credit market also exists across geographic location (Leyshon and 
Thrift, 1996). This is mostly observed in deprived areas, such as the rural communities 
in Africa, where there is lack of economic and infrastructural development and lack of 
financial institutions. Rural central Malawi is comparatively less poor due to its 
proximity to the capital city of the country where there is better economic and 
infrastructural development than other locations of the country. Rural south Malawi is 
poorer than rural north. The households in very poor locations are expected to be 
deprived of financial services and may not be able to meet the collateral requirements. It 
is therefore expected that households in the rural north and south of Malawi will need 
credit, be discouraged to borrow and less likely to be successful in their application in 
comparison to the households in rural central of the country. 
As part of locational measurement, the distance to microfinance institutions and 
Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) were also included. 
Different locations imply different distances to financial institutions. Households in 
deprived communities often have to journey long distances to financial institutions. This 
increases the cost of applying for credit and therefore may discourage such households 
from applying although they may need credit. Further, financial institutions like 
microfinance institutions are more likely to be biased towards households closer to them 
than those farther away. Hence, it is expected that these households would be more 
successful to receive credit. 
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ADMARC is a Malawian parastatal which buys agricultural produce from traders and 
smallholder farmers through its vast network of markets, procures and sells farm inputs 
to smallholder farmers which are sometimes subsidised and also plays a key role in the 
FRXQWU\¶V IRRG VHFXULW\ VLWXDWLRQ SDUWLFXODUO\ IRU PDL]H $ WUDGLWLRQDO SUREOHP RI
farmers is selling their produce and accessing farm inputs at the right time. With the 
help of ADMARC farmers may be able to have access to inputs at the required time and 
also sell their produce for revenue. This therefore gives farm households some secured 
income flow which may be a substitute to credit. Therefore, the presence of or distance 
to an ADMARC institution in a rural farm community is likely to reduce housHKROGV¶
need for credit or may act as a complement for loan.  
2.3.3.5 Household size 
Poor rural households are believed to have larger household sizes than the non-poor. 
With the already high economic pressure of being poor, larger households would require 
extra resources to survive as a result of the high dependency ratio. Therefore, larger 
household sizes are expected to be highly in need of credit. As large households are also 
associated with the poor it is more likely such households are unlikely to accumulate 
wealth to build up assets that could be used as collateral hence may be discouraged from 
applying for credit. However, a study by Shimamura and Lastarria-Cornhiel (2010) and 
Bendig et al. (2009) have concluded that households with larger members are more 
likely to participate in the credit market. Household size in this study is measured as the 
number of members within the household. 
2.3.3.6 Network/Social group 
Some studies have reported the importance of social capital or social ties on the demand 
for credit (Bastelaer, 2002; Brown et al., 2015; Mohammed et al., 2013). For example, 
in the absence of physical collateral, lenders, especially informal lenders, rely on their 
social interaction to provide credit to borrowers as there is some level of trust due to 
long social interaction. Formal financial institutions, unlike the informal lenders, have 
less penetration in rural areas due to mainly information asymmetry. There is obviously 
high level of demand for credit from friends and relations which forms the primary basis 
of the social interaction or network. These also make taking credit for non-productive 
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purposes easier as formal lenders hardly provide credit for consumption purposes 
especially in rural poor communities. Further, high social interaction enables 
information flow from the more informed to the less informed. Thus, household 
members who belong to a credit program may influence non-borrowers either positively 
or negatively depending on their experience from borrowing. Some formal institutions 
like the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh have also relied on the social groups as a basis for 
lending credit to borrowers as this reduces the associated problems of information 
asymmetry like moral hazard, adverse selection, transaction cost and cost of contract 
enforcement. Social capital is measured based on number of social groups, trust and 
level of involvement in the social group among others. However, due to lack of 
information in the data, this study only measures social group as the number of networks 
that households participate in. The more groups household members are involved in the 
better their social standing and the more likely they are to receive credit. However, 
depending on the kind of information received from others about the credit market, 
household members may be discouraged from or encouraged to apply for credit. 
2.3.3.7 Household assets  
Household assets are very important in affecting the welfare of a household. This is also 
used as a proxy for household income since it is argued that the higher the household 
LQFRPHWKHKLJKHUWKHYDOXHRIKRXVHKROGV¶DVVHWVLQFUHDVLQJWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIGHPDQG
for credit. Thus, the assets could be used as collateral. According to Diagne (1999) who 
VWXGLHG WKHGHWHUPLQDQWVRIKRXVHKROGV¶DFFHVV WRFUHGLW LQ0DODZLFRQFOXGHG What the 
FRPSRVLWLRQRIKRXVHKROGDVVHWVLVPRUHLPSRUWDQWLQGHWHUPLQLQJKRXVHKROGV¶DFFHVVWR
credit than the total value of assets. Following this, the household assets are decomposed 
into four main components. These include land asset (farm size measured in hectares), 
value of agricultural or farm assets which can also be termed as the productive assets 
(e.g. farm implements, machinery, and structures measured in Malawian Kwacha), value 
of livestock measured in Malawian Kwacha, and value of non-agricultural or home 
assets (television, bicycle, sewing machine, etc. measured in Malawi Kwacha). It is 
expected that households with higher household assets may be in a better position to 
meet collateral requirements to take up loans and therefore not discouraged from 
applying and may also be in a good position to be granted credit. 
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2.3.3.8 Land tenure 
Following from the farm size, households with secured land ownership or registered 
land are more likely to use these lands as collateral to obtain credit. Foltz (2004) argues 
WKDWKRXVHKROGV¶WLWOHWRODQGDUHH[SHFWHGWRFUHDWHPXFKLQIOXHQFHRQVXSSO\RIFUHGLW
rather than demand as it increases collateral and the quality of the applicants. Hence, 
households with a land that are titled to them are less likely to be discouraged and more 
likely to be successful in receiving credit.  
2.3.3.9 Remittances 
Access to remittances by farm households may be considered as an important variable 
DIIHFWLQJ WKH KRXVHKROG¶V ZHOOEHLQJ 5HPLWWDQFHV FRQWULEXWH WR KRXVHKROG LQFRPH DQG
could be used to finance both farm and off-farm activities, and can substitute for credit. 
For this reason, households which are unlikely to receive remittances are more likely to 
be in need of credit and more likely to apply for credit and not to be discouraged. 
2.3.3.10 Shocks 
Households may react differently to their demand for credit depending on the type of 
external shock they experience. Shocks were hence decomposed into three categories: 
natural shocks such as earthquakes, floods, landslides, and drought, which affect almost 
all households within the community; agricultural shocks like pest infection, animal 
diseases, low agricultural output prices and high cost of farm inputs; and household 
shocks such as death of the income earner, illness, theft etc. It is expected that 
households which experience certain shocks will be in need of credit and possibly apply 
for credit to manage the risk of the shocks. However, due to high risk of default 
especially from natural shocks, households are more likely to be denied credit. As 
confirmed by Udry (1994), Barslund and Tarp (2008) and Pidé (2013), credit has been 
very useful for rural folks to shoulder various forms of shocks although Pidé (2013) 
attests that these shocks could also lead households to default in payment of their credit. 
2.3.3.11 Identification 
Using a Heckman-like model involves obtaining some variables that could be used as 
exclusion restriction variables or instruments. The criteria are that the instrument or 
instruments should be relevant, thus must be correlated with the supposed endogenous 
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variable, and valid, not directly correlated with the outcome variable. Identifying the 
instruments for the need credit equation was quite challenging as both equations (need 
credit and apply credit equations) are related to demand for credit. Hence, it is most 
likely that a variable used as instrument may be weak or not good instrument. As the 
first equation, need for credit, is notional demand and the second equation, apply for 
credit, captures effective demand, finding a variable that affects the need for credit but 
not applying credit was extremely difficult. A study by Brown et al. (2012) used internal 
finance as an instrument in their firm level study on the assumption that while this may 
influence need for credit, it does not affect the likelihood of a firm applying for credit 
given that they need it. However, using household expenditure as a proxy for internal 
finance did not meet the criterion for validity. Other variables such as distance to 
ADMARC branch and shock coping strategies were also used but these also did not 
meet the criteria. 
However, a panel data was used to examine whether the lag of land intensity (measured 
as the ratio of the hectares of land cultivated in the previous period to total cost of inputs 
in the same period) would be a good instrument. However, the panel data had a three-
year gap which confounded the use of the three-year lag variable which was found to 
have no statistical significant effect on the current decision of whether a household 
needs or does not need credit. In addition, very few of the variables in the model were 
significant. Hence, the study continued with the cross-sectional data. 
Finally, the value of home assets was also tried as an instrument. Home assets are 
durable home goods such as a bicycle, radios and televisions owned by the household. 
These assets must be saved for, purchased and accumulated over the life time of the 
members of the household. The value of home assets accumulated over the years is 
expected to be a reasonable indicator of the level of wealth of the household (the survey 
captures no other wealth variables). It is expected that poor households would have little 
choice but to spend on productive farm assets than durable goods and would only spend 
on home assets where they have more to spend. Hence, the higher the value of home 
assets the relatively wealthier the household is compared to another household. It could 
be argued that relatively wealthy households are less likely to be in need of external 
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credit and therefore may not need to apply for credit especially in areas like rural 
Malawi where there is lack of formal credit. Hence, the argument that possession of 
KRPHDVVHWVGRHVQRW DIIHFWFUHGLWDSSOLFDWLRQ LV EXLOW DURXQGKRXVHKROG¶VQRWQHHGLQJ
credit. Therefore, it is expected that there would be a negative relationship between 
home assets and needing credit. 
The estimation with home assets as an instrument is tested against an estimation with no 
exclusion restriction as a robustness check of whether there is a difference between the 
two estimated results. The estimation without an exclusion follows a study by Allen et al 
(2016) using a maximum likelihood estimator to jointly estimate the correlated 
equations (that is, need/no-need equation and applied/discouraged equation) similar to 
using the STATA heckprob command used in this study.   
As a three-step model was estimated, an instrumental variable is also required to identify 
the third-stage probit equation. A variable that influences the accessibility of credit but 
not whether a household would be denied or approved credit was used. For this study 
the number of financial institutions within each district was used. It is postulated that the 
greater the number of financial institutions in a location increases the greater the 
likelihood that households would increase their application for credit. Although they 
become accessible, banks and other formal financial institutions go through some sort of 
screening process to identify worthy borrowers from unworthy ones. Their accessibility 
or number in a district is therefore not a condition that households would be denied or 
approved credit in poor areas like rural Malawi. A second instrument was also used, that 
is distance to an ADMARC market. ADMARC institutions have no role in the 
distribution of credit but they assist farmers through supplying inputs and also serve as a 
ready market for farmers. With ready markets, farmers are able to get a secured income 
and may rely on that income when credit is unavailable. Therefore, this may affect the 
likelihood of a household applying for credit given need for credit but will not explain if 





2.4.1  Descriptive analysis 
Among the entire sample of rural farm households, 80.47 percent required credit 
indicating the high need for credit for production and also consumption among rural 
farm households in Malawi (see Figure 2.2 below.) Despite this, only 24.4 percent of 
those who needed credit actually applied implying a high level of discouragement (75.6 
percent). Among households which were discouraged, about 37 percent did not borrow 
because they did know any lender, followed by those who did not borrow because they 
were afraid they would be denied credit (25%). Only about 3.5 percent did not borrow 
because they lacked adequate collateral. Further, only 37 percent of those who applied 
for credit were denied. As a result, about 15 percent of those who needed credit applied 
and obtained it. This suggests that among the households that needed credit in rural 
Malawi, almost 85 percent were credit constrained, a percentage composed of 
discouraged and denied borrowers. By comparing discouraged and denied borrowers, it 
was identified that discouraged borrowers were over 7 times more (in number) than 
those who were denied credit. This is consistent with the assertion of Kon and Storey 
(2003) who predicted a high prevalence of discouraged borrowers over denied 
borrowers in developing countries compared with the developed worlds as in Levenson 
and Willard (2000). Freel et al. (2012) and Levenson and Willard (2000) in their 
empirical works found about twice the number of discouraged borrowers over denied 




Figure 2.2: Descriptive statistics of the sequential break down of credit access 
A correlation coefficient matrix was also generated for the variables to identify possible 
highly correlated variables. This is necessary as multicollinearity could render the 
results unreliable. The correlation coefficient matrix is presented in Table A1 of 
Appendix A of this chapter. Examining the results show that all the variables have a 
coefficient below 0.5 except for age and age squared which is expected. The variables 
with coefficients just above 0.4 are the correlation between value of home assets, farm 
assets and value of livestock and also between remittances and age of the household 
head. They all have positive coefficients implying a direct association between them. 
However, the magnitudes of the coefficients are not large enough to worry about 
multicollinearity. From the correlation table, it can also be seen that, value of home 
assets used as an instrument is correlated with the credit dependent variables. This 




















To understand who these rural farm households are, Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 present 
some descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the rural farm households in Malawi 
by their borrowing status. Table 2.2 presents the summary characteristics of the total 
sample and of non-borrowers (those who do not need credit) and those that need credit. 
Table 2.3 includes the summary characteristics of discouraged borrowers and those who 
applied for credit and Table 2.4 presents denied and approved borrowers. Two 
univariate test statistics were also carried out. An Adjusted Wald Test was applied to 
determine the statistical difference of the weighted mean values of each continuous 
variable by the paired borrowing status, while the Pearson chi-square (߯ଶ) test examines 
whether the categorical or discrete independent variables of rural farm households differ 
significantly by their borrowing status.  
Table 2.2 indicates that about three-fourths of all the respondents were male-headed 
households. However, the ߯ଶtest shows no statistically significant difference for 
household need for credit between a male-headed or female-headed household. The 
average age of those who do not need credit was 46 years and was significantly different 
from that of the mean age of households that needed credit (42 years). There were on 
average about 5 members in each household. Farm land cultivated during the raining 
season was approximately 0.77 hectare. Generally, non-borrowers had higher home 
assets, farm assets, value of livestock and also remittances than the household who 
needed credit. These could easily explain why they are not in need of credit as they are 
comparably better off. These variables showed a highly significant difference between 
those who do not need credit and those who needed credit. 
Table 2.2 further shows among other information that, just below 50 percent of the 
respondents resides in the rural south of the country. An overwhelming 81 percent had 
no formal education. Household heads with higher education were greater in comparison 
to the other education levels among non-borrowers. Location and the levels of education 
had highly significant differences comparing the two groups as inferred from their ߯ଶvalues which were significant at 1 percent level. Distance to the nearest microfinance 
institution (MFI) and ADMARC branch were on average 31 and 8.8 kilometres 
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respectively, but the test showed no statistically significant difference in mean distance 
to an MFI between the two groups.  
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of need credit 
Variables Total Sample No-need Need credit Statistical test 
Gender     
   Male 0.752 0.197 0.803 0.51 
   Female 0.248 0.189 0.811  
Head age 42.994 45.66 42.347 35.27*** 
Household size 4.679 4.489 4.725 11.60*** 
Location      
   Rural North 0.120 0.312 0.688 80.95*** 
   Rural Centre 0.423 0.25 0.75  
   Rural South 0.457 0.114 0.886  
Education     
   None 0.807 0.183 0.817 13.68*** 
   Primary 0.09 0.233 0.767  
   Higher 0.103 0.262 0.738  
Network  3.281 3.415 3.249 6.02** 
Land size (hectare) 0.765 0.880 0.735 36.03*** 
Land tenure     
   Unsecured 0.121 0.216 0.784 2.06 
   Secured 0.879 0.193 0.807  
Home assets (MWK) 17,071.94 31,118.03 13,662.95 20.26*** 
Farm assets (MWK) 5,861.155 9,731.34 4,921.862 7.74*** 
Livestock (MWK) 27,634.74 52,523.1 21,594.33 13.02*** 
Remittances (MWK) 3,194.78 7,081.50 2,251.47 17.66*** 
MFI Distance (Km) 31.34 30.68 31.50 0.38 
ADMARC Distance 
(Km) 
8.761 8.162 8.906 3.70* 
Financial Institutions  23.607 32.617 21.420 56.90*** 
Shock (natural) 0.466 0.150 0.850 53.77*** 
Shock (agric.) 0.383 0.162 0838 20.55*** 
Shock (household) 0.443 0.143 0.857 62.75*** 
Observations 8,230 1,573 6,657  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2.3 presents the statistics of discouraged borrowers and those who applied for 
credit. Female-headed households were more discouraged from borrowing, while a 
greater proportion of those who applied for credit were in rural centre of the country. 
Also, a higher percentage of households who applied for credit had a higher level of 
education. These variables; gender, location, and education, all had statistically 
significant ߯ଶ values at 1 percent level showing a strong significant difference between 
the applicants for credit and the discouraged borrowers.  
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Discouraged borrowers were older than those who applied for credit (43.3 years and 
39.5 years respectively), they also received more remittances but however, had lower 
value of home and farm assets and value of livestock than applicants. Discouraged 
borrowers also resided farther from the MFIs and ADMARC branches. The households 
that applied for credit had on average 5 members each, belonged to more social groups, 
and cultivated larger farms than those who were discouraged from borrowing. The 
differences in mean were all statistically significant, as shown in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of applied/discouraged 
Variables Need Credit Discouraged Applied Statistical test 
Gender     
   Male 0.750 0.732 0.268 52.65*** 
   Female 0.250 0.827 0.173  
Head age 42.347 43.261 39.521 71.52*** 
Household size 4.725 4.603 5.10 46.02*** 
Location      
   Rural North 0.102 0.792 0.208 28*** 
   Rural Centre 0.395 0.687 0.313  
   Rural South 0.503 0.802 0.198  
Education     
   None 0.820 0.779 0.221 34.78*** 
   Primary 0.028 0.675 0.325  
   Higher 0.095 0.631 0.369  
Network  3.249 3.090 3.741 119.46*** 
Land size (hectare) 0.735 0.706 0.824 20.00*** 
Land tenure     
   Unsecured 0.118 0.644 0.356 40.48*** 
   Secured 0.882 0.771 0.229  
Home assets (MWK) 13,662.95 10,342.22 23,931.93 6.07** 
Farm assets (MWK) 4,921.86 4,063.64 7,575.82 8.69*** 
Livestock (MWK) 21,594.33 20,072.94 26,299.06 1.12 
Remittances (MWK) 2,251.47 2,665.19 972.103 8.54*** 
MFI Distance (Km) 31.50 32.252 29.172 5.37** 
ADMARC Distance 
(Km) 
8.906 9.119 8.249 3.39* 
Financial Institutions  21.420 21.478 21.241 0.05 
Shock (natural)  0.492 0.733 0.267 10.07*** 
Shock (agric.) 0.398 0.700 0.300 48.78*** 
Shock (household) 0.472 0.705 0.295 57.30*** 
Observations 6,657 4,946 1,711  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The descriptive statistics of the variables for households who were denied or were 
successful in borrowing are presented in Table 2.4. A greater proportion of female-
headed households had their credit applications approved, as compared to the male-
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headed households. Further, there were more denied applications in the rural south of 
the country than in the other locations. As expected, households which obtained credit 
lived closer to MFIs, cultivated larger farm area, and had a saving or credit institution in 
their community. Likewise, those who obtained credit suffered more agricultural and 
household shocks while those who were denied experienced more natural shocks. 
Surprisingly, households with larger home and farm assets including higher value of 
livestock and remittances were denied credit in comparison with those who received 
credit. However, there are no significant differences among majority of these 
characteristics between households who were denied credit and those who were 
approved.  
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of received or denied credit 
Variables Applied Approved Denied Statistical test 
Gender     
   Male 0.823 0.623 0.377 2.70 
   Female 0.177 0.681 0.319  
Head age 39.521 39.099 40.250 2.35 
Household size 5.100 5.174 4.971 2.50 
Location      
   Rural North 0.087 0.640 0.360 1.83 
   Rural Centre 0.505 0.658 0.342  
   Rural South 0.408 0.602 0.398  
Education     
   None 0.743 0.616 0.384 1.69 
   Primary 0.114 0.666 0.334  
   Higher 0.143 0.696 0.304  
Network  3.741 3.830 3.587 3.95** 
Land size (hectare) 0.824 0.839 0.797 0.75 
Land tenure     
   Unsecured 0.172 0.644 0.356 0.12 
   Secured 0.828 0.631 0.369  
Home assets (MWK)  23931.93 23,795.3 24,167.98 0.00 
Farm assets (MWK) 3.27e+08 1.50e+08 6.34e+08 0.86 
Livestock (MWK) 26299.06 23193.25 31664.78 0.33 
Remittances (MWK) 972.103 735.922 1380.137 0.65 
MFI Distance (Km) 29.172 28.435 30.445 1.73 
ADMARC Distance (Km) 8.249 7.615 9.346 5.49** 
Financial Institutions  21.241 22.152 19.667 2.56 
Shock (natural)  0.538 0.569 0.708 27.61*** 
Shock (agric.) 0.489 0.624 0.376 0.41 
Shock (household) 0.57 0.628 0.372 0.23 
Observations 1,711 1,055 656  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.4.2 Multivariate analysis of who needs and who gets credit 
As indicated earlier, the econometric estimations follow a three-step sequential process 
or a trivariate probit model with double sample selection. A bivariate probit model with 
sample selection using the heckprobit STATA command was used to estimate 
simultaneously the first two stages of the model. An IMR was estimated from the 
second stage of the equation and added as an extra variable in the third stage. To 
reiterate, the first equation attempts to determine the factors that influence rural 
KRXVHKROGV¶ QHHG IRU FUHGLW 7KH VHFRQG DQG WKLUG HTXDWLRQV LGHQWLI\ WKH IDctors that 
explain the decision to apply for credit against being discouraged from applying, and 
subsequently whether a household that applies is successful in gaining credit. The result 
outputs of the estimated models are presented in Table 2.58. 
Results from this estimation are compared to an estimation with no exclusion restriction 
variable. As already stated, this follows a similar estimation by Allen et al. (2016) who 
jointly estimate two correlated equations using a maximum likelihood. Results are 
shown in Table A4 in Appendix A. Comparing these results show some great similarity 
in 1) the variables that were significant, 2) the significance levels and 3) very little 
difference in the magnitude of some of the variables (mostly evident in the third column 
which estimates denied/approved). This may show that the results are robust as there is 
quite significant similarities in results. 
2.4.2.1 Determinants of the need for credit 
Column 1 of Table 2.5 presents the results of the first stage of the of the heckprobit 
estimation with the dependent variable need credit which equals 1 if the household 
needs credit, and 0 if the household does not need credit. The Wald chi square has a 
value of 438.30 and is significant at 1 percent level, rejecting the null hypothesis that the 
                                                 
8
 A sensitivity analysis was done reclassifying need credit and discouraged borrowers with interest rate 
as a stated reason for not borrowing. The results (Shown in Table A3 in Appendix A) showed many 
significant differences in magnitude and significance of the coefficients in especially the need for credit 
estimations. For example, gender became significant in the need credit with the inclusion of the interest 
rate component but was not in the need credit without the interest rate component.  Farm asset for instance 
was not significant in the apply credit equation with interest rate component not included in the 
GLVFRXUDJHGERUURZHUV¶GHILQLWLRQ 
Due to these differences and a careful search in the literature, the interest rate reason for not borrowing 
was added as part of discouraged borrowers for the rest of the study (Mama ad Ewoudou, 2010 & Kon 
and Storey, 2003). 
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estimates of the parameters are simultaneously equal to zero. This inference also applies 
to the second stage regression; apply credit, as they were estimated simultaneously. 
Further, the estimate of rho which shows the correlation between the selection and the 
outcome equations that is first and second stage regressions, is statistically significant at 
1 percent. It being positive also implies that a household that needs credit is more likely 
to apply for credit. The statistically significant coefficient of rho implies that estimating 
a simultaneous-like model was appropriate. This is further supported by the Wald test of 
independent of equations presented below the table. This is also significant at 5 percent. 
Table 2.5: Estimation of who needs and who gets credit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Heckprobit Probit 
Variables Need credit a Apply credit b Denied credit c 
Male 0.0450 0.143*** 0.360*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0424) (0.112) 
Head age 0.0152** 0.0133* -0.0188 
 (0.00627) (0.00763) (0.0153) 
Age squared -0.000207*** -0.000229*** 0.000185 
 (6.06e-05) (7.90e-05) (0.000183) 
Household size 0.0524*** 0.0365*** 0.0114 
 (0.00960) (0.00962) (0.0231) 
Rural Centre d 0.168** 0.354*** 0.389* 
 (0.0749) (0.0668) (0.199) 
Rural South 0.655*** 0.0384 0.0429 
 (0.0786) (0.0711) (0.115) 
Primary educ. e -0.0522 0.0906 -0.0127 
 (0.0594) (0.0585) (0.113) 
Higher educ. -0.178*** 0.204*** -0.0263 
 (0.0523) (0.0577) (0.128) 
Network  -0.0137 0.0618*** 0.0298 
 (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0301) 
Land size -0.0797*** 0.0367 0.102** 
 (0.0272) (0.0325) (0.0499) 
Land tenure 0.0525 -0.167*** -0.143 
 (0.0538) (0.0574) (0.115) 
Home asset -0.0364***   
 (0.00624)   
Farm asset 0.00366 0.0249* 0.00681 
 (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0262) 
Livestock -0.0139*** -0.00202 -0.0202** 
 (0.00449) (0.00452) (0.00801) 
Remittance  -0.0191*** -0.00977 -0.00621 
 (0.00624) (0.00744) (0.0167) 
MFI Distance 0.0206 -0.0162 -0.00514 
 (0.0166) (0.0170) (0.0329) 
ADMARC Distance 0.0317 -0.0665***  
 (0.0202) (0.0200)  
FI number -0.0863*** -0.0708*** -0.121** 
 (0.0253) (0.0220) (0.0495) 
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Shock (natural) -0.109** 0.220*** 0.575*** 
 (0.0436) (0.0488) (0.118) 
Shock (agric.) 0.230*** 0.0738* 0.0768 
 (0.0436) (0.0434) (0.0888) 
Shock (household) 0.282*** 0.250*** 0.144 
 (0.0410) (0.0398) (0.130) 
IMR apply   1.142** 
   (0.581) 
Constant 0.418** -1.564*** -2.023 
 (0.196) (0.207) (1.239) 
Log pseudolikelihood -7164.15  -1095.83 
Athrho 0.523** (0.208)  
Rho  0.480 (0.160)  
Wald chi2 438.30***  82.55*** 
Prob>chi2 0.0000  0.0000 
Wald test (rho=0) 6.31**   
Prob>chi2 0.0120   
Observations 8,230 8,230 1,711 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Need Credit = 1 if either discouraged, rejected or successful, 0 if non-borrower. b Apply credit = 1 if 
rejected or successful, 0 if discouraged. c Denied credit = 1 if denied credit, 0 if successful. d Base 
category for location is Rural North; e Base category for education is None. 
 
In terms of the levels of education, only higher level of education is statistically 
significant and negatively related to the need for credit. This implies that household 
heads with higher level of education were less likely to be in need of credit as compared 
with those without any form of formal education. At first glance, this seems counter-
intuitive since education brings knowledge, including possibly financial knowledge. But 
education also provides the opportunity to engage in productive non-farm work, which 
may make these households relatively stable financially and therefore provide them with 
some income which decreases their need for credit. This finding is supported by a study 
by Elhiraika (1999) who also found in rural Sudan that higher level of education reduced 
the probability of a household demanding credit, specifically informal credit.  
The results also show that age increases the need for credit but has a quadratic 
relationship with the need for credit as the age squared of the household head is 
negative. This confirms the expectation of the age variable. Thus, rural household need 
for credit increases as age increases till the age of 37, beyond which the need for credit 
begins to fall. Thus, households with younger heads have greater necessities and 
therefore have higher need for resources including credit to meet the necessities of their 
households while the older heads are presumed to have lesser necessities and therefore 
may not need credit. This could be related to the life cycle hypothesis that the marginal 
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propensity to consume reduces beyond a certain age. This is also confirmed by similar 
results found by Mpuga (2010) in a study conducted in Uganda. He argues that the 
young are more likely to borrow to meet their needs including smoothing consumption 
while the old would rather depend on their past savings to survive. 
The number of people within a household cannot be overlooked when it comes to 
household need for capital like credit as is confirmed in this study. Household size was 
significantly positive in explaining the need for credit. It is argued that the greater the 
household size the greater the need for food and non-food items. This hence increases 
the need for resources to meet this increase in demand. Credit has been seen as one such 
means of supplementing household budget hence the finding is found to be reliable. This 
is also argued by Bendig et al. (2009) who found in a study in rural Ghana that the size 
of the household influenced the demand for some financial services such as savings and 
credit.  
Contrary to expectation, households that cultivated relatively larger land areas were less 
in need of credit. This was also evident for households with higher value of home assets 
and livestock. This is corroborated by Diagne (1999) who found that higher shares of 
land and household assets negatively affected the demand for credit; however, this was 
mostly in demand for formal credit although land was significantly important for 
informal credit. As found in the descriptive statistics, households which do not need 
credit own relatively bigger land sizes than those who needed credit. Therefore, the 
larger the household land size and assets, the less likely the household would need 
credit. Moreover, some commercial agricultural credit given in rural Malawi is in kind, 
for example fertilizers, seed and pesticides for hybrid maize provided by Malawi Rural 
Finance Company (Diagne and Zeller, 2001) and therefore households already having 
such inputs may not have the need for credit. 
Households in the rural centre and south of Malawi were more likely to need credit than 
those living in the rural north of the country. The coefficients are larger for rural south 
dwellers. This is not surprising as majority of the poor households reside in the rural 
south of the country implying that the rural south of Malawi is highly deprived (NSO, 
2012). It has been established that financial institutions are more likely to be drawn to 
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areas which are less deprived, less risky and less costly to serve (Claessens, 2006). 
Further, it is noticed that there were less financial institutions in the rural south 
compared to the other locations (Table A2). This confirms that financial institutions are 
ignoring more deprived areas in Malawi.  
Also, it was found that, households that needed credit were more likely to be in districts 
with less formal financial institutions. Vanroose (2015) concluded from other studies 
that there were much lower financial services in the rural areas compared to a higher 
demand for credit in the rural areas. This, he used to buttress the point of location 
playing a crucial role in the demand for credit and also defining the level of poverty of 
an area. Thus, an MFI with a pure profit motive is highly drawn to less deprived areas as 
this reduces the cost of operation, monitoring and risks. Therefore, poorer areas are 
likely to have greater distance between them and the nearest MFIs although households 
in these areas are more likely to need credit.  
Contrary to the above argument, the presence of savings and credit institutions within an 
area did not diminish the need for credit as seen from the results of this study. It is found 
that households living in communities that had the presence of a savings or credit 
institution also needed credit. Therefore, financial services presence increases 
KRXVHKROGV¶DFFHVV WRFUHdit by increasing their need for credit. Considering that these 
are poor areas of the country, the level of development or deprivation is still not satisfied 
by the few financial institutions available or even by informal lenders. This finding is 
confirmed by a study in rural Malawi by Shimamura and Lastarria-Cornhiel (2010) who 
found that presence of credit programs in a location increased the participation of 
households in the credit market. 
The study further showed that households that suffered from household shocks (like 
death and birth) and agricultural shocks (such as high input prices, pest attacks etc.) 
were more likely to be in need of credit. In addition to their poor economic situations, 
rural households which experienced some sort of shock are identified to be in worse 
economic situations than those who did not experience these shocks. Hence, this 
increases their need for financial services particularly credit especially in situations 
where there is no other form of financial support. This finding is supported by studies of 
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Barslund and Tarp (2008) and Pidé (2013) who found that shocks were important 
factors to consider when looking at KRXVHKROGV¶ demand for credit. Hence shocks could 
be expected to affect the need for household credit. However, households that suffered 
from natural shocks were less likely to be need of credit.  
2.4.2.2 Determinants of the decision to apply for credit 
Column 2 of Table 2.5 presents the results of the second stage of the heckprobit 
estimation of apply credit given that the household needs credit. The F statistics that 
looks at the overall significance of the model and the rho that looked at the correlation 
between the first two stages have already been discussed to be significantly different 
from zero. As no exclusion restriction variable is included in the first stage, it is 
therefore concluded that this model is not identified hence still struggles from 
endogeneity. 
The results showed that although households in the rural south of the country were more 
likely to need credit, location had no effect on whether they would apply for credit or be 
discouraged from applying. Only households in the rural centre of the country were 
more likely to apply for credit compared to those in the rural north of the country; hence 
they were less discouraged from applying. The central part of Malawi, where Lilongwe 
the capital of Malawi is located, is the most developed area in the country and would be 
expected to have more financial institutions than other areas of the country. Rural 
households located in the central part of Malawi will be closer to these financial 
institutions which might facilitate loan application as compared to households in the 
rural north. The findings however are inconsistent with a study by Shimamura and 
Lastarria-Cornhiel (2010) which reveal that rural south households in Malawi were 
more likely to participate in credit programs than those in the north but being in the 
centre had no significant impact on participation. 
Among the various assets of the rural household, only value of farm assets was 
important in determining whether a household would apply for credit or is discouraged 
from applying. The results reveal that, households with a higher value of farm assets 
increased the probability to apply for credit hence reducing discouragement. This 
positive effect on the decision to apply for credit is consistent with the study by Mpuga 
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(2004). Thus, households with higher value of farm assets required extra form of capital 
to boost their farm production and therefore were less discouraged but rather would 
apply for credit. According to Barslund and Tarp (2008), higher value of particularly 
productive assets increased the likelihood of application for farm credit especially for 
formal credit so as to increase farm investment. Generally, this is consistent with the 
assertion by Diagne (1999) that the composition of household assets is more important 
than the total value of assets as they vary in effect on access to credit. 
An increase in age of the household head increased the likelihood of household 
members applying for credit. However, the negative effect of age squared implies a 
quadratic effect and also conforming to the life-cycle hypothesis. This implies that much 
older household heads are more likely to be discouraged from applying for credit and 
instead rely on accumulated resources (savings). Mpuga (2010) found in Uganda that 
not only does age increase the demand for credit, it also increased the amount of credit 
applied for. Further, male headed households were more likely to apply for credit 
implying female headed households were more discouraged from applying for credit. In 
most developing countries where the male controlled almost all resources and assets, 
and engaged in the market and economic activities while the female mostly concentrated 
on the home, it is most certain that females would be discouraged from borrowing while 
their male counterparts applied for credit. This is in line with findings of Demirguc-Kunt 
et al. (2013) who found a significant gender borrowing gap in favour of men. 
Large household size increases the needs of a household and therefore increases their 
need for resources including credit. This was true from the findings in this study with a 
positive effect of the size of the household on application for credit. Hence, the results 
showed that a larger household size was a motivating rather than a discouraging factor 
to applying for credit. This finding is corroborated in other studies such as Nguyen 
(2007) in rural Vietnam where he found that among other factors household size was 
LPSRUWDQWIRUKRXVHKROGV¶ILQDQFLDODFWLYLW\ 
The study further showed the importance of human capital in the participation of a 
household in the credit market. The study showed that household heads with especially 
higher level of formal education reduced the probability of a member of the household 
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being discouraged from applying for credit thus, increasing application for credit. This is 
consistent with the study by Mpuga (2004) who found that an additional year increase in 
education increased the application for credit by about 0.3 percent. This could be 
explained by the fact that some form of formal education increases the understanding of 
credit application procedures of financial institutions and also the ability to obtain some 
collateral due to the high possibility of engaging in off-farm economic activities and 
therefore less likely to be discouraged than those with no level of education. In a study 
by Chen and Chivakul (2008) only primary level of education impacted participation 
while higher level of education was documented to have no impact on credit market 
participation in a study conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
,Q DGGLWLRQ WR WKH DERYH KRXVHKROGV¶ PHPEHUVKLS LQ D VRFLDO JURXS ZDV IRXQG WR EH
significantly important in the application for credit. It had a positive effect and 
significant at 1 percent level. Therefore, membership in an association was an 
encouraging factor rather than a discouraging factor for the application of credit. This is 
also noted by a number of studies (Hananu et al., 2015; Mohammed et al., 2013). 
Therefore, social groups influence access to credit as Hananu et al. (2015) noted that the 
reason most farmers join social groups includes the need to access credit and other 
financial facilities. 
As confirmed in the need for credit estimation, households that suffer some shocks are 
highly in need of credit and this further increases their likelihood of applying for credit. 
All the shock variables are positively significant at 1 percent level making them very 
LPSRUWDQWIDFWRUVWRFRQVLGHUZKHQVWXG\LQJKRXVHKROGV¶GHPDQGIRUFUHGLW7KLVDJDLQ
is confirmed by the studies of Barslund and Tarp (2008) and Pidé (2013) who found 
VKRFNVWREHDQLQIOXHQFLQJIDFWRULQKRXVHKROGV¶GHPDQGIRUFUHGLW 
2.4.2.3 Determinants of denied credit application 
The last column of Table 2.5 presents the probit estimation results of whether a 
household is approved or denied credit, with the variable coded as 1 if household is 
denied credit, while successful or approved applicants are coded as 0. This decision is 
conditional on whether a household has applied for credit. Hence, an IMR was estimated 
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from the apply credit regression and added as an extra variable in the denied credit 
equation. This was found to be statistically significant at 5 percent. This implies the 
sample selection issue theoretically discussed in the methodology has been proven to be 
true in the study. Hence ignoring this sample selection could have biased the results 
further. The Wald chi square statistic that tests the null hypothesis that estimated 
coefficients are simultaneously zero is rejected at 1 percent significance level. Also, to 
make this estimation identified due to sample selection estimation, distance to 
ADMARC market was dropped from the third stage regression. On the whole, only a 
IHZ YDULDEOHV ZHUH IRXQG WR EH VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQLILFDQW LQ GHWHUPLQLQJ KRXVHKROGV¶
outcome of credit denial or approval.  
While male-headed households were more likely to apply for credit, the results show 
that they also had a greater probability of being denied credit as compared to their 
female counterparts. Some credit schemes have targeted females due to the fact that 
women are seen to be vulnerable, disadvantaged but most importantly more efficient in 
handling and paying back credit, as such they are considered as lower risk borrowers 
(Chirwa, 1997; Akudugu, 2012). The age of the household head was negatively 
significant at 1 percent implying that an increase in age reduces the probability of 
obtaining credit. Hence, older household heads were more likely to be denied credit than 
the younger ones. However, age squared was also significant but positive. Therefore, 
beyond a certain age, which is calculated to be about 50 years, maturity or experience 
becomes an important indicator as to whether one would be given credit. This is 
however inconsistent with the findings from Fabbri and Padula (2004) who found that 
borrowing increases with age but falls after a certain point in time. 
Households that were more likely to receive credit also included households with higher 
value of home assets and livestock. It could therefore be inferred that lenders accept 
home assets and livestock as collateral for providing credit. This makes these assets very 
important factors to consider when studying access to household credit. As a proxy for 
household wealth, it is implied that relatively wealthier households have a higher 
probability to obtain credit as they may be seen to be more credit worthy than the less 
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wealthy households. This is validated in the study by Mpuga (2010) where assets played 
a significant role in both demand for credit and obtaining credit in Uganda. 
The only other variable that was also significant in determining if a household is either 
denied or granted credit is experiencing of a natural shock. Where a household 
experienced natural shocks such as drought or flood, they are more likely to be denied 
credit when they apply. As floods and droughts have adverse effect on farm production, 
it is very unlikely that households would be able to recover from their loss and possibly 
default when granted credit. This makes them high risk borrowers driving lenders away 
from such borrowers. Although this argument can be theoretically accepted to be true, it 
is inconsistent with the findings of Pidé (2013) who found no effect of weather shocks 
on household borrowing. 
The hectare of land cultivated by the farm household was positively significant in the 
model. This implied that households that cultivated larger land size were more likely to 
be rejected credit if they applied for credit. While this may be contrary to expectation, it 
is however consistent with other studies like that of Oyedele et al. (2009) who found that 
land size increased the probability of a household being credit constrained, thus denied 
credit in this regards. Also, households in the rural centre of the country are more likely 
to be denied credit compared to those in the rural north.  
The informal credit sector plays a significant role in the development of the rural areas 
of Malawi. As such it would be good to see its effect on credit application outcome and 
the differences in the characteristics of households that apply to either the formal of the 
formal credit sector. Table 2.6 below shows the cross tabulation of credit sources and 
the application outcomes. The table shows that there more approved applications by the 
informal lenders than formal lenders however as a percentage of the applications that 
were made to each of these sectors, formal lenders approved more credit applications 
than informal lenders. The F-statistics also shows that there is a significant relationship 






Table 2.6: Source of credit application 
Source  Approved Denied Total 
Informal 760 506 1,266 
 (61.31%) (38.69%) (100%) 
Formal 295 150 445 
 (68.88%) (31.12%) (100%) 
Total 1,055 656 1,711 
 (63.34%) (36.66%) (100%) 
Design-Based F statistics 6.1817** P=0.0132  
Note: Weighted row percentages in parenthesis 
Hence, there is a possibility this may be an important factor in loan application decisions 
in an econometric estimation. The third stage model therefore may be driven by the 
source of credit as requirements for credit applications differ from formal lenders to 
informal lenders. To capture this effect, first, a dummy variable measured as 1 if the 
credit was approved or denied by a formal lender such as a bank or MFI and 0 by an 
informal lender was included in the last equation. Second, the data was split into a 
formal source and an informal source running separate estimations for each source. 
Results of these estimations are presented in Table 2.7 below.  
Table 2.7: Effect of source of credit on credit denial 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Pooled  Informal  Formal  
Male 0.362*** 0.244** 0.699*** 
 (0.111) (0.122) (0.257) 
Head age -0.0179 -0.0290* -0.000338 
 (0.0153) (0.0175) (0.0323) 
Age squared 0.000177 0.000338 -0.000145 
 (0.000183) (0.000208) (0.000384) 
Household size 0.0122 -0.0139 0.0835* 
 (0.0231) (0.0266) (0.0472) 
Rural Centre 0.391** 0.294 0.810** 
 (0.199) (0.222) (0.389) 
Rural South 0.0443 -0.0850 0.575** 
 (0.116) (0.131) (0.231) 
Primary educ. -0.0122 -0.0923 0.202 
 (0.113) (0.130) (0.236) 
Higher educ. -0.0141 -0.114 0.210 
 (0.128) (0.151) (0.249) 
Network  0.0311 0.00989 0.0878 
 (0.0300) (0.0331) (0.0589) 
Land size 0.103** 0.171*** -0.0453 
 (0.0497) (0.0601) (0.112) 
Land tenure -0.143 -0.0485 -0.455* 
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 (0.115) (0.129) (0.235) 
Farm asset 0.00812 -0.0160 0.0685 
 (0.0263) (0.0300) (0.0549) 
Livestock  -0.0202** -0.0246*** -0.00543 
 (0.00801) (0.00908) (0.0159) 
Remittance  -0.00633 0.00237 -0.0289 
 (0.0168) (0.0196) (0.0327) 
MFI Distance -0.00598 0.00758 -0.0431 
 (0.0330) (0.0343) (0.0569) 
FI number -0.122** -0.113** -0.113 
 (0.0494) (0.0575) (0.100) 
Shock (natural) 0.569*** 0.574*** 0.621*** 
 (0.118) (0.137) (0.227) 
Shock (agric.) 0.0777 -0.000789 0.332** 
 (0.0886) (0.104) (0.151) 
Shock (household) 0.142 -0.0469 0.677** 
 (0.129) (0.141) (0.282) 
Formal Source  -0.0756   
 (0.0782)   
IMR apply 1.145** 0.647 2.584** 
 (0.579) (0.616) (1.210) 
Constant -2.045* -0.680 -5.916** 
 (1.235) (1.344) (2.526) 
Log pseudolikelihood -1095.315 -811.474 -266.495 
Wald chi2 83.47*** 81.26*** 32.75** 
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0359 
Chow test  36.14** P>chi2=0.0148 
Observations 1,711 1,266 445 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Column 1 of Table 2.7 presents the results third stage estimation with the dummy of the 
source of the credit application as an extra variable. The credit source dummy variable 
however, was not significant at any of the conventional levels. This implies that source 
of credit application was irrelevant to whether a farm household obtained credit or was 
rejected credit in rural Malawi. The second set of estimation, attempted to identify if 
there were any significant difference in the characteristics of households across the 
sources of credit. This is also reported in Table 2.7 where the informal source estimation 
is presented in column 2 and column 3 presents the formal source estimation. The chow 
test of whether the coefficients in the two set of regressions are equal is significant at 5 
percent, implying a rejection of equality of coefficients across the models. Hence, the 
estimated parameters of the separated sources are significantly different from each other. 
Examining the results, there were generally differences in the variables that were 
significant in one equation that were not significant in the other. For example, household 
size, location, and the shock variables were more likely to increase the probability of a 
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household been denied credit while a household with secured land ownership was more 
likely to be given credit in the formal source sub-sample only. However, variables that 
were only significant in the informal source sub-sample included land size, home assets, 
livestock and the number of financial institutions in the districts. Another major 
difference between the two models is the that the IMR was only significant in the formal 
source only. 
2.5 Conclusion and implications of the study 
7KLV VWXG\DQDO\VHV UXUDO IDUPKRXVHKROGV¶DFFHVV WRFUHGLWGUDZLQJDWWHQWLRQ WRQRQ-
borrowers and discouraged borrowers. Using a rich data set from the third wave of the 
Malawi Integrated Household Survey (2010/2011), a three-step estimation model which 
captures a Trivariate Probit Model with Double Sample Selection was applied. 
Specifically, the study addressed three objectives which included determining the 
demographic and socio-HFRQRPLFIDFWRUVWKDWLQIOXHQFHKRXVHKROGV¶QHHGIRUFUHGLW
(2) discouragement from applying for credit; and finally, (3) being denied/granted 
credit.  
One major observation from the study is that there were over 7 times more discouraged 
borrowers than denied borrowers, showing a greater percentage of constrained 
households than would have been the case if only denied borrowers were considered. 
This is consistent with the findings of Levenson and Willard (2000), Freel et al. (2012) 
and especially Brown et al. (2011) who found that discouraged borrowers were more 
than twice as much as denied applicants and also Kon and Storey (2003) who predicted 
a greater prevalence in developing countries. Hence, this makes an important case for 
the inclusion of discouraged borrowers in studies of access to credit. This ensures that 
all those who are credit constrained are analysed to provide a better reflection of the 
composition of credit constrained households and a more inclusive policy that would be 
more effective and far-reaching. 
Despite the fact that gender played no significant role in explaining whether a household 
needed credit, female-headed households were more likely to be discouraged from 
applying for credit but were more likely to be successful if they applied for credit. The 
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success in obtaining credit could be credited to some financial service programmes 
being carried out in Malawi targeting women especially. One such programme is by 
Concern Universal Microfinance Operations which aims at taking financial services to 
women in remote areas in Malawi. However, as women are still highly discouraged, 
financial literacy programmes such as that by CARE Australia which attempts to fight 
poverty by providing women with financial knowledge aiming to increase their access to 
credit and provide business management skills should be replicated across Malawi. 
According to CARE the main challenges identified that is preventing the extension and 
expansion of financial services to women in Malawi has been lack of financial literacy, 
limited use of technology, lack of loan capital and lack of support in accessing the 
markets. It has been found that women are able to alleviate the poverty level of the 
household a lot better than their male counterparts given some financial support 
(Burjorjee et al., 2002).  
Location played an important role. Rural south dwellers, typically with high level of 
poverty, were more likely to be in need of credit followed by the rural centre as 
compared to the rural north. Further, rural centre households were also more likely to 
apply and not discouraged as they were closer to the relatively more developed areas of 
the country. The households in the rural north of the country therefore were highly 
discouraged from borrowing. This shows that the rural areas of Malawi are very 
heterogeneous in their demand for credit. This could be linked to the disparity or 
unequal development across the country. As financial institutions are more inclined to 
be established in more developed areas it is realised that the central part of the country 
had majority of financial establishments as it is found in the IHS3 report that rural centre 
LVWKHOHDVWSRRUUHJLRQ7KLVFRXOGEHGXHWRLWVSUR[LPLW\WRWKHFRXQWU\¶VFDSLWDO7KLV
implies that the rural centre would be much closer to financial institutions than the other 
locations. The rural south compared to the other locations of the country is densely 
populated and has the highest level of poverty hence attract the least financial 
institutions. The dense population will also imply a huge pressure on the few financial 
institutions in the rural south. As the main driving force to this disparity between 
location is the level of development across the country, it is recommended that 
development programmes such as the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy, 
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Medium Term Expenditure Framework and the Public-Sector Investment Programmes 
should have location specific development goals. Location specific development goals 
will help identify specific development issues that needs to be addressed to help bring 
all locations to a close to equal developed level. For instance, as the south of Malawi is 
densely populated and also the highly-deprived area of the country, Conscious effort 
needs to be made to increase the level of development across the country and also create 
the enabling environment to attract financial institutions to deprived areas of the 
country. This should go a long way to bridge the poverty gap between the locations and 
further close up the inequality between the urban and rural areas of Malawi. Hence, 
there is a need for accelerated financial deepening policies so as increase access to credit 
across the country especially the north of the country and the south where there is a 
dense population in addition to high poverty levels. The government of Malawi¶V 
Financial Sector Technical Assistance Project financed by the World Bank and the 
Malawi Financial Sector Deepening Trust also supported by the World Bank, USAID 
and DFID, for example, which has the end goal of improving access to financial services 
and increasing financial literacy across the country especially in the deprived areas of 
Malawi should be properly managed to yield the required outcomes. 
The influence of social groups within rural Malawi cannot be underplayed. Since 
households living within rural areas have closer relationship with each other, 
information is easily shared amongst them. As a complement to extending financial 
services to rural communities, it will also be necessary to establish financial social clubs 
or events where financial literacy can be given. These clubs could be similar or replicate 
the Village Savings and Loans Associations which are being practiced in some rural 
areas in the country with successful ones like the Sanambe village savings and loan club 
in the Karonga South district of Malawi. As earlier explained these associations are 
made up of a group of individuals who meet regularly, pool money into a common pot 
which is given to a different member as credit during their meetings. Financial literacy 
or knowledge obtained during the meetings of such associations could then be passed on 
from those who attend to those who do not attend and this may further reduce the level 
of discouragement and increase participation in the credit market. However, this would 
have to be complemented with increase in the presence of financial institutions to meet 
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the demand for credit and other financial services. 
Households with extra resources should be encouraged to investment in assets such as 
livestock. The findings from the study showed that these assets increased the chance of a 
households obtaining credit. This may be because lenders accept these as collateral to 
advance credit to borrowers. These assets are possibly a proxy for wealth and 
households with more assets are considered as less risky borrowers. Rural households 
therefore should be encouraged to invest in livestock farming in addition to their crop 
farms. It may be in the same light that Self Help Africa, an NGO that has supported a 
number of village savings and loan associations, have supported individuals who have 
obtained credit from this programme to purchase livestock and also establish small 
shops and stalls. 
Finally, it is recognised that the open definition given to discouraged borrowers using 
the Malawi data may differ for another researcher. Despite that, the results are not 
expected to differ extremely from this study. Further empirical research needs to be 
done in other regions of sub-Saharan Africa so as to have a correct measure of those 
who are credit constrained when discouraged borrowers are also identified. The 
recommendations drawn from the results however are considered weak when 
considering the fact that the instrument used for the analysis was invalid. Therefore, 
recommendations drawn should be treated with caution as they may be invalidated 





Table A1: Correlation coefficient matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Male 1         
2. Head age -0.200*** 1        
3. Age squared -0.209*** 0.983*** 1       
4. Hhd. size 0.223*** -0.0240* -0.0954*** 1      
5. Location  -0.0671*** -0.0158 -0.00560 -0.0949*** 1     
6. Education 0.179*** -0.185*** -0.184*** 0.0258* -0.103*** 1    
7. Network  0.106*** -0.0348** -0.0489*** 0.128*** -0.126*** 0.100*** 1   
8. Land secured -0.0679*** 0.0702*** 0.0798*** -0.0601*** 0.0378*** -0.134*** -0.184*** 1  
9. Land size 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.103*** 0.219*** -0.102*** 0.0389*** 0.249*** -0.00957 1 
10. Home asset 0.273*** 0.00860 -0.0187 0.228*** -0.107*** 0.224*** 0.228*** -0.0988*** 0.246*** 
11. Farm asset 0.234*** 0.0763*** 0.0353** 0.297*** -0.197*** 0.0945*** 0.275*** 0.01000 0.334*** 
12. Livestock  0.129*** 0.0831*** 0.0534*** 0.244*** -0.177*** 0.0737*** 0.342*** 0.00963 0.273*** 
13. Remittance  -0.178*** 0.419*** 0.417*** -0.0781*** -0.0592*** -0.0630*** 0.0202 0.0387*** 0.0612*** 
14. MFI Distance 0.0367*** -0.0105 -0.00952 0.00439 -0.0634*** -0.0438*** 0.0226* 0.0324** 0.0733*** 
15. ADMARC D -0.00920 0.0143 0.0154 -0.00576 0.0607*** -0.0381*** 0.0333** 0.0518*** -0.00875 
16. FI num. 0.0313** 0.0210 0.0184 0.00888 -0.126*** 0.00663 0.0285** -0.0477*** 0.0311** 
17. Shock natural -0.0427*** 0.00502 0.00641 -0.0157 0.297*** -0.0474*** -0.0383*** 0.0460*** -0.0783*** 
18. Shock agric. 0.0236* -0.00635 -0.0115 0.0756*** -0.133*** 0.0102 0.142*** -0.0470*** 0.0762*** 
19. Shock hhd. -0.0519*** -0.0284** -0.0264* 0.0147 0.0449*** -0.00335 0.0479*** -0.0288** -0.00308 
20. Need credit  -0.00235 -0.0877*** -0.0938*** 0.0476*** 0.195*** -0.0613*** -0.0545*** 0.0234* -0.0746*** 
21. Apply credit 0.0965*** -0.102*** -0.112*** 0.101*** -0.0723*** 0.103*** 0.150*** -0.0952*** 0.0807*** 
22. Denied credit 0.0222 0.0372 0.0541* -0.0563* 0.0693** -0.0718** -0.0603* 0.0271 0.00110 
*










Table A1: Correlation coefficient matrix (continued) 
Variables 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
10. Home asset 1          
11. Farm asset 0.403*** 1         
12. Livestock 0.332*** 0.446*** 1        
13. Remittance 0.0480*** 0.0686*** 0.0874*** 1       
14. MFI Distance -0.00612 0.0476*** 0.0471*** -0.0172 1      
15. ADMARC D -0.00311 0.0237* 0.0456*** 0.0217* 0.103*** 1     
16. FI num. -0.0207 -0.0300** -0.0152 0.0114 -0.00432 -0.0288** 1    
17. Shock natural -0.0390*** -0.0754*** -0.0178 0.0186 -0.00415 0.0584*** -0.200*** 1   
18. Shock agric. 0.00429 0.0602*** 0.0708*** -0.00565 -0.0269* -0.0753*** 0.0452*** 0.0860*** 1  
19. Shock hhd. -0.0552*** -0.0521*** -0.0294** -0.0194 -0.0304** -0.0273* -0.0265* 0.175*** 0.367***  
20. Need credit -0.100*** -0.0671*** -0.0855*** -0.0973*** 0.00335 0.0319** -0.099*** 0.0692*** 0.0619*** 0.121*** 
21. Apply credit 0.0747*** 0.0848*** 0.0681*** -0.0542*** -0.0297* -0.0819*** -0.0148 0.0300* 0.112*** 0.108*** 
22. Denied credit -0.0947*** -0.0540* -0.0911*** 0.0223 0.0139 0.0488* -0.0615* 0.144*** -0.00102 0.00848 
*





Table A2: Mean of number of financial institutions across location 
Location Mean Std. Dev. Freq. Obs. 
Rural North 28.714072 16.097249 255,904 1,305 
Rural Centre 31.077113 32.585891 906,542 2,987 
Rural South 15.355008 18.257312 979,024 3,938 
Total 23.606993 26.279304 2,141,470 8,230 
Note: Weighted statistics 
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Table A3: Sensitivity analysis of interest rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Heckprobit Probit  
Variables Need credit a Apply credit b Denied credit c 
Male 0.0688* 0.136*** 0.346*** 
 (0.0380) (0.0432) (0.107) 
Head age 0.0132** 0.0130* -0.0199 
 (0.00558) (0.00773) (0.0150) 
Age squared -0.000187*** -0.000223*** 0.000204 
 (5.46e-05) (7.98e-05) (0.000177) 
Household size 0.0468*** 0.0352*** 0.00822 
 (0.00845) (0.00975) (0.0219) 
Rural Centre d 0.130* 0.366*** 0.378* 
 (0.0690) (0.0697) (0.194) 
Rural South 0.492*** 0.0399 0.0419 
 (0.0723) (0.0730) (0.115) 
Primary educ. e 0.0316 0.0888 -0.0195 
 (0.0545) (0.0590) (0.112) 
Higher educ. -0.145*** 0.220*** -0.0252 
 (0.0490) (0.0610) (0.128) 
Network  0.00420 0.0612*** 0.0258 
 (0.0104) (0.0114) (0.0283) 
Land size -0.0736*** 0.0402 0.103** 
 (0.0273) (0.0330) (0.0500) 
Land tenure 0.0475 -0.171*** -0.136 
 (0.0495) (0.0607) (0.113) 
Home asset -0.0190***   
 (0.00539)   
Farm asset 0.0159 0.0218 0.00282 
 (0.0127) (0.0142) (0.0254) 
Livestock -0.0110*** -0.00125 -0.0195** 
 (0.00400) (0.00460) (0.00796) 
Remittance  -0.0123** -0.0105 -0.00625 
 (0.00591) (0.00747) (0.0167) 
MFI Distance 0.0221 -0.0180 -0.00567 
 (0.0146) (0.0177) (0.0329) 
ADMARC Distance 0.0307* -0.0721***  
 (0.0157) (0.0217)  
FI number -0.0723*** -0.0694*** -0.116** 
 (0.0218) (0.0228) (0.0478) 
Shock (natural) -0.0574 0.217*** 0.559*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0509) (0.112) 
Shock (agric.) 0.141*** 0.0760* 0.0741 
 (0.0407) (0.0443) (0.0882) 
Shock (household) 0.256*** 0.244*** 0.124 
 (0.0358) (0.0407) (0.121) 
IMR apply   1.068** 
   (0.541) 
Constant -0.107 -1.494*** -1.818 
 (0.182) (0.220) (1.137) 
Log pseudolikelihood -7907.569  -1095.8048 
athrho 0.572** (0.233)  
rho 0.517 (0.171)  
Wald chi2 411.93***  82.60*** 
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Prob>chi2 0.0000  0.0000 
Wald test (rho=0) 6.02**   
Prob>chi2 0.0141   
Observations 8,230 8,230 1,711 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Need Credit = 1 if either discouraged, rejected or successful, 0 if non-borrower. b Apply credit = 1 if 
rejected or successful, 0 if discouraged. c Denied credit = 1 if denied credit, 0 if successful. d Base 





Table A4: Estimation of who needs and who gets credit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Heckprobit Probit 
VARIABLES Need credit a Apply credit b Denied credit c 
Male 0.0450 0.143*** 0.393*** 
 (0.0411) (0.0433) (0.112) 
Head age 0.0152** 0.0133* -0.0173 
 (0.00626) (0.00762) (0.0153) 
Age squared -0.000207*** -0.000229*** 0.000172 
 (6.06e-05) (7.90e-05) (0.000183) 
Household size 0.0524*** 0.0364*** 0.0138 
 (0.00960) (0.00972) (0.0231) 
Rural Centre d 0.168** 0.354*** 0.352* 
 (0.0749) (0.0671) (0.196) 
Rural South 0.655*** 0.0379 0.0225 
 (0.0786) (0.0709) (0.116) 
Primary educ. e -0.0522 0.0906 -0.0101 
 (0.0594) (0.0585) (0.113) 
Higher educ. -0.178*** 0.204*** 0.00384 
 (0.0522) (0.0578) (0.129) 
Network  -0.0137 0.0618*** 0.0315 
 (0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0298) 
Land size -0.0797*** 0.0367 0.113** 
 (0.0272) (0.0325) (0.0510) 
Land tenure 0.0525 -0.167*** -0.154 
 (0.0538) (0.0574) (0.116) 
Home asset -0.0364*** 0.000216 -0.0250** 
 (0.00632) (0.00581) (0.0105) 
Farm asset 0.00365 0.0248* 0.0178 
 (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0273) 
Livestock -0.0139*** -0.00203 -0.0180** 
 (0.00449) (0.00454) (0.00806) 
Remittance  -0.0191*** -0.00976 -0.00536 
 (0.00625) (0.00743) (0.0167) 
MFI Distance 0.0206 -0.0162 -0.00757 
 (0.0166) (0.0170) (0.0327) 
ADMARC Distance 0.0317 -0.0665***  
 (0.0203) (0.0200)  
FI number -0.0863*** -0.0707*** -0.121** 
 (0.0253) (0.0220) (0.0495) 
Shock (natural) -0.109** 0.220*** 0.566*** 
 (0.0436) (0.0487) (0.118) 
Shock (agric.) 0.230*** 0.0737* 0.0777 
 (0.0436) (0.0434) (0.0887) 
Shock (household) 0.282*** 0.250*** 0.135 
 (0.0410) (0.0396) (0.128) 
IMR apply   1.130** 
   (0.575) 
Constant 0.418** -1.564*** -1.967 
 (0.196) (0.206) (1.222) 
Log pseudolikelihood -7164.149  -1092.9118 
Athrho  0.519** (0.205)  
Rho  0.477*** (0.1587)  
Wald chi2 438.55***  91.55*** 
Prob>chi2 0.0000  0.0000 
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Wald test (rho=0) 6.38**   
Prob>chi2 0.0115   
Observations 8,230 8,230 1,711 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This model does not include an exclusion restriction. 
a Need Credit = 1 if either discouraged, rejected or successful, 0 if non-borrower. b Apply credit = 1 if 
rejected or successful, 0 if discouraged. c Denied credit = 1 if denied credit, 0 if successful. d Base 





CHAPTER 3  
 HOUSEHOLD CREDIT CONSTRAINTS AND CROP PRODUCTIVITY IN 
MALAWI 
3.1 Introduction  
According to IFAD (2011), productivity of farmers in Malawi has not improved since 
WKH ¶V GHVSLWH WKH DYDLODELOLW\ RI EHWWHU WHFKQRORJLHV ,QWHUQDWLRQDO )XQG IRU
Agricultural Development (IFAD) recommends that using improved seed varieties, 
together with applying fertilizers, adopting better crop husbandry and irrigation systems 
will potentially increase yields. However, inadequate financing has made this impossible 
for majority of farmers who live in rural locations in Malawi hindering their ability to 
produce to their potential.  
In addition to falling agricultural productivity, poverty has been one of the major 
challenges in rural Malawi and the country as a whole. From 2002 to 2011, almost 74 
percent of the population were below the income poverty line of $1.25 (UNDP, 2013). 
There is also little opportunity to engage in non-farm economic activities, so farmers are 
unable to diversify their source of income making it more difficult to obtain adequate 
capital for land cultivation. With market failure, typical for credit market, access to 
formal finance is very limited, hence making it very difficult to access credit. Banks and 
other financial institutions have no or little interest in lending to the agricultural sector 
firstly because it is made up of poor households in the rural areas, also due to the 
covariant risk associated with agriculture, lack of useable collateral by farm households 
and high transaction cost of delivering small loans, among others (Diagne and Zeller, 
2001).  
Credit constrained farmers face issues of low farm investment (Carter and Olinto, 2003) 
leading to low farm output (Feder et al., 1990) and hence low farm profit (Carter, 1989) 
which creates a vicious circle. Additionally, studies have shown that credit is a 
significant tool for development especially for the rural poor, helping them undertake 
important investments to improve their productivity and consumption. For this reason, 
increasing access to financial services and markets will enable agriculture to become a 
viable economic activity for the long term (RSC, 2012). As alluded by Diagne et al. 
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(2000), access to credit alone may not be adequate to alleviate poverty, however, they 
argue that this may be the only choice available to smallholders to finance production, 
especially when in the previous season the crop failed and therefore farmers had no 
other means of finance. 
Thus, there is the need to improve access to credit for rural smallholder farmers if 
productivity is expected to be improved. With agriculture being the most important 
economic activity in developing countries, especially in Malawi, any credit policy 
intervention that improves farm productivity would possibly have a great impact on 
IDUPHUV¶ OLYHOLKRRG5XUDO0DODZLSUHVHQWV DQ LQWHUHVWLQJ FDVHEHFDXVH RI WKH OHYHO RI
poverty in the country. At first glance, because of the level of poverty, it would be 
expected that almost all rural farmers in the country would be credit constrained, but 
data from the Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3) used in this study provides 
evidence of access to credit by some rural farm households; therefore, it would be 
empirically interesting to investigate whether this actually makes any impact on their 
farm productivity. 
Using an endogenous switching model, this study simultaneously examines the 
likelihood of a rural farm household being credit constrained or unconstrained and its 
LPSDFWRQ IDUPKRXVHKROG¶Vcrop productivity. Further, expected crop yield, treatment 
and heterogeneity effects will also be employed to estimate the counterfactual 
conditions of being in either a credit constrained or unconstrained household and its 
effect on crop productivity. Data from the Third Integrated Household Survey collected 
by the National Statistics Office of Malawi is used in the empirical analysis. The survey 
uses a direct elicitation approach to gather informatLRQ RQ KRXVHKROGV¶ FUHGLW PDUNHW
engagement which this study uses to group households into credit constrained and 
unconstrained households.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: section 2 examines sources and use of 
credit in rural Malawi. The impact of credit on productivity is presented in section 3. 
The endogenous switching model used for empirical estimations is then presented in 
section 4 together with the counterfactual conditions. The data employed for the analysis 
is also explained briefly together with the variables of interest in section 5. This is 
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followed by section 6 which presents and discusses the results obtained from the 
econometric estimation preceded by some descriptive statistics. Section 7 summarizes 
key findings and some policy implications of the study.  
3.2 Impact of agricultural credit  
There are a number of studies on the impact of credit access on farm output and 
productivity. Sial and Carter (1996) in a study in Pakistani Punjab observed that a first-
time borrower was able to make a return of 200 percent on the first rupee borrowed, but 
a randomly selected individual makes a return of 48 percent on an average sized credit. 
Guirkinger and Boucher (2008) and Ali et al. (2014) found that completely eliminating 
credit constraint would increase the value of farm output per hectare by 26 percent in 
Peru and 17 percent in Rwanda.  
Duong and Izumida (2002) analysing data from rural Vietnam concluded that 
households could both increase and optimise their production activities if they could 
sufficiently finance their production. This conclusion was drawn after they found a high 
positive elasticity of output with respect to credit. In Tunisia, Foltz (2004) found that 
higher debts of households brought about increasing profits. This implied that 
households were willing to take credit which could help them to be productive and 
hence profitable. However, Freeman et al.¶V (1998) study in Ethiopia and Kenya 
reported locational influence of credit. Using investment in crossbred dairy cows as 
proxy for credit, they found that in Ethiopia a percentage increase in credit increased 
productivity by 0.6 and 0.4 percent in constrained and unconstrained households 
respectively; while in Kenya productivity increased by 1.6 and 0.9 percent. 
Some studies have also found a weak significance of the impact credit has on farm 
productivity. Carter (1989) observed a weak positive impact of credit on the 
productivity of small farms in Nicaragua. Similarly, Feder et al. (1990) examined the 
effect of credit on output supply in the northeast part of China and estimated that 1 
percent increase in liquidity of credit constrained households would raise their 
production by 0.04 percent. This impact may be deemed to be quite low given the 
impacts from other regions or location. Inferring from these few studies, it could be 
emphasised that the impact of credit on farm productivity differs by geographic location.  
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In an attempt to explain why credit might have a low impact on productivity, Petrick 
(2004) found that farmers diverted credit to other purposes instead of production. 
Further, constrained households may be incapable of using their skills and knowledge 
adequately, as found by Dong et al. (2010)7KHLUVWXG\DUJXHGWKDWIDUPHUV¶FDSDELOLWLHV
and education were not fully utilized in credit constrained households making them 
unproductive while improved income for unconstrained households reflected a better 
use of their abilities and education. This was also evidenced for inputs use for 
SURGXFWLRQ+HQFHXQDYDLODELOLW\RIFUHGLWOLPLWVIDUPKRXVHKROGV¶DELOLW\WRWDSGHHSHU
into their innate abilities and acquired education.  
The mixed findings on the impact of credit on productivity across some developing 
countries necessitate country-specific studies to avoid generalizing findings across all 
developing countries. This has motivated the present study in rural Malawi. This present 
study is not the first on Malawi, a few related studies have previously been conducted in 
Malawi. Diagne and Zeller (2001) in their studies on the impact of credit on welfare in 
Malawi concluded that many smallholder farmers who received credit ended up with 
lesser net crop income than smallholders who did not participate in the credit market. 
This implied that farmers were better-off not taking credit. Further, Diagne (2002) also 
found that the level of access to credit did not contribute to the technical efficiency of 
KRXVHKROGV¶PDL]HFURSSURGXFWLRQORFDODQGK\EULGH[FHSW IRUDVPDOO LPSURYHPHQW
for tobacco production which is only grown in the Central and Northern regions of 
Malawi. Given these divergent views for Malawi it is necessary to conduct further 
studies on the impact of credit on productivity. The aforementioned studies are based on 
data collected in 1995 on only 404 households from 5 districts in Malawi. Hence, this 
may not be nationally representative and would not capture new evidences due to the 
year of the data collection. This current study on the other hand uses a representative 
nationwide survey but concentrates on only food crops.  
3.3 Empirical Strategy 
3.3.1 Endogenous Switching Model 
The easiest way of examining the impact of a household credit status is to add a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if the household is credit unconstrained and 0 if constrained in 
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the production function and after apply an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate to the 
model to produce the estimated results. However, doing this produces biased estimates 
because it assumes that the credit status of the household is randomly determined.  
Hence, the productivity (output/yield per hectare) of farm households considering their 
credit status is plagued with issues of heterogeneity and self-selection which leads to a 
problem of endogeneity. Households in themselves are heterogeneous in their 
characteristics by way of their endowments such as skills, abilities and resources, while 
WKHLUFUHGLWVWDWXVPD\EHDWWULEXWHGWRHLWKHUKRXVHKROGV¶VHOI-selection decision to either 
apply for credit or not, or lenders decision to either grant or deny credit to households 
which may affect their productivity level. Firstly, farm households have a combination 
of innate abilities and farm skills that could influence their level of productivity. Thus, a 
household with high level of farm skills and also credit unconstrained is more likely to 
be productive than a household with less skills and also credit constrained. Also, their 
endowments which may include collateral assets could influence their ability to obtain 
credit or even how much credit is obtained. Their level of skill which includes their level 
of education could determine whether households are able to understand credit contracts 
and therefore meet the requirements to obtain credit.  
)XUWKHUKRXVHKROGV¶GHFLVLRQWRSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHFUHGLWPDUNHWLVYROXQWDU\DQGPD\EH
based on individual self-selection. For example, households may not apply for credit if 
they consider themselves to be less productive, which could see them may run into debt 
and thus default in repayment should they take credit. On a counterargument, less 
productive households though knowing their productivity level to be low and/or being 
credit unworthy could still apply for credit and possibly obtain credit which is related to 
the issue of adverse selection. Also, lenders decision to either grant or deny credit 
applied for raises another issue of credit status being endogeneity. Among other 
VFUHHQLQJSURFHGXUHVOHQGHUVPD\XVHLQIRUPDWLRQRQIDUPHU¶VOHYHORISURGXFWLYLW\WR
screen good borrowers from bad borrowers. Judging rightly, lenders could provide or 
deny credit to households. Therefore, households credit status is not randomly 
determined which first raises issues of sample selection and also endogeneity as credit 
status may depend on other variables. Further, it could be argued that productive farmers 
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are productive because they had access to credit and inputs that could have improved 
their output (Freeman et al, 1998). On the other hand, unproductive farmers may have 
not applied for credit or been denied credit due to their history of low productivity or 
bad credit history. Also, as stated by Reyes et al. (2012), it is possible that a farm 
household that is less productive may have higher credit demand as compared to a more 
productive farm household. 
These therefore raises a problem of endogeneity brought about by sample selection bias 
on the credit constrained status of farm households. A commonly accepted was of 
avoiding the selection bias is to estimate an extra equation which explicitly models the 
selection process (Heckman, 1979). A switching regression model is employed to 
resolve the issues raised above as the assumption is that the relationship between 
productivity, the variable of interest, and some explanatory variables varies across 
discrete regimes, thus credit status (Dutoit, 2007). This estimation could be related to the 
study of Roy (1951) which considered the consequences for the occupational 
distribution of earnings in the presence of individual heterogeneity in skills and self-
selection into occupation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). According to Cameron and 
7ULYHGL  D QXPEHU RI DXWKRUV LQ WKH ¶V SURSRVHG PRGHOV ZLWK VLPLODU
problems that were estimable with cross-section data and this have been known as the 
Roy model (Roy, 1951). 7KLVPRGHOLVDOVRNQRZQDVWKH³VZLWFKLQJUHJUHVVLRQPRGel 
ZLWK HQGRJHQRXV VZLWFKLQJ´ 0DGGDOD DQG 1HOVRQ, 1975 and Maddala, 1983), or the 
³HQGRJHQRXVVZLWFKLQJPRGHO´DVH[SODLQHGE\/RNVKLQDQG6DMDLDRUWhe Tobit 
type 5 model (Amemiya, 1985).  
To present this model formerly based on the problem of this study, we define a latent 
variable ܥכ, which is the credit status of the households classified using responses from 
WKH VXUYH\ TXHVWLRQV LV XVHG WR GHWHUPLQH ZKLFK KRXVHKROGV¶ SURGXFWLYLW\ DUH
constrained or unconstrained due to credit. Households are said to be credit constrained 
if they were denied credit or discouraged from applying as discussed in chapter two of 
the thesis. Further, they are unconstrained if they received credit or did not require 
credit. This determines whether the outcome (output per hectare) for the unconstrained, 
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ܻ ?כ , or constrained, ܻ ?כ , is observed. Specifically, we observe whether ܥכ is positive 
(unconstrained) or negative (constrained), 
 ܥ ൌ ൜ ?ǡ ݂݅ܥכ ൐  ?ǡ ?ǡ ݂݅ܥכ ൑  ?ǡ (1) 
   
And hence we observe either one of the outcomes, ܻ ?כ  or ܻ ?כ  according to 
 ܻ ൌ ൜ ଵܻכǡ ݂݅ܥכ ൐  ?ǡଶܻכǡ ݂݅ܥכ ൑  ?ǡ (2) 
   
According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), it is normal to specify a linear model with 
additive errors for the latent variables, with  
 ܥכ ൌ ݖԢߙ ൅ ߤǡ (3) 
 ܻ ?כ ൌ ݔ ?Ԣ ߚ ?൅ ߝ ?ǡ (4) 
 ܻ ?כ ൌ ݔ ?Ԣ ߚ ?൅ ߝ ?Ǥ (5) 
   
Where ݖǡ ݔଵܽ݊݀ݔଶ, are vectors of exogenous variables, ߙǡ ߚଵܽ݊݀ߚଶ are vectors of 
parameters to be determined, ߤǡ ߝଵܽ݊݀ߝଶ are random disturbance terms. Thus, ܥכ is 
known as the sample selection equation and ܻ ?כ  and ܻ ?כ  are continuous dependent 
variables of the outcome equation.  Using OLS to estimate the parameters ߚ ? and ߚ ? 
yield inconsistent results because the expected value of the error term, from ܻ ?כ  and ܻ ?כ , 
conditional on the sample selection equation is non-zero hence correlated (Maddala 
1983).  
Hence, the parametric model for the correlated errors is said to have a joint normal 
distribution with mean zero and a variance-covariance matrix presented as; 
 ൥ ߤߝ ?ߝ ?൩  ?ܰۏێێێ
ۍ൥ ? ? ?൩ ǡ ൦  ? ߪߤ ? ߪߤ ?ߪ ? ? ߪ ? ?ߪ ? ?൪ےۑۑۑ
ېǡ  (6) 
   
Where the normalization ߪߤ ? ൌ  ? is used as the sign of ܥכ is observed. Further,  ߪ ? ? is 
said to be equal to zero, ሺߪଵଶ ൌ  ?ሻ, as we cannot observe ܻ ?כ  and ܻ ?כ  together as each is 
in one state or the other but cannot be in both. The likelihood function for the model, as 
adopted from Maddala (1983), is expressed as:  
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Where ݃ is the bivariate normal density function of ሺߝ ?ǡ ߤሻ and ݂ is also the bivariate 
normal density function of ሺߝ ?ǡ Ɋሻ,WLVXVXDOWRHVWLPDWHWKLVPRGHOXVLQJD+HFNPDQ¶V
two-step method applied to the truncated means, 
 ܧሾܻȁݔǡ ܥכ ൐  ?ሿ ൌ ݔଵᇱ ߚଵ ൅ ߪఓଵߣሺݖᇱߙሻǡ (8) 
 ܧሾܻȁݔǡ ܥכ ൑  ?ሿ ൌ ݔଶᇱ ߚଶ ൅ ߪఓଶߣሺെݖᇱߙሻǡ (9) 
   
Where ߣሺߜሻ ൌ ߶ሺߜሻȀɅሺɁሻ and as already shown ߪߤ ? ൌ  ?. For the first stage, which is a 
binary model, a probit estimation of whether or not ܥכ ൐  ? yields an estimate of ߙ and 
hence ߣሺݖᇱߙොሻǤ Two separate OLS regressions on the outcome equations yield direct 
estimates of ሺߚଵǡ ߪఓଵሻ and ሺߚଶǡ ߪఓଶሻ. Further, estimates of ߪ ? ? and ߪ ? ? is obtained using 
the squared residuals from the regressions. 
Endogenous switching models can be estimated one equation at a time either through a 
two-step least squares or maximum likelihood estimation process, but, these methods 
are inefficient and require cumbersome adjustments to derive consistent standard errors 
(Lokshin and Sajaia 2004). Hence to estimate this model, this study uses the movestay 
STATA command developed by Lokshin and Sajaia (2004) which implements the full-
information maximum likelihood method to simultaneously fit binary and continuous 
parts of the model in order to yield consistent standard errors. 
One major issue that must be considered when estimating such a model is the problem 
of identification. To resolve this, an exclusion restriction condition was imposed on the 
analysis. To this effect,ܼ௜  should contain at least one variable that is not contained 
in ௝ܺ௜Ǥ This additional variable should directly explain the farm households credit 




3.3.2 Conditional expectations, treatment and heterogeneity effects 
According to Cater and Milon (2005) and Di Falco et al. (2011) estimates from the 
endogenous regression model above is used to compare an expected outcome to some 
household decision yielding treatment and heterogeneity effects. Adapting the analysis 
to this study, firstly, the results from the endogenous switching model are used to (a) 
compare an expected crop productivity of rural farm households that are credit 
unconstrained and (b) to those that are credit constrained, and secondly, to examine the 
expected crop productivity in the counterfactual hypothetical cases to situations where 
(c) unconstrained households are considered constrained, and (d) constrained 
households are also considered as unconstrained. These conditional expectations for the 
outcome variables in the above scenarios are shown in Table 3.1 and also defined in 
equation (10) as follows: 
Table 3.1: Definition of Conditional expectations, treatment and heterogeneity 
effects 




ሺܽሻܧሺ ଵܻ௜ȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ ሺܿሻܧሺ ଶܻ௜ȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ ܶܶ 
Constrained Farm 
households 
ሺ݀ሻܧሺ ଵܻ௜ȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ ሺܾሻܧሺ ଶܻଵȁܥ௜ൌ  ?ሻ ܷܶ 
Heterogeneity 
effects 
ܤܪଵ ܤܪଶ ܶܪ 
Notes: (a) and (b) represent observed expected farm productivity; (c) and (d) capture the counterfactual 
expected crops productivity. ܥ௜ ൌ  ? if rural farm household is credit unconstrained and  ? otherwise.  ଵܻ௜ǣ crop productivity if the rural farm household is credit unconstrained  ଶܻ௜ǣ crop productivity if the rural farm household is credit constrained ܶܶǣ effect of the treatment (credit unconstrained) on the treated (credit unconstrained farm households) ܷܶǣ effect of the treatment (credit unconstrained) on the untreated (credit constrained farm households) ܤܪ௜ ǣ effect of base heterogeneity for farm households that are unconstrained and are constrained; ܶܪ ൌ ሺܶܶȂ ܷܶሻ, transitional heterogeneity. 
 
 (a) ܧሺ ଵܻ௜ȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ǡ ଵܺ௜ሻ ൌ ߚଵܺଵ௜ ൅ ߪଵ௨ߣଵ௜  
 (b) ܧሺ ଶܻ௜ȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ǡ ଶܺ௜ሻ ൌ ߚଶܺଶ௜ ൅ ߪଶ௨ߣଶ௜  
 (c) ܧሺ ଶܻ௜ȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ǡ ଵܺ௜ሻ ൌ ߚଵ ଵܺ௜ ൅ ߪଶ௨ߣଵ௜ (10) 
 (d) ܧሺ ଵܻ௜ȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ǡ ଵܺ௜ሻ ൌ ߚଶ ଵܺ௜ ൅ ߪଵ௨ߣଶ௜  
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According to Carter and Milon (2005) these expectations can be used to estimate the 
expected differences in the outcome variable (crop productivity) between the two 
regimes (credit unconstrained and constrained) as seen from the table. The differences 
obtained could capture the actual effect of credit status and differences in unobserved 
heterogeneity (Winship and Morgan, 1999). Distinguishing between these two 
according to Carter and Milon (2005) enables for good policy prescription. From Table 
3.1, cases (a) and (b) are the actual conditions observed in the data sample where (c) and 
(d) are the counterfactual expected crop production. The effect of credit unconstrained 
IRU WKRVH ZKR DUH FUHGLW XQFRQVWUDLQHG LV WKH ³HIIHFW RI WKH WUHDWPHQW RQ WKH WUHDWHG´
(TT) (Carter and Milon, 2005) and this can be calculated as the difference between (a) 
and (c) expressed as: 
 ܧሺ ଵܻ௜ȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ െ ܧሺ ଶܻ௜ȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ܺଵ௜ሺߚଵ െ ߚଶሻ ൅ ߣଵ௜ሺߪଵ௨ െ ߪଶ௨ሻ ൌ ܶܶ (11) 
This captures the effect of improved crop production of rural farm households that are 
actually credit unconstrained. Equally, rural farm households who are credit constrained 
EXWPD\EHFUHGLWXQFRQVWUDLQHGZKLFKLVWKH³HIIHFWRIWKHWUHDWPHQWRQWKHXQWUHDWHG´
(TU) (Carter and Milon, 2005) can also be calculated from the difference between (d) 
and (b) also expressed as: 
 ܧሺ ଵܻ௜ȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ െ ܧሺ ଶܻ௜ȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ܺଶ௜ሺߚଵ െ ߚଶሻ ൅ ߣଶ௜ሺߪଵ௨ െ ߪଶ௨ሻ ൌ ܷܶ (12) 
They explain that the parameter from calculating TT and TU produces the expected crop 
productivity effect of credit status on a randomly chosen household from the credit 
unconstrained and constrained households respectively. Heterogeneity effects as seen 
from the table can also be calculated from the expectations. Rural farm households that 
are unconstrained may more or less be productive than credit constrained households not 
because of their being credit unconstrained but due to some unobservable characteristics 
ZKLFK PD\ LQFOXGH KRXVHKROG PHPEHUV¶ LQQDWH DELOLW\ 7KH EDVH KHWHURJHQHLW\ HIIHFW
(BH) as described and adopted from Carter and Milon (2005) as the difference in crop 
productivity between credit unconstrained and constrained households is estimated for 
two states of nature with the first, ܤܪଵ, for households who are credit unconstrained 
captured as the difference between (a) and (d): 
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 ܧሺ ଵܻ௜ȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ െ ܧሺ ଵܻ௜ȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ߚଵሺ ଵܺ௜ െ ܺଶ௜ሻ ൅ ߪଵ௨ሺߣଵ௜ െ ߣଶ௜ሻ ൌ ܤܪଵ (13) 
and the second state, ܤܪଶ, for credit constrained households is also calculated as the 
difference between (c) and (b): 
 ܧሺ ଶܻ௜ȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ െ ܧሺ ଶܻଵȁܥ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ߚଶሺ ଵܺ௜ െ ܺଶ௜ሻ ൅ ߪଶ௨ሺߣଵ௜ െ ߣଶ௜ሻ ൌ ܤܪଶ (14) 
Another type of heterogeneity captured is the transitional heterogeneity ሺܶܪሻ described 
in this study as whether being credit unconstrained increases or decreases productivity 
for farm households that are actually credit unconstrained or in the counterfactual case 
for households who are constrained but deemed to be unconstrained. This is the 
difference between ܶܶ and ܷܶ (difference between ܤܪଵand ܤܪଶ also produces similar 
result). 
3.4 Data  
By the scope of the study, only rural farm households who cultivated and harvested any 
food crop within the 12 months prior to the period of the data collection are included 
and analysed. After deleting households with missing information, the sample used for 
the study reduced to 5,071 rural farm households. 
Though a panel data exists for the Malawi survey, after careful consideration and some 
trial estimations done, it was considered that given the time lag between the years, the 
effect of credit taken would have faded off after three years. Further, among households 
that provided information on the duration of their loans, it was realised that about 89.73 
percent of the recorded loans were short-term loan as they were to be repaid within 0 to 
12 months. Hence, the credit obtained were to yield whatever return possible to be 
repaid within a year. Hence, it was possible for credit borrowed to have an impact 
within the same period it was obtained and that remaining in year plus 3 may be small. 
Hence, the productivity obtained, among other factors, is also influenced by the inputs 
purchased using the credit obtained. It is also important to note that agricultural-related 
credit in Malawi is chiefly in-kind of inputs of fertilizer and seeds (Luboyeski et al, 
2004). Further, consumption purpose unlike productivity purpose of borrowing has an 
HYHQLPPHGLDWHHIIHFWRQDKRXVHKROGV¶ZHOIDUHDVFRQVXPDEOHJRRGVWDQJLEOHRUQRQ-
tangible goods, can be obtained immediately credit is obtained.  
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Data contained information on individual, household, and community levels. Relevant 
to this study was information on demographics, education of head of household, access 
to credit, value of assets, membership of social groups and household crop production 
among others. The dependent variable for the first stage maximum likelihood regression 
is the credit status of the household. This was constructed from responses to some 
credit-related questions. Majority of information in the data were obtained through 
GLUHFW HOLFLWDWLRQ DSSURDFK WKURXJK ZKLFK LQIRUPDWLRQ FRQFHUQLQJ KRXVHKROGV¶
engagement in the credit market was also obtained. The information was used to 
categorise households into either credit constrained or unconstrained households.  
 
Figure 3.1: Classification of constrained household based on IHS3 data 
 
Figure 3.1 presents the sequence of questions and how the categorisation was done. 
Households that applied for credit were asked whether they obtained credit or were 
denied. For this study, successful applicants were categorised as unconstrained 
households while denied borrowers were classified as constrained households. Some 
households did not apply at all and were split under credit constrained and 
unconstrained depending on their reason for not applying for credit. Those who stated 
that they did not need credit or were restricted by the high interest rate were categorised 
Household 
applied for 
















Too expensive (high interest rate) 










as unconstrained. However, those who stated reasons such as: fear of been refused, 
inadequate collateral, do not know any lender, were classified as constrained.  
The second stage regression captures the effect of the credit constrained status on farm 
productivity. Productivity has been measured in several ways but according to 
Dharmasiri (2012), it has been in defined in agricultural geography and economics as 
³RXWSXW SHU XQLW RI LQSXW´ S  7KXV Productivity is measured as the ratio of the 
quantity harvested (output) to the quantity of resource used in the course of production 
(input/factor). Output is the outcome of a production process (crop and/or livestock 
products) while input implies land, labour, pesticides, fertilizers, physical capital, etc. 
used in producing output. Productivity measures the efficiency of a production system. 
Hence, a higher productivity indicates producing more output from a given level of 
inputs. Productivity is measured in two ways: either in an aggregate level known as total 
factor productivity (TFP) or on an individual level known as partial factor productivity 
(PFP). For TFP all inputs used in the production process are considered while PFP 
measures the effectiveness of the individual factors of production. Hence for PFP we 
could have labour productivity, land productivity, etc. In measuring agricultural-
production performance, labour and/or land productivity are normally used as PFP is 
easy to measure (IFPRI, 2013). Further, the prices of all inputs are needed to calculate 
TFP which are not always available in survey studies making it easier to use the hectare 
of land cultivated for land productivity or the labour hours for labour productivity. As 
land and labour are the most common factors in rural areas, it is important to determine 
how efficient they are being used. Hence, this study uses yield productivity that shows 
output per hectare of land cultivated (Zepeda, 2001). 
The agricultural section of the survey instrument gathered questions on the final output 
of crops cultivated and harvested. This information was used to generate the household 
yield productivity variable for each household. Farm yield productivity was calculated 
as the value of farm crop output harvested per hectare during the last raining season9. 
                                                 
9
 Farm yield productivity was measured as the sum of the value of food crops harvested in each household 
per hectare of land cultivated (Diskin, 1997). Output of farm households were collected at the plot level. 
Most households owned multiple plots hence, the sum of harvested crops for all plots within each 
household were aggregated to total output at the household level. As output harvested were reported in 
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According to Diskin (1997), this is the most common indicator for agricultural 
productivity. As these are multiproduct farms, the value of farm production is an 
aggregate of total crops harvested by each farm household. The study only looked at 
food crops. Food crops cultivated within the households included maize, which is the 
staple food cultivated by majority of households in the sample, soybean, groundnut, and 
sorghum among others.  
3.4.1 Credit Constraint Determinants 
Variables used in the study are presented and defined in Table 3.2. Some household 
head demographic characteristics included age, gender and level of education. Increase 
in age is accompanied with rising experience with respect to the benefit and risk of 
taking credit. It is expected that older household heads, given their long-standing 
relationship especially with informal lenders, are more likely to be unconstrained. 
Household heads with no level of education compared to those with some level of 
education are also likely to be credit constrained. Higher education levels capture a 
higher human-capital endowment as those with higher level of education are more likely 
to be productive, obtain non-farm economic jobs that could offer a secured income 
which increases access to credit (Bendig et al., 2009).  
Table 3.2: Description of Variables 
Variable Type Definition 
Output per hectare 
(yield) 
Continuous  Output per hectare (value of all food crop cultivated per 
hectare of land cultivated in raining season) in Malawian 
Kwacha (MWK) 
Head age Continuous  Age of household head 
Educational level Categorical 1 no education, 2 Primary, 3 Higher 
Head Gender Binary 1 if household head is male, 0 if female 
Household size Continuous Number of members within the household 
Agro-ecological 
zones 
Categorical 1 Tropic-warm/sub arid, 2 Tropic-warm/ sub humid, 3 
Tropic-cool/semiarid and 4 Tropic-cool/sub humid 
Network (agric.)  Binary 1 if belong to an agricultural network, 0 otherwise  
Land size Continuous Total plot size cultivated during raining season in 
hectares (GPS-measured) 
Land tenure Binary 1 if secured land ownership and 0 otherwise 
                                                                                                                                               
different quantity units (like Kilogram, 50 KG Bag, 90 KG bag, pail, base, etc.) for similar and different 
crops, a common unit was needed to make productivity comparable between households therefore, prices 
of crops were used to estimate the value of farm output in Malawian Kwacha. Average Enumeration Area 
(EA) prices were estimated per crop per different quantity units. These were estimated from sale values of 
crops cultivated within each area. Also, total area cultivated by households were all converted from the 
various units of measurements to hectares.  
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Hired labour Continuous Head count of labour hired onto farm 
Farm asset  Total value of farm assets in MWK 
Livestock value Continuous Total value of household owned livestock in MWK 
ADMARC 
Distance 
Continuous Distance to a permanent ADMARC (Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation) branch 
Extension officer Binary 1 if there is an extension officer in the community, 0 
otherwise 
Temperature Continuous Temperature seasonality (standard deviation*100): the 
difference between the annual maximum and minimum 
temperature  
Other crops Binary 1 if other crops apart from maize was cultivate, 0 
otherwise 
Organic fertilizer Binary 1 if organic fertilizer was used, 0 otherwise 
Inorganic fertilizer Binary 1 if inorganic fertilizer was used, 0 otherwise 
Variable cost per 
hectare 
Continuous Total cost of inputs including fertilizers, seeds and cost 
of transporting these inputs in Malawi Kwacha 
MFI Distance Continuous Distance to a microfinance institution  
Financial Inst Continuous Number of financial institutions in each district 
Male headed households are likely to be less constrained than their female counterparts. 
Female-headed households are considered the poorer lacking many economic resources 
including land and other assets that could be used as collateral. Household size and 
location of the household were also considered. A larger household size may imply 
KLJKHU GHSHQGHQF\ UDWLR WKHUHIRUH FRXOG LQFUHDVH KRXVHKROGV¶ OLDELOLW\ 7KHUefore, a 
larger household would require more credit and would be more constrained than a 
smaller household. Location for this particular study was captured using the agro-
ecological zones of the country. As seen from Table 3.2 there are four agro-ecological 
zones within Malawi.  
Network groups enable social interaction between members and also transfer 
information and knowledge. Chloupkova and Bjønskov (2002) conclude that through 
H[LVWLQJ VRFLDO VWUXFWXUHV OLNH IDUPHUV¶ VRFLDO FDSLWDO DJULFXOWXUDO FUHGLW can be 
improved. Members of an agriculture group may not only focus on farm production but 
also share information on credit sources or even provide credit to each other. Hence, it is 
expected that being a member of an agricultural network would likely reduce credit 
constraint. A relatively larger land size could be used as collateral for particularly own 
land. Hence, it is likely that a household that has a large farm size and legally owns land 
could be credit unconstrained. Thus, access to land was seen to be negatively related to 
household credit constraint status in a study by Baiygunhi et al. (2010).  
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The value of assets which is disintegrated into value of farm assets, value of home assets 
and value of livestock are used as determinants of household credit constraint. Value of 
assets may be an indication of the relative wealth of the household. It is expected that 
relatively richer households would be credit unconstrained as these could be used as 
collateral for obtaining credit. This is similar to the expectation of Baiyegunhi et al. 
(2010) in their study in South Africa. Distance to Agricultural Development and 
Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) branch was also included as an explanatory 
variable. With the crucial role that ADMARC plays as an agricultural marketing board, 
households in communities with ADMARC are expected to have ready markets for their 
produce and more likely to be unconstrained as they may be deemed to be credit worthy 
to pay back loans.  
3.4.2 Productivity Determinants  
In addition to the above variables, other variables that directly affect farm productivity 
but not credit statuses were included in the productivity estimation equations. The 
presence of an agricultural extension officer in the community could indicate 
KRXVHKROGV¶DFFHVVWRVRPHfarming advice to boost productivity. It is expected that, the 
presence of agricultural extension officer would imply the existence of an agricultural 
H[WHQVLRQ SURJUDP ZKLFK FRXOG LQFUHDVH IDUPHUV¶ NQRZOHGJH DQG VNLOOV ZKLOH DOVR
promoting improved technology for an increase in productivity (Elias, 2013). Hence it is 
expected that the presence of extension officer in the community would positively 
influence farm productivity. Temperature seasonality was also included as a 
productivity determinant. Temperature seasonality is measured as the standard deviation 
of annual average temperature. High seasonal temperatures have been found to be 
detrimental to agricultural productivity (Battisti and Naylor, 2009) therefore an increase 
in temperature is expected to have a negative effect on farm productivity.  
Cultivating other food crops apart from maize on the same piece of land could increase 
productivity. Nitrogen fixing crops like soybean, intercropped with maize and other 
food plants could increase the soil quality and hence lead to higher productivity. 
However, Oseni et al. (2015) expected multi-cropping to reduce productivity as single 
crop farmers were more skilful and also experienced in cultivating single crops. 
 92 
 
Application of organic and inorganic fertilizers is also necessary for increase in 
productivity (Oseni et al., 2015). Application of fertilizers increase the soil quality of 
farm lands by increasing the nutrients and minerals in the soil which help plants to 
withstand the negative effects of crop diseases and pests, produce healthier crops, and 
further produce plentiful yield. It is therefore hypothesized that application of organic 
and inorganic fertilizers would have a positive effect on productivity. However, it is also 
expected that as inorganic fertilizer is an improved technology its application would lead 
to higher productivity than organic fertilizer. Further, expenditure on variable inputs like 
seeds and chemicals, such as herbicide and pesticide, is expected to also improve farm 
productivity. This variable was vital in a productivity study by Freeman et al. (1998). 
Land is the most important capital for farm production without which nothing can be 
cultivated. The size of land cultivated has been found to play a crucial role in the 
productivity of farms. Several studies in especially developing countries have noted an 
inverse relationship between farm size and production or output per hectare (Sen, 1975; 
Berry and Cline, 1979; Eastwood et al., 2010; Ali and Deininger, 2012 and Ali et al., 
2014). According to Lipton (1993), the main argument for this inverse relationship is 
that small farm holders avoid transaction cost, such as search, screening and supervision 
costs, in the labour market as they depend mostly on family labour thereby using more 
labour per hectare thus increasing output per hectare. With an increase in farm size, 
family labour is used in search for hiring labour, screening and supervision of labour 
thus increasing cost of production and also reducing labour per hectare. Further, poor 
rural households in developing countries lack the necessary capital to cultivate large 
lands therefore, are better at managing smaller farms and obtaining higher output per 
hectare. Hence it is also hypothesized in this study that land size will be inversely 
related to output per hectare. 
Place (2009) recognises that there is a heterogeneous effect of land tenure on 
agricultural productivity in the economics literature. Deininger and Jin (2006) in their 
study in Ethiopia found that a stronger land transfer rights had a significantly direct 
effect on farm investment and further on farm productivity. However, a study in Kenya 
by Hunt (2003) found that a land registration program had no significant impact on 
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productivity due to an undeveloped credit system. Further, a study in Malawi found no 
effect of land security on farm productivity although there was an increase in farm 
investment (Place and Otsuka, 2001). Hence the effect of land tenure on productivity in 
this study is also uncertain.   
Location of farms was captured by the agro-ecological zones as these zones have the 
potential of affecting farm productivity. Agro-ecological zones are areas divided into 
smaller units based on distribution of soil, land surface and climate. Further, these are 
geographical areas that exhibit same climatic conditions that govern their ability to 
support rain fed agriculture. According to Wood-Sichra and Wood (2014) tropical arid 
zones have some of the lowest production per hectare whiles subtropical arid and humid 
zones observe high productivity per hectare. However, the productivity effect of each is 
ambiguous as they could also be affected by other factors.  
The study used a head count of hired labour to measure the extent of labour from outside 
of the household that was employed on the farm. Hours worked by hired labour were not 
provided in the data hence the use of the head count. Households that are able to employ 
more additional labour to the family would be able to have more labour per hectare of 
land which would likely increase productivity. It is expected that households that are 
less constrained will employ more external labour due to cost involved. Hence, this is 
expected to result in a higher productivity for unconstrained households especially. This 
variable is also used in the study by Oseni et al. (2015) to explain productivity. 
Membership of an agricultural group has been noted to affect productivity of households 
as it endows farmers to achieve higher productivity (Godtland et al., 2004). In the study 
by Godtland et al. (2004), they found that participation in farmer-field school increased 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ knowledge in integrated pest management (IPM) compared to the non-
participants and further increased their potato productivity. It is therefore expected that 
farmers in agricultural groups would have increased knowledge in good farming 






Two variables were used as instrument to satisfy the exclusion restriction criteria or for 
identification purposes. The other two variables may be argued to be credit supply 
factors that would directly affect credit constraint status of the household but not farm 
productivity. These included the number of financial institutions within each district and 
the distance in kilometres from the community to a microfinance institution in the 
nearest community10. The greater the number of financial institutions in a district, the 
more accessible they are to communities and hence households. Therefore, the less 
credit constrained households might be. The same analogy is applied to the distance of a 
microfinance institution from a community. Where households or communities are 
closer to microfinance institution (MFI), the transaction cost of accessing the MFI 
reduces encouraging households to apply for credit. Further, a lesser distance implies 
WKDW0),¶VDUHDEOHWREHWWHUPRQLWRUERUURZHUVDWDUHODWLYHO\OHVVHUFRVW7KHGLVWDQFH
may also slightly reduce information asymmetry as MFIs closer to their clients may 
have more and slightly accurate information about their clients than those farther away 
from them. As stated by Presbitero and Rabellotti (2014) physical distance between 
borrowers and MFIs is considered as a proxy for agency costs, cost of monitoring and 
easing moral hazard. It is therefore expected that the farther away a community is to an 
MFI, the more constrained the households in that community would be. This variable 
hence is expected to directly affect access to credit more than on crop productivity. Data 
for the number of financial institutions in each district was obtained from the Financial 
Inclusion Laboratory (Finclusion Lab) made available by the Microfinance Information 
Exchange (MIX) (Finclusion Lab, 2014). 
3.5 Empirical results 
3.5.1 Descriptive results 
In general, about 20 percent of the rural farm households sampled applied for credit with 
just about 63 percent (13 percent of total sample) of them obtaining credit. About 66 
percent borrowed from informal sources and only 4.3 percent borrowed from a 
commercial bank. This confirms the dominance and importance of the informal lenders 
                                                 
10A community with the presence of a microfinance institution was given a distance value of zero.  
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in contributing to the rural development of Malawi. On the whole, about 37 percent of 
the reasons for taking credit were related to agricultural purposes which included 
purchasing inputs while 24 percent borrowed for consumption purposes. The rest 
included borrowing for a business start-up capital among other reasons. For those who 
were denied credit, 24 percent of them wanted the credit for agricultural related reasons, 
51 percent as business start-up capital and 15 percent for household consumption. 
Rural households in developing countries including Malawi are considered to be both 
producer of goods and consumers of these goods. They are also typically poor and 
constrained by a tight overall budget which must be allocated between immediate 
consumption and production. Therefore, decisions taken on one inevitably affects the 
other. Thus, poor households especially are unable to separate their production decisions 
from their consumption decisions. Hence, when a household borrows for production 
purposes (to purchase inputs) for example, it also frees some income or resources for 
consumption purpose which otherwise would have not been possible without credit. 
Hence, whether credit was obtained for production or consumption purpose, it 
ultimately has an effect on the other. 
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in the study. The means, 
standard deviations, minimum and maximum of the variables are grouped under credit 
constrained and unconstrained households. On the average, household heads are 43 
years of age slightly similar across both groups. Illiteracy, that is people with no level of 
formal education, is a major phenomenon in deprived areas, especially in rural areas of 
developing countries, and this is seen in the data. Almost 79 percent of the rural farm 
household heads were illiterate, and it is about 5 percent higher for constrained 
households as compared to unconstrained households. With a low level of formal 
education, adoption rate might be low and being able to understand formal loan 
application procedures might be difficult hence very likely to affect productivity. This 
may also account for the high levels of informal borrowing, among other factors.  
More than 74 percent of the household heads are male, with an average household size 
of approximately 5 members across all types of households. Majority of the households 
are located in the tropical warm semi-arid agro-ecological zone of the country. Social 
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capital enables transfer of knowledge and information. On the average 8 percent of 
unconstrained households are in an agricultural related group about 1 percent higher 
than constrained households. A greater percentage, 88 percent, of the cultivated land can 
be described to be legally owned through inheritance or purchase. Unconstrained 
households had a little larger land size than the constrained households; both types of 
households cultivated on average less than a hectare.  
The amount of hired labour by constrained household was approximately 5 persons 
compared to 9 for the unconstrained households. Additionally, unconstrained 
households had on average about two times more value of livestock. Distance to the 
nearest ADMARC branch was approximately 8 kilometres for the total sample. About 
30 percent of the communities had a farm extension officer. Also, 65 percent of the 
households cultivated other crops apart from maize. About 17 percent of all rural farm 
households used an organic fertilizer, while 86 percent of unconstrained households 
compared to 81 percent of constrained households used inorganic fertilizers. This may 
be linked to the fertilizer subsidy program of the government making fertilizer less 
expensive for both households. Finally, constrained households lived further away from 
microfinance institutions and also had on average lower number of financial institutions 
within their districts of abode. 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 Constrained Unconstrained Pooled 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Productivity 84412.1 181055.3 14.1203 3320080 110759.8 205095 95.04046 2503381 93161.75 189763.2 14.1203 3320080 
Head age 42.72453 16.32659 15 110 43.06413 16.41704 16 96 42.83731 16.35585 15 110 
No education .8178329 .3860392 0 1 .7309976 .4435729 0 1 .7889963 .4080613 0 1 
Primary .0912312 .2879801 0 1 .111639 .3150153 0 1 .0980083 .2973552 0 1 
Higher .0909359 .2875604 0 1 .1573634 .3642512 0 1 .1129955 .3166185 0 1 
Male .7304399 .4437968 0 1 .7719715 .4196857 0 1 .7442319 .4363351 0 1 
Household size 4.676115 2.147933 1 17 4.759501 2.212104 1 16 4.703806 2.169591 1 17 
Warm/semiarid .4960142 .5000579 0 1 .4091449 .4918221 0 1 .4671662 .49897 0 1 
Warm/subhumid .3483909 .4765309 0 1 .3313539 .4708398 0 1 .3427332 .47467 0 1 
Cool/semiarid .104222 .3055935 0 1 .1478622 .3550688 0 1 .1187143 .3234839 0 1 
Cool/subhumid .0513729 .2207898 0 1 .111639 .3150153 0 1 .0713863 .2574944 0 1 
Network (agric.) .0628875 .2427964 0 1 .0700713 .2553429 0 1 .0652731 .2470315 0 1 
Land size .7455303 .5956611 .0121406 7.122474 .8681692 .7224516 .0161874 8.081579 .7862568 .6430833 .0121406 8.081579 
Land secured .8960732 .3052106 0 1 .8610451 .3460022 0 1 .8844409 .319727 0 1 
Hired labour 5.054621 18.54089 0 450 8.538599 24.53703 0 630 6.211595 20.78782 0 630 
Farm asset 4429.323 17142.62 0 532000 9282.378 71781.27 0 2704650 6040.947 43725.15 0 2704650 
Home asset 12731.51 54097.44 0 1588000 27932.45 126849.5 0 2586548 17779.51 85715.39 0 2586548 
Livestock  20185.1 89331.18 0 3100000 39686.25 138859.4 0 3119200 26661.13 108694.7 0 3119200 
ADMARC Dist. 8.139962 5.161903 .13 33.74 8.007024 5.211189 .11 31.55 8.095815 5.178187 .11 33.74 
Extension Off. .2849129 .4514396 0 1 .314133 .4643075 0 1 .2946164 .4559151 0 1 
Temperature 2335.128 201.8605 1410 2967 2271.556 267.1171 1410 2942 2314.016 227.5857 1410 2967 
Other crops .6530853 .4760586 0 1 .6508314 .476849 0 1 .6523368 .4762754 0 1 
Org. fertilizers  .1685858 .3744409 0 1 .1947743 .3961445 0 1 .1772826 .3819453 0 1 
Inorg. fertilizers .8113375 .3912981 0 1 .861639 .3453811 0 1 .8280418 .3773813 0 1 
Input cost 4170.12 10330.58 0 177450 8153.407 18009.33 0 257370 5492.907 13507.69 0 257370 
MFI Distance 29.09943 24.36749 0 200 29.26802 24.91837 0 200 29.15541 24.54947 0 200 
Financial 
Institutions 
18.79274 24.36749 2 87 22.14192 26.79613 2 87 19.90495 24.8865 2 87 





3.5.2 Econometric results 
3.5.2.1 Determinants of household credit constrained status 
Table 3.4 presents estimated results from the Endogenous Switching model. The 
Wald chi square shows the overall significance of the estimated coefficients. This is 
statistically significant at 1 percent level. Hence, at least one of the estimated 
coefficients is significantly different from zero. The correlation coefficients (rho) are 
both negative but significant for only the correlation between the credit constraint 
status equation and the productivity equation for the constrained households. 
Inferring from the explanation from Lokshin and Sajaia (2004), since rho is positive 
and significant in the constrained equation, it suggests that a household that is 
constrained is less productive than a randomly selected household from the sample 
would but that for the unconstrained household is inconclusive. However, a Wald 
test for joint independence of the three equations was reported in the results table and 
shown to be significant. This is performed to test the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant correlation coefficient between the errors of the selection equation (credit 
constraint status) and the outcome equations (productivity equations) for the two 
regimes. From the estimates of the Wald tests of independence, it can be concluded 
that the null hypothesis of independence of equations between the selection 
equations and the outcome equations is rejected at 1 percent significance level. 
Hence, the estimation of the Endogenous Switching Model is the right econometric 
technique for the estimation of the model in this study. 
Column 1 of Table 3.4 presents estimates from the first stage probit equation of the 
determinants of the credit constraint status of the households. To improve the 
identification of the equation, two variables were included which included the 
distance to the nearest microfinance institution and the number of financial 
institutions within a district. The number of financial institution within a district was 
statistically significant at 5 percent level. Inferring from the results, households in 
districts with fewer financial institutions were more likely to credit constrained. The 
summary statistics showed that there were as little as two financial institutions in 
some of the districts which could imply less outreach increasing the chance of 
borrower discouragement due to not knowing any formal institution to apply to 
leading to a household being constrained. Though not significant the negative sign of 
the distance to the nearest MFI implies distance could contribute to a household 
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being credit constrained. This is corroborated by the study of Presbitero and 
Rabellotti (2014) who found that distance increased the operation cost of financial 
institutions including MFIs and therefore reduced the likelihood of credit being 
granted to borrowers. However, considering the correlation coefficient matrix 
presented in Table B1, the instruments (MFI distance and financial institutions) are 
argued to be invalid as they are correlated with the outcome variables, thus the 
productivity dependent variables, violating the assumptions under which an 
instrument should be valid. Hence, results might be influenced by endogeneity. 
Table 3.4: Determinants of Credit Constraints and Farm Productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Productivity 
 Selection Constrained  Unconstrained 
Age  -0.00869 0.0314 -0.181 
 (0.0652) (0.0733) (0.116) 
Primary education a 0.181** 0.0550 -0.286* 
 (0.0767) (0.0875) (0.161) 
Higher education 0.254*** 0.0351 -0.215 
 (0.0662) (0.0923) (0.168) 
Male -0.0215 0.0730 0.103 
 (0.0564) (0.0586) (0.109) 
Household size -0.00914 0.0752 0.164** 
 (0.0440) (0.0525) (0.0780) 
Tropic-warm/sub humid b 0.0448 0.164* 0.193 
 (0.0749) (0.0950) (0.122) 
Tropic-cool/semiarid 0.214** -0.115 -0.139 
 (0.107) (0.0934) (0.186) 
Tropic-cool/sub humid 0.381*** -0.143 -0.338 
 (0.114) (0.154) (0.246) 
Network (agric.) -0.00849 0.269*** 0.0260 
 (0.0929) (0.0989) (0.175) 
Land size 0.0397 -0.347*** -0.274*** 
 (0.0381) (0.0494) (0.0691) 
Land tenure 0.00174 -0.338*** -0.207* 
 (0.0657) (0.0787) (0.110) 
Hired labour 0.0893*** 0.105*** 0.00685 
 (0.0209) (0.0264) (0.0698) 
Farm asset 0.0304 0.0606*** -0.0276 
 (0.0210) (0.0196) (0.0393) 
Home asset 0.0121 0.0253*** 0.0463*** 
 (0.00743) (0.00821) (0.0168) 
Livestock  0.00369 0.0246*** 0.0197** 
 (0.00524) (0.00523) (0.00879) 
ADMARC Distance -0.101** 0.00772 -0.0422 
 (0.0394) (0.0476) (0.0969) 
Extension Officer 0.0909 0.173** 0.000265 
 (0.0730) (0.0742) (0.121) 
Temperature  -0.626* -1.654*** -1.151* 
 (0.356) (0.453) (0.589) 
Other crop -0.0158 0.437*** 0.402*** 
 (0.0573) (0.0692) (0.130) 
Org. fertilizers 0.0412 -0.0171 -0.00879 
 (0.0593) (0.0599) (0.106) 
Inorg. fertilizers 0.0359 0.368*** 0.241** 
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 (0.0627) (0.0692) (0.116) 
Input cost 0.00864 0.0190*** 0.0144 
 (0.00557) (0.00695) (0.0115) 
MFI Distance -0.0309   
 (0.0249)   
Financial Institutions  0.137**   
 (0.0564)   
Constant 3.779 21.33*** 20.65*** 
 (2.724) (3.614) (4.189) 
lnsigma ሺ ߪሻ   0.212*** 0.434 
  (0.0184) (0.282) 
athrho ሺ ߩሻ  -0.326** -1.027 
  (0.144) (0.761) 
Sigma  1.236 1.543 
  (0.023) (0.435) 
Rho  -0.315 -0.773 
  (0.129) (0.307) 
Log pseudolikelihood  -2891500.7  
Wald chi2 (22)  125.6*** P>chi2=0.0000 
Wald test c  8.71*** P>chi2=0.0032 
Wald chi2 (5) d  4.83 13.85** 
  P>chi2=0.4372 P>chi2=0.0161 
N   5071 
Notes:  
Robust Standard errors in parentheses;  
P-value of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Credit constrained: A household is defined as credit constrained if it is discouraged from borrowing or 
denied credit within the survey period and also defined as unconstrained if it received credit or does 
not need credit. 
All continuous variables are in logs hence their coefficients are interpreted as elasticities in the 
productivity equations in column 2 and 4.  
Base categories: a. Education: No education; b. Ecological Zone: Tropic-warm/sub arid;  
Selection equation: For constrained households, positive coefficients imply variables increase 
likelihood of being credit constrained and negative reduces likelihood of being constrained. Similarly, 
for unconstrained households, positive coefficients increase likelihood of being credit unconstrained 
and negative sign coefficients reduces the likelihood of being credit unconstrained. 
c. Wald Test of Independent Equations 
d. Wald chi2 on whether the demographic factors be excluded from the productivity equations. 
 
The levels of education were statistically significant in explaining the credit 
constraints of the household. The estimated results showed that household heads 
with some level of education were less likely to be constrained compared to those 
with no level of formal education. This increased with the level of education with 
those with higher education having a higher likelihood to be unconstrained than 
those with primary level of education. Highly educated household heads are 
expected to be relatively better in financial literacy and hence would be more likely 
to apply for credit. The results are confirmed by Ali et al. (2014) who found that 
education reduced all forms of credit rationing. Chen and Chivakul (2008) explain 
that lenders may be using higher level of education as a proxy for permanent income 
and therefore included it as a factor in their decision making.  
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3.5.2.2 Credit Status and Productivity 
This section looks at the impact of credit constrained status on food crop 
productivity. The estimates are from the second stage results of the Endogenous 
Switching Model, reported in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.4. Column 2 captures that 
for the credit constrained household while column 3 reports that for the credit 
unconstrained households. Results show that some variables were significant in one 
type of household but not in the other. Also, the significance levels often differed for 
variables that were statistically significant in both equations. This shows 
heterogeneity exists between the two household groups. A Wald chi-square test was 
also estimated with the null hypothesis that the demographic factors (age, gender and 
education of the household heads) including the household size were not important 
in the productivity equations. This was conducted as most of the variables, especially 
in the constrained households, were insignificant. The result from the test revealed 
that the demographic factors including the household size are jointly not significant 
in the constrained households but significant at 1 percent in the unconstrained 
households. This implies that these variables can be excluded from the constrained 
productivity function.  
First, the results also showed that an increase in the household size resulted in a 
positive effect on the productivity of unconstrained households. Thus, larger 
household sizes contributed to higher family labour supply, increase in labour per 
hectare and consequently higher productivity as evidenced in the study of Thapa 
(2007). The result shows that household size elasticity of productivity was about 
0.16 percent. However, as this is significant for only unconstrained households, it is 
likely that credit status also played a crucial role in affecting productivity. 
Unconstrained households are therefore able to smooth consumption in a relatively 
larger household which could translate into higher productivity. Similar result was 
found in the study by Duong and Izumida (2002) who linked number of adults to the 
family labour force and this was only found to be positively significant in the output 
supply of unconstrained household.  
Further from the productivity estimates in Table 3.4, it is found that tropic warm 
(sub humid) zones were more productive than the tropic warm (sub arid) zones for 
constrained only. Thus, a household in the tropic warm (sub humid) zone had an 
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increase in crop productivity by about 16 percent in the constrained household. This 
is thus supported by the findings of Wood-Sichra and Wood (2009) who found the 
tropical humid zones to be highly productive. It could be explained that, given 
favourable agro-ecological conditions, constrained households would capitalise on 
nature or their environment to be productive in the absence of credit.  
The membership in agricultural group increased the productivity of credit 
constrained households by about 27 percent but had no effect on the crop 
productivity of unconstrained households. It is deduced from the positive effect that 
constrained households are better empowered through their membership in 
agricultural groups which make them more productive. Thus, it could be possible 
that members support each other on their respective farms through the supply of 
farm labour or other inputs to compensate for being credit constrained. Although 
Godtland et al (2004) did not decompose households into credit constrained and 
unconstrained households, they generally found a positive effect of agricultural 
group membership on productivity. Similarly, the presence of an extension officer in 
the community was significant for only constrained households increasing 
productivity by about 17 percent. Constrained households could be deduced to utilise 
effectively the knowledge and skills acquired from their contact with an extension 
officer to increase their farm productivity in the absence of credit. The positive effect 
of an agricultural extension on productivity is also found by Elias et al. (2013).  
Similarly, an increase in the variable cost of inputs increased productivity for both 
constrained and unconstrained households. This is expected as purchasing inputs is 
seen as an investment which is more likely to increase farm productivity. As this is 
significant in both households, it is therefore evident that any purchase of inputs for 
production purpose is vital for farm productivity. However, this finding is contrasted 
in a study by Freeman et al. (1998) who found expenditure on variable inputs to be 
significant in productivity function for only constrained households in Ethiopia but 
insignificant for both credit statuses in Kenya. 
Value of household livestock also has the capacity to increase crop productivity. 
This improved crop yield between 2 to 2.5 percent for the households. It is likely that 
in the absence of credit to buy inputs or hire extra labour, constrained households 
especially use some of their livestock as animal traction and/or the livestock 
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droppings as manure which may have increased their farm productivity. Reardon et 
al (1997) found that households that used livestock as animal traction were allocative 
efficient as this allows them to cultivate at the right time of the season and provide 
farmers the chance to clear land for cultivation. 
On the contrary, 1 percent increase in land size decreased farm productivity by 0.35 
percent for constrained households and 0.27 percent for unconstrained households. 
This is corroborated by similar results found by Reardon et al. (1997), Ali and 
Deininger (2012) and Ali et al. (2014) all in Rwanda where cultivating on a smaller 
farm land was more productive than on a larger farm. Carter (1989) records four 
possible reasons for this to happen. Firstly, smallholders are deemed to be 
technically more efficient thus producing more output from given levels of inputs; 
decreasing returns to scale could be a feature of agricultural production; smallholders 
utilise greater quantities of variable inputs per hectare compared to relatively larger 
farms; and lastly, the inverse relationship witnessed could be because of higher 
quality of land on small farms. However, Dorwad (1999) in a study on farm size and 
productivity among smallholder farmers in Malawi identified a positive relationship 
EHWZHHQ IDUPVL]HDQGSURGXFWLYLW\ LQ WKH¶Vwhich he attributes to failures in 
land, capital and product market with severe capital constraints which consequently 
affects the capital and labour inputs of smallholders. 
Similarly, land tenure was observed to have a negative effect on the productivity of 
both type of households Thus, households that had land security were about 34 
percent (constrained) and 21 percent (unconstrained) less productive than a 
household without land security. This finding, in reference to credit unconstrained 
households is not supported by the study of Place and Otsuku (2001) who found no 
effect in a study on Malawi. However, the results may be consistent with the 
economics literature as noted by Place (2009) that there is both divergent and 
convergent views on the effect land tenure on agricultural production in Africa. The 
contradiction in results with that of Place and Otsuku (2001) could imply that land 
tenure, although important in land ownership, have a heterogeneous effect on 




High temperature levels decreased the productivity of both constrained and 
unconstrained households. High temperatures induce droughts implying less rainfall. 
As farmers in Malawi are dependent on rainfall for irrigation, their productivity is 
likely to be very poor during periods of high temperature. This is corroborated by 
Battisti and Naylor (2009) who stated that high seasonal temperatures have been 
established to be damaging on agricultural productivity. 
Further, cultivation of other crops apart from maize increased the productivity of 
both credit groups. Hence, the estimates confirm the well-known fact that multi-
cropping is more productive and efficient way of farming compared to single-
cropping. Cultivating multiple crops increased productivity of households by about 
42 percent for both credit constrained and unconstrained households. This is contrary 
to the findings of Oseni et al. (2015) who found no evidence of the effect of multi-
cropping on productivity. Applying inorganic fertilizers also increases productivity 
by as much as 37 percent for constrained households and 24 percent for credit 
unconstrained households. This result could be reflective of the government fertilizer 
subsidies given to farmers in rural Malawi. Hypothetically, where the main inputs 
needed by constrained households is fertilizer, obtaining such fertilizer subsidy is 
more likely to have a much larger impact on their productivity than for 
unconstrained households who possibly have the means of obtaining fertilizer. This 
positive effect was expected as this is an improved technology that would shift the 
production frontier outwards. This is consistent with the findings by Okoye et al. 
(2007) and Ukoha et al. (2010).  
3.5.2.3 Expected crop production, treatment and heterogeneity 
effects 
Table 3.5 presents the expected crop output produced per hectare under actual and 
counterfactual conditions for rural farm households in Malawi. These are obtained 
from estimates from the endogenous switching model. Figures in the table labelled 
(a) and (b) are the actual observed crop output per hectare from the data sample used. 
Expected output for households that were unconstrained was 10.77 just a little higher 
than households that were constrained with an output of 10.48. To conclude from 
this comparison that unconstrained households are more productive than constrained 
households may be misleading, as other unobserved characteristics that may impact 
productivity have not been accounted for (Carter and Milon, 2005). To overcome 
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this, the last row of Table 3.5 adjusts for the base heterogeneity and shows the 
differences in expected productivity. With the counterfactual condition that the 
constrained households were instead unconstrained, the households that were 
actually unconstrained would be expected to be about 1.81 percent less productive. 
Likewise, on the counterfactual condition that the unconstrained households were 
constrained, the unconstrained household were again about 0.44 percent less 
productive. In either condition, unconstrained households are less productive than 
the constrained households. The differences, inferring from the study by Carter and 
Milon (2005), reflect systematic causes of deviation between the two types of 
households that may not otherwise be entirely accounted for in the observable 
determinants of crop productivity.  
Table 3.5: Expected Crop Output, Treatment and Heterogeneity Effect 
Sub-samples  
(farm households) 
Credit Status Treatment Effects 
Unconstrained Constrained 
Unconstrained ሺܽሻ ? ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ሺܿሻ ? ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?*** 
   ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሻ 
Constrained ሺ݀ሻ ? ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ሺܾሻ ? ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ?*** 
   ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሻ 
Heterogeneity effects െ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ?***
 
െ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?***
 
െ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ?ሻ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ሻ  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; P-value of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The treatment effect of credit constrained as the expected change in productivity in 
each credit status is presented in the third column of Table 3.5. For the households 
who are credit unconstrained, the mean effect of being credit unconstrained, that is 
the effect of the treatment on the treated (TT), saw an increase in productivity by 
0.73 percent. Similarly, constrained households who are considered credit 
unconstrained, that is effect of the treatment on the untreated (TU), will have their 
productivity also increase by 2.1 percent. In both cases, productivity increased 
implying that being credit unconstrained increases or improves productivity or crop 
yield. However, the transitional heterogeneity effect, which shows whether the 
difference in the TT is greater or lesser than the TU, is negative (thus, TU is higher 
than TT) which implies that the effect of being credit unconstrained is higher for 
constrained households should they become credit unconstrained.  
Although impact may be marginal, it makes a good policy argument for the 
development of the credit market in rural Malawi which could drastically improve 
 106 
 
productivity in Malawi. This finding is however not consistent with the study of 
Diagne and Zeller (2001) who found in their assessment of the impact of credit on 
welfare in Malawi concluded that households who choose to borrow were instead 
disadvantaged as they obtained lesser net crop income compared to those who did 
not borrow. However, as it has been more than a decade since that study, it could be 
argued that some improvement has occurred in the rural credit market for which this 
benefit is being observed. 
3.5.2.4 Robustness Checks 
As a robustness check, the study replicated the crop productivity determinants using 
output per labour as the dependent variable. This is presented in Table B2 in the 
appendix section. The output per labour is the total value of food crop harvested 
divided by the number of members within the household. Similar to the preliminary 
results from the output per hectare model, the rhos ሺߩᇱݏሻ are both negative but only 
significant for the credit constrained households. However, the Wald test of joint 
independence of the three equations was significant at 1 percent level rejecting the 
null hypothesis that the three equations are not correlated.  Results of the 
determinants were quite similar to that of the output per hectare results with respect 
to direction of effect. However, there were some extra variables such as age of the 
household head and belonging to an agricultural network that were also significant 
but maintained the same sign.  
The treatment effects using output per labour was also conducted and is presented in 
Table B3 in appendix B. Though the magnitudes are different, similar results are 
obtained generally as in Table 3.5. The treatment on the treated and on the untreated 
were both positive implying an improvement in productivity with that of the 
untreated, that is constrained households, being larger than that of the of 
unconstrained results. This also leads to a negative transitional heterogeneity effect 
implying that the constrained households would be more productive should they 
become credit unconstrained. This results therefore buttresses the point on improving 
the access to credit in rural Malawi. 
3.6 Conclusion  
Using a cross-sectional national representative household survey, the study examined 
the impact of credit status on crop productivity in rural Malawi. The usable sample 
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included 5,071 rural farm households who had cultivated and harvested food crops in 
the previous \HDU¶VUDLQ\VHDVRQ7KHVWXG\HPSOR\VDQHQGRJHQRXVVZLWFKLQJPRGHO
using a Heckman selection model to simultaneously examine the determinants of 
household credit status and its impact on farm productivity. In utilizing this model, 
the study is able to address the problem of sample selection bias and endogeneity.  
The study makes some general observations. Firstly, the results show that credit 
unconstrained groups had some differing characteristics compared to the credit 
constrained households. Hence the model for the analysis which separates the two 
types of credit status households makes this an efficient method of estimation. On 
the contrary, should a dummy variable capturing the credit status be added to an 
OLS estimation of productivity (ignoring the fact that it suffers from sample 
selection bias), these differences between the credit statuses of households would not 
have been noticed. As an example, the household size increase the productivity of 
unconstrained households, while no observed was found for the constrained 
households. Further, value of farm asset and livestock, presence of an extension 
officer in the community, participation in agricultural group and hired labour 
affected constrained households¶ productivity but had no effect on the productivity 
of unconstrained households. 
Secondly, the variables used as exclusion restriction variables were considered 
invalid judging from the correlation coefficient matrix. Thus, they were highly 
correlated with outcome variables violating the validity assumption of instrumental 
variables. Also, the study recognises that there is a possible issue of endogeneity 
caused by reverse causality. This is because, it is possible for farm productivity to 
also affect household credit constraint status. Thus, lenders are more likely to give 
credit to only productive households. These issues therefore, renders the 
recommendations drawn from the findings in the analysis weak and hence should be 
treated with caution. 
Agricultural networks were identified to be a key determinant in increasing 
productivity especially for constrained households. It can be implied that these 
households could be benefiting from members supporting each other through 
supplying farm labour to each other. Hence, it is recommended that in areas in rural 
Malawi that are yet to have developed or any credit markets in their location, 
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agricultural networks could be formed so as members could share resources, such as 
labour and farm inputs, among each other. It is further recommended that the 
members in these social networks as an addition to supporting each other in-kind 
could also pull savings together which is given to a different member of the network 
at some regularly periods. Thus, following the model of the rotating savings and 
credit associations (ROSCA) or the village savings and loan associations (VSLA) 
which is an improvement of ROSCA. Thus, through this, members become both 
lenders and borrowers at different points in time. The VSLA as a social network 
practised in some rural areas in Malawi has been found to be an essential tool for 
improving household welfare (Ksoll et al., 2016). 
Further, as the presence of extension officers has significant impact on the 
productivity of constrained households mostly, it is also recommended that extension 
programmes should be intensified in areas with little or no credit market. More 
extension officers should be trained and deployed to rural areas to reduce the farmer-
H[WHQVLRQ RIILFHU UDWLR 7KH *RYHUQPHQW RI 0DODZL¶V SXEOLF H[WHQVLRQ VHUYLFH KDV
about 2,175 staff as at 2011 serving farmers at the national level (GFRAS, 2016). It 
is likely this may be smaller on the local level due to lack of resources. However, the 
JRYHUQPHQWRI0DODZL¶VSOXUDOLVWLFH[WHQVLRQSROLFLHVKDYHLQIOXHQFHGDQLQFUHDVHLQ
the particLSDWLRQ RI WKH SULYDWH VHFWRU LQFOXGLQJ 1*2¶V PXOWLODWHUDO RUJDQLVDWLRQV
and farm based organisations among others in extension programmes to farmers in 
Malawi (GFRAS, 2016). Adequately harnessing this extra support from the private 
sector should increase the impact on both credit constrained and unconstrained 
households. 
One other important factor that increases productivity of food crop production was 
inorganic fertilizer application. It was found that constrained households had a 
greater productivity than unconstrained households who applied inorganic fertilizers 
WR WKHLU IDUPV7KHJRYHUQPHQWRI0DODZL¶V IDUP LQSXW VXEVLG\SURJUDPPHZKLFK
gives subsidized fertilizers and seeds to farmers is probably what has increased the 
use of fertilizers by constrained households. There is also evidence of its significant 
impact, that is increasing the national maize production and productivity which led 
to an increase in real wages and reduction in poverty (Dorward and Chirwa, 2011). It 
is therefore recommended that the government subsidy programme should be 
carefully managed and also directed to areas with little or no credit markets as it may 
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be that fertilizers are mostly what some constrained households need to become 
productive as seen in this study. Further, it is recommended that extension 
programmes or officers should propagate the benefits of intercropping as it has been 
identified to increase farm productivity. Nitrogen-fixing crops, such as soybeans and 
peanuts, should be intercropped with food crops like maize to increase the yield of 
the food crops and also gain extra harvest from these nitrogen-fixing plants. 
/LYHVWRFNZDVDOVRLGHQWLILHGDVDQLPSRUWDQWIDFWRUWRLQFUHDVLQJIDUPKRXVHKROGV¶
productivity in both households. Livestock are used sometimes as a store of wealth 
and especially as farm inputs (for example oxen) for ploughing. The droppings from 
some livestock are also used as manure, that is organic fertilizer, though this was not 
significant in this study. Given this importance of livestock, it is recommended that 
farmers use part of any gain from the farm or credit obtained to purchase some 
livestock if they can afford them.  
The study also shows that there is a positive effect of a household being credit 
unconstrained on productivity. The findings suggest that a household that is 
constrained is less productive than a randomly selected household from the sample 
would but that for the unconstrained household is inconclusive however, the 
counterfactual arguments as seen from the analysis shows that being credit 
unconstrained was beneficial to increasing productivity. The effect of the treatment 
on the treated and the untreated all show that productivity would increase due to a 
household being credit unconstrained. Thus, credit constrained is a great limitation to 
the improvement in farm productivity. Also, as there is limited access to credit in 
rural areas due to credit market failure, it implies that those obtaining credit may not 
be obtaining the maximum credit needed to achieve the optimum potential of their 
farm productivity. Hence, as these gains have been marginal, it is argued that an 
improvement in the rural credit market could see further increase in productivity and 
other household welfare indicators. Therefore, it is recommended that the 
government should plan and implement credit programmes that could provide credit 
to these poor rural farm households to increase their productivity. Also, the already 
existing government credit programme like the Malawi Rural Finance Company 
should be tasked to improve on its outreach activities so that its core mandate of 
providing credit to rural areas of Malawi to promote economic development are 
achieved. Further, as recommended in Chapter 2, village savings and loans 
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associations should be encouraged in rural areas in the short term until the formal 
credit markets are developed in these areas. These associations could be a way of 
avoiding paying the high interest rates charged by the traditional informal lenders as 
in this association farmers would pool savings together and give out as credit to each 
other one at time. Hence, they become their own lenders. 
Further, it was also found that distance to microfinance institutions had an inverse 
effect on the credit constrained status of households. Households which lived in 
locations with relatively more financial institutions were less credit constrained. This 
presents a case for the government to provide the enabling environment that would 
increase the outreach of other formal financial institutions within rural Malawi. This 
will increase the financial institutions, provide diverse financial services and also 
bring financial markets closer to the rural households. 
Lastly, in agreeing with Freeman et al. (1998) that borrowers are not homogenous in 
their demand for credit, it is further argued that constrained and unconstrained 
groups are also not homogenous within themselves as they are aggregation of several 
credit statuses. It will be interesting to find the effect each disintegrated or 
identifiable credit status has on productivity and whether the aggregation hides vital 





Table B1: Correlation coefficient matrix  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Constrained 1         
2. Land productivity 0.109*** 1        
3. Labour Productivity 0.0844*** 0.697*** 1       
4.Head age 0.0116 -0.0207 -0.0359* 1      
5. Education 0.108*** 0.101*** 0.130*** -0.167*** 1     
6. Male 0.0448** 0.0810*** 0.0131 -0.185*** 0.165*** 1    
7. Household size 0.0120 0.0805*** -0.0538*** -0.0267 0.0416** 0.261*** 1   
8. Agro-ecological zones  0.130*** 0.0375** 0.0343* 0.00685 0.0334* 0.0356* 0.0187 1  
9. Network (agric.) 0.0137 0.0525*** -0.00642 0.0350* 0.0272 0.0177 0.0317* -0.0139 1 
10. Land size 0.0752*** -0.0140 -0.0608*** 0.183*** 0.0289* 0.159*** 0.243*** 0.106*** 0.0468*** 
11. Land secured -0.0516*** -0.112*** -0.0976*** 0.0620*** -0.137*** -0.0550*** -0.0517*** 0.0528*** -0.0493*** 
12. Hired labour 0.149*** 0.182*** 0.186*** 0.0525*** 0.171*** 0.0118 -0.0490*** 0.0434** 0.0536*** 
13. Farm asset 0.111*** 0.158*** 0.0450** 0.128*** 0.0929*** 0.254*** 0.295*** 0.114*** 0.0475*** 
14. Home asset 0.121*** 0.203*** 0.163*** 0.0392** 0.232*** 0.282*** 0.209*** 0.0383** 0.0474*** 
15. Livestock 0.0946*** 0.180*** 0.0652*** 0.128*** 0.0707*** 0.140*** 0.225*** 0.0802*** 0.0243 
16. ADMARC D. -0.0299* -0.0349* -0.0386** 0.0147 -0.0146 0.0155 0.000975 0.00918 -0.0248 
17. Extension Officer 0.0302* 0.0156 0.0441** -0.0242 0.0882*** 0.0398** 0.0231 0.0138 0.00260 
18. Temperature -0.140*** -0.177*** -0.130*** -0.0269 -0.0304* -0.00352 -0.00845 -0.255*** 0.0261 
19. Other crops -0.00223 0.122*** -0.0598*** 0.0120 -0.0564*** -0.0104 0.0141 -0.0251 0.0202 
20. Organic fertilizer 0.0323* 0.0357* -0.0303* 0.0320* 0.0238 0.0461** 0.0702*** 0.00809 0.0383** 
21. Inorganic fertilizer 0.0628*** 0.149*** 0.0798*** 0.0649*** 0.101*** 0.0634*** 0.0922*** 0.0585*** 0.0633*** 
22. Input cost 0.113*** 0.164*** 0.0878*** -0.0963*** 0.196*** 0.202*** 0.158*** 0.111*** 0.0894*** 
23. MFI Distance -0.00173 -0.0355* -0.0650*** -0.0230 -0.0320* 0.0504*** -0.00266 0.109*** -0.0305* 





Table B1: Correlation coefficient matrix (continued) 
 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
10. Land size 1         
11. Land secured -0.00191 1        
12. Hired labour 0.259*** -0.128*** 1       
13. Farm asset 0.404*** -0.000304 0.197*** 1      
14. Home asset 0.281*** -0.110*** 0.259*** 0.407*** 1     
15. Livestock 0.312*** 0.00925 0.176*** 0.451*** 0.315*** 1    
16. ADMARC D. 0.0134 0.0521*** -0.0221 0.0339* -0.0107 0.0426** 1   
17. Extension Officer 0.0297* -0.0465*** 0.0320* 0.00863 0.0320* -0.0227 -0.0667*** 1  
18. Temperature 0.0262 -0.00417 -0.0680*** -0.116*** -0.0738*** -0.150*** -0.0862*** 0.113*** 1 
19. Other crops 0.181*** 0.0366** 0.0442** 0.0983*** 0.0468*** 0.119*** -0.00329 -0.0650*** 0.0191 
20. Organic fertilizer 0.135*** 0.0192 0.0771*** 0.139*** 0.0742*** 0.140*** -0.0115 0.0205 0.0758*** 
21. Inorganic fertilizer 0.169*** -0.0192 0.130*** 0.179*** 0.173*** 0.151*** -0.0474*** 0.0584*** 0.0133 
22. Input cost 0.264*** -0.121*** 0.251*** 0.240*** 0.263*** 0.172*** -0.0482*** 0.0498*** 0.0207 
23. MFI Distance 0.106*** 0.0483*** -0.00997 0.0473*** 0.0131 0.0538*** 0.149*** 0.00273 0.00782 
24. Financial Inst. 0.0349* -0.0954*** 0.0648*** 0.00633 -0.0000879 -0.0301* -0.0705*** -0.0144 0.112*** 
 
Table B1: Correlation coefficient matrix (continued) 
 19 20 21 22 23 24 
19. Other crops 1      
20. Organic fertilizer 0.0613*** 1     
21. Inorganic fertilizer 0.0316* 0.0446** 1    
22. Input cost -0.0232 0.0903*** 0.236*** 1   
23. MFI Distance 0.0432** 0.0215 -0.0279* -0.0153 1  
24. Financial Inst. -0.115*** 0.0389** 0.0136 0.0637*** 0.0157 1 
*
 p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B2: Determinants of credit constraint and crop labour productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Land Productivity 
 Selection Constrained Unconstrained 
Age  -0.0114 -0.0594 -0.311** 
 (0.0641) (0.0826) (0.127) 
Primary education a 0.181** 0.0582 -0.335* 
 (0.0770) (0.0970) (0.198) 
Higher education 0.254*** 0.120 0.123 
 (0.0664) (0.105) (0.225) 
Male -0.0130 -0.0270 -0.155 
 (0.0582) (0.0685) (0.122) 
Household size -0.0188 -0.129** -0.207** 
 (0.0431) (0.0568) (0.0933) 
Tropic-warm/sub humid b 0.0376 0.321*** 0.330** 
 (0.0793) (0.104) (0.135) 
Tropic-cool/semiarid 0.209* -0.0820 -0.0270 
 (0.109) (0.125) (0.242) 
Tropic-cool/sub humid 0.395*** -0.0619 -0.181 
 (0.113) (0.206) (0.329) 
Network (agric.) 0.00845 0.00716 -0.264 
 (0.0945) (0.113) (0.213) 
Land size 0.0390 -0.224*** -0.219*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0512) (0.0742) 
Land tenure -0.00123 -0.193** -0.265** 
 (0.0663) (0.0904) (0.126) 
Hired labour 0.0955*** 0.127*** 0.113* 
 (0.0212) (0.0334) (0.0656) 
Farm asset 0.0336 0.00995 -0.00745 
 (0.0205) (0.0236) (0.0410) 
Home asset 0.0136* 0.0426*** 0.0446** 
 (0.00727) (0.00952) (0.0176) 
Livestock  0.00286 0.0112* 0.00474 
 (0.00543) (0.00648) (0.0119) 
ADMARC Distance -0.100*** -0.0329 0.000592 
 (0.0389) (0.0526) (0.117) 
Extension Officer 0.103 0.164* 0.0906 
 (0.0721) (0.0941) (0.138) 
Temperature  -0.602* -1.179** -0.381 
 (0.357) (0.465) (0.630) 
Other crop -0.0183 -0.176** -0.0977 
 (0.0564) (0.0795) (0.134) 
Org. fertilizers 0.0507 -0.109 -0.115 
 (0.0595) (0.0740) (0.130) 
Inorg. fertilizers 0.0338 0.123* 0.312** 
 (0.0625) (0.0716) (0.131) 
Input cost 0.00814 -0.00510 0.00734 
 (0.00565) (0.00759) (0.0131) 
MFI Distance -0.0501**   
 (0.0223)   
Financial Institutions  0.134**   
 (0.0591)   
Constant 3.648 12.01*** 8.798* 
 (2.724) (3.685) (4.610) 
lnsigma ሺ ߪሻ  0.314*** 0.590** 
  (0.0228) (0.298) 
athrho ሺ ߩሻ  -0.407*** -1.028 
  (0.154) (0.800) 
Sigma   1.369 1.803 
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  (0.031) (0.537) 
Rho   -0.386 -0.773 
  (0.131) (0.322) 
Log pseudolikelihood  -3037249.2  
Wald chi2 (22)  83.87*** P>chi2=0.0000 
Wald test c  12.16*** P>chi2=0.0005 
Wald chi2 (5) d  8.20 15.52*** 
  P>chi2=0.1452 P>chi2=0.0083 
N   5071 
Notes:  
Robust Standard errors in parentheses;  
P-values of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10;  
Credit constrained: A household is defined as credit constrained if it is discouraged from borrowing or 
denied credit with the survey period and also defined as unconstrained if it received credit or does not 
need credit. 
All continuous variables are in logs hence their coefficients are interpreted as elasticities in the 
productivity equations in column 2 and 4.  
Base categories: a. Education: No education; b. Ecological Zone: Tropic-warm/sub arid;  
Selection equation: For constrained households, positive coefficients imply variables increase 
likelihood of being credit constrained and negative reduces likelihood of being constrained. Similarly, 
for unconstrained households, positive coefficients increase likelihood of being credit unconstrained 
and negative sign coefficients reduces the likelihood of being credit unconstrained. 
c. Wald Test of Independent Equations 
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CHAPTER 4  
DECOMPOSITION ANALYSES OF CREDIT CONSTRAINT AND 
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY IN MALAWI 
4.1 Introduction  
Unequal distribution of income in Malawi has contributed to the low level of 
development in the country. With the poorest 20 percent of the population earning 
less than 6 percent of the total income and the highest 20 percent earning more than 
50 percent, Malawi could be described as country with high income inequality 
(Povertydata.worldbank.org, 2015). Inequality connotes the existence of several 
development issues and it is of no surprise that Malawi ranks 173 out of 188 
countries on the Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2015).  
There is a high inequality between the rural and urban areas of the country, as those 
on the lower end of the income distribution are found in the rural areas and those at 
the higher end in the urban areas. Statistics indicate that the rural areas account for 
85 percent of the population of Malawi and almost 95 percent of the poor live there 
(NSO, 2012). Consequently, there is a need to investigate the factors that account for 
low income or consumption in rural Malawi. One such factor is that about 90 percent 
of the rural dwellers engage in farming and this is generally a very low return sector. 
These rural dwellers also lack other economic opportunities to diversify their source 
of income. As a result, they have unequal access to education, services, assets and 
financial markets as compared to the urban areas of the country. 
One major area in which rural households lack access is to financial markets. 
Literature has shown that undeveloped financial markets have been a major 
contributing factor to the increase in inequality, especially in developing countries 
(Kai and Hamori, 2009). Claessen (2006) notes that finance, which includes access 
to credit, contributes to smoothing individual and household income, insuring 
against risk and increasing investment opportunities. Hence, it is an important tool 
that could help reduce poverty and inequality. However, in a typical rural agrarian 
setting, financial institutions face an exacerbated problem of information asymmetry. 
This leads to issues of moral hazard, adverse selection, costly borrower verification 
and contract enforcement problems (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). This poses a great 
challenge to the establishment of formal financial institutions in rural Malawi and 
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this negatively impacts rural areas and the ability of rural households to access 
credit.  
Rural credit has been identified to be a welfare enhancing tool (Rui and Zhu, 2010; 
Baiyegunhi et al., 2010). In the absence of adequate internal resource accumulation, 
credit has been used as a substitute. Studies have concluded that households that 
have access to credit, i.e. credit unconstrained households, are able to increase their 
farm investment (Carter and Olinto, 2003), farm productivity (Ali and Deininger, 
2012) and also raise their household income (Dong et al., 2010). Therefore, credit 
unconstrained households are at an advantage of improving their welfare compared 
to credit constrained households. This is backed by economic theory which proposes 
that poor households that are credit constrained could experience significant negative 
consequences on their income and also on their general welfare (Boucher et al., 
2009).  
While looking to reduce the rural-XUEDQLQHTXDOLW\JDSFRPSDULQJUXUDOKRXVHKROGV¶
inequality by their credit constrained status can produce useful insights into the role 
of imperfect credit market in rural areas. One way to approach this comparison is by 
employing decomposition procedures to determine the important factors that 
contribute to increasing or decreasing inequality within and between the credit 
constrained statuses of rural households. 
The objective of the study is threefold. The first objective investigates whether 
inequality is greater between or within credit constrained or unconstrained groups. 
The second objective is to identify the key determinants of rural inequality within 
each credit constrained group and also the inequality shares of each factor. This 
employs Fields (2003) method of decomposition. The third objective is to find the 
differential gap that exists between the two statuses and further explain the gap by 
decomposing it into an endowment component and a residual component. This 
employs Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method (Blinder, 1973 and Oaxaca, 1973). 
One main benefit of using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is that it helps identify 
any source of discrimination that may exist within the credit market. 
Determining the within and between differences in consumption as stated in the first 
objective will be estimated by decomposing the General Entropy Index. The within 
and between decomposition analyses using the General Entropy (GE) index is more 
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of a descriptive analysis which only considers a variable or a factor at a time. This is 
similar to doing descriptive statistics or a univariate analysis. However, the 
regression based decomposition approaches takes into consideration the effect of 
other variables and or confounding factors when estimating the within and between 
analyses 7KH )LHOGV¶ DSSURDFK LV WR WKH ZLWKLQ GHFRPSRVLWLRQ DQDO\VLV DQG WKH
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is to the between analysis both considering other 
factors that the GE fails to consider. Hence,  
4.2 Effect of Credit on Inequality 
Ahlin and Jiang (2008) observe that access to credit by poor individuals or 
households enable them to engage in income-generating activities so as to improve 
their income levels. Some studies have found that improvement in access to financial 
services alleviates credit constraints on the poor allowing them access to inputs to 
increase their productivity, thereby reducing both poverty (World Bank, 2011; 
Jalilian and Kirkpatrick, 2002; Kai and Hamori, 2009a; cited in Kai and Hamori, 
2009b) and inequality (Beck et al., 2004).  
A number of studies have examined the effect and impact of credit on some 
household outcome variables such as agricultural productivity (Guirkinger and 
Boucher, 2008 and Ali et al., 2014), profitability (Foltz, 2004), technology adoption, 
income (Zeller et al., 1998), food consumption (Muayila and Tollens, 2012), 
nonfarm and farm income and food security (Diagne and Zeller, 2001), education 
(Sorokina, 2013) and poverty (Zaman, 1997; Khandker, 1998 and Obisesan and 
Akinlade, 2013). Similarly, there have also been studies on the impact of credit on 
inequality, but the majority have been at the macro level and sometimes employed 
cross country analysis (see Beck et al., 2004; Clarke et al., 2006; Tchouassi, 2011 
and Hermes, 2014).  
Based on a cross country analysis, Beck et al. (2004) find that financial development 
through access to credit reduces inequality as it disproportionately increases the 
incomes of the poor. In a similar study, Hermes (2014) finds that participation in 
credit programs helps reduce the income gap between the poor and the rich, 
however, the effect is relatively small. Further to this, Kai and Hamori (2009) 
conclude that credit has an equalizing effect and as such could be used as a 
redistribution tool to lower the inequality gap. Other studies that support a positive 
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impact of credit on decreasing inequality include Clarke et al. (2006) and Tchouassi 
(2011).  
However, there are fewer studies that focus on the micro level (e.g. Nguyen et al., 
2007; Mukhopadhyay, 2014; Viet and Van den Berg, 2014). Mukhopadhyay (2014) 
examines the impact of access to credit on consumption inequality at various 
percentiles using a panel data of slum households in Andhra Pradesh, India. He finds 
that access to credit rather worsened consumption inequality and this was primarily 
driven by non-food expenditure. However, in the long-run where all households 
were assumed to have equal access to credit, there was no impact on consumption 
inequality. Similarly, Viet and Van den Berg (2014) investigate the impact of 
informal credit on poverty and inequality using a panel data of Vietnam between 
2004 and 2006. Their results show that although access to informal credit by 
households reduced both poverty and inequality, the impact on inequality was 
relatively small. Nguyen et al. (2007) also find a small impact of subsidized credit on 
inequality which they link to the issue of lack of penetration of credit programs into 
the rural part of Vietnam. However, Copestake (2002) concludes that although credit 
could reduce poverty in the short term, the opportunity cost of that happening is an 
increase in inequality. Results as seen from these empirical studies do not give a 
unifying conclusion on the impact of credit on inequality. As the results have also 
been mixed, this restricts the possibility of generalizing the findings across 
developing nations. Hence, this calls for more studies on the micro level.  
According to the IHS3 report, 14.2 percent of households in Malawi have had some 
interaction with the credit market with 8.3 percent being successful in their loan 
application. However, not every household requires credit while others do not even 
attempt borrowing because of the fear of being denied although they may require 
credit (discouraged borrowers) or some other reasons such as not possessing 
adequate collateral. Given this information, households in this study are grouped into 
credit constrained and unconstrained. Constrained households include both 
households whose applications have been rejected and also those households which 
DUH GHILQHG DV ³GLVFRXUDJHG ERUURZHUV´ -DSSHOOL, 1990). Similarly, unconstrained 
households also include those who did not require credit and those who were 
successful in their application.  
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The remainder of the study is structured as follows: the next section discusses the 
methodologies, followed by a brief explanation of the data and variables used in 
section 3. Results and discussions are included in section 4 and conclusions are 
drawn in section 5.  
4.3 Methodology  
Inequality studies at national levels are mostly adequate for comparison with other 
countries. Spatial analysis within a country or micro factor analysis that seeks to 
examine inequality in-depth could provide more useful policy conclusions. 
Therefore, it is usually useful to analyse inequality at a detailed level, especially 
when investigating the main determinants of inequality (Mckay, 2002). According to 
Cowell and Fiorio (2011), the main determinants of inequality are better understood 
through a decomposition analysis. It helps to provide useful and more focused 
policies that could reduce inequality as the contributors to inequality are clearly seen 
from decomposition analysis. This section therefore presents some decomposition 
methods used in this study. 
4.3.1 Index Decomposition of Inequality by population sub-group 
There are several measures of inequality but only a few align themselves to 
decomposition. One such measure is the General Entropy (GE) class of indices 
which particularly has the property for decomposition of consumption inequality into 
population sub-groups. The general formula is captured as follows: 





where ݊ is the number of households (or the unit of measurement of the study) 
within the sample, ݕ௜ and ݕ are respectively the consumption of the households and 
the arithmetic mean consumption. ܩܧ ranges from   ? (equal distribution of 
consumption) to  ?  (higher levels of inequality). The parameter ߙ captures the 
weight given to the distances between incomes at different areas of the consumption 
distribution and can take on any real value. ܩܧ is more sensitive to changes in the 
lower tail where there are lower values of ߙ and highly sensitive to changes in the 
upper tail where there are higher values of ߙ. The commonly used values of 
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parameter ߙ are 0 (giving more weight to distances between incomes in the lower 
tail), 1 (giving equal weights across the distribution) and 2 (giving more weights to 
distances between incomes in the higher tail). For ܩܧሺ ?ሻ, the GE index is called the 
7KHLO¶V / DQG DOVR XVXDOO\ UHIHUUHG WR as the mean log deviation measure and 
expressed as (Haughton and Khandker, 2009); 




Further, for ܩܧሺ ?ሻWKHPHDVXUHLVFDOOHGWKH7KHLO¶V7LQGH[DQGDOVRH[SUHVVHGDV 




Firstly, the ܩܧ inequality index can be decomposed based on differences in 
household characteristics such as gender, location, race, age, and other factors 
including their credit status. This helps to identify the major contributors to 
inequality. However, this is done without considering the effects of other factors. 
Secondly, the GE inequality index helps to decompose inequality into an explained 
part which is inequality between-groups and an unexplained (residual) part capturing 
the inequality within groups (Salardi, 2002). Decomposing into these components is 
useful for policy purposes so that for example, where majority of the inequality is 
attributable to disparities across groups, that is between groups, then policy may be 
drawn to focus on the economic enhancement of the less deprived group. However, 
where the majority inequality is more within-group than between-group, then 
household it could be said that there is more household heterogeneity within the 
groups than between the groups. 
Equation (1) measures the between-group inequality while the within-group is 
expressed as (Salardi, 2002): 




where ݓ௝ ൌ ୨஑୨ଵି஑. The term ݓ௝ is a weight of each subgroup that depends on ݕ௝ as 
the income share and ௝݊  the population share for each partition ݆. As a general rule, 
the sum of between-inequality and within-inequality is total inequality.  
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GE inequality index is considered as a summary measure of inequality as it provides 
the distribution of consumption over the population rather than the causes of 
inequality. Therefore, it acts as sign post to where consumption is greatest and 
lowest which is also true for the within and between group inequality decomposition 
obtained from the index. Hence, it does not provide a casual factor effect as this 
considers a factor at a time which falls short of estimating the simultaneous effects of 
all possible factors contributing to consumption inequality.   
4.3.2 Regression Based Decomposition of Inequality  
Unlike the GE inequality index decomposition, the use of a regression based 
decomposition (RBD) processes have the advantage of determining simultaneously 
the contribution of each factor to total inequality through an econometric model. 
Hence, it is possible and easy to establish a casual effect of factors on inequality and 
simultaneously identify the contribution of each factor to total inequality using the 
RBD approaches. The process of the RBD approaches start by econometrically 
estimating a consumption function. The results from the econometric analysis are 
then used in specific formulas of each RBD approach adopted (Salardi, 2002). 
Although there are various RBD methods, this study adopts two methods, i.e. the 
Fields¶ (2003) approach as elaborated by Fiorio and Jenkins (2007), and the Blinder 
(1973)-Oaxaca (1973) decomposition approach.  
4.3.2.1 Fields¶ Decomposition Technique  
As stated, the decomposition approach involves an initial estimation of the 
consumption as a function of a number of contributing factors. It is generally written 
in the form: 
 ௜ܻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ෍ ߚ௝௜ ௜ܺ ൅ ߤ௜௞௝ୀଵ  
 
(5) 
where ௜ܻ is the logarithm of household consumption per adult equivalence 
(henceforth consumption) for each household ݅ with ݅ ൌ  ? ǥ ݊ǡ and ܺ௜ are the 
consumption determining factors. As presented in equation (5), the consumption 
function is a semi-log function, but can also be estimated in a level form. ߚ଴ is a 
constant and ߚ௝௜ are the coefficients to be estimated using OLS. As usual, ߤ௜ is the 
residual or the error term.  
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Before applying the OLS estimation, it is argued that the main variable of interest, 
the credit constrained status, is endogenous and, thus, suffers from sample selection 
bias as it is not randomly determined. Following similar argument by Khandker and 
Faruqee (2003), the study argues that households demand for credit and also their 
credit constrained status is determined by household and community characteristics 
which also affect the supply of credit giving rise to selection bias. Consequently, 
households make their own decision whether or not to apply for credit after 
considering their own economic situations influenced by their household 
characteristics and community factors. Some other households may decide not to 
borrow because they do not desire to take credit (credit unconstrained), while others 
may also not borrow because they do not have adequate or usable collateral, and in 
some instances, may fear that they will be denied credit (discouraged households). In 
the study of those who apply for credit some may be denied credit (credit 
constrained) or may be successful (credit unconstrained). The application outcomes 
are, however, determined by the lender through screening processes which most 
often are subjective, especially in rural areas due to information asymmetry. Hence, 
credit constrained statuses of households are not randomly determined causing the 
estimates of household consumption to be inconsistent if this is not taken into 
consideration.  
The credit constrained statuses are also assumed to be heterogeneous following 
Feder et al. (1990) who argue that the credit constrained groups are not homogenous 
regarding their credit demand. It is also expected that unconstrained households 
would be comparatively more productive and, hence, with higher consumption than 
constrained households due to the advantage of having credit. As a result of this their 
slope coefficients may differ providing an argument for separate estimation 
equations for both credit statuses. To resolve the above issues, an endogenous 
switching model is therefore estimated which involves running separate estimations 
models for each credit constrained group. This is equivalent to running two separate 
Heckman selection models one for either status which was followed in this particular 
study. For this part of the estimation, the analysis follows a study by Freeman et al. 
(1998). 
As the estimation involves a selection equation (credit constrained status) and an 
outcome equation, the selection equation is estimated first using a Probit Maximum 
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Likelihood Estimation method. The credit constrained status is a dummy variable 
written as a function of household and community characteristics:  
 ܥ௜כ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ܼ௜ߛ ൅ ݑ௜ 
 
(6) 
 ܥ௜ ൌ ൜ ?݂݅ܥ௜כ ൑  ? ?݂݅ܥ௜כ ൐  ? (7) 
 
where ܥ௜ takes on the value 1 if the household is credit constrained and 0 if 
unconstrained; ܼ௜ are the credit constrained determining factors, which include all 
variables in the consumption equation and some extra variables which act as 
instruments to satisfy the exclusion restriction or the identification condition of the 
model; and ݑ௜ is the error term with zero mean and a constant variance. The 
parameter ߛ is estimable up to a scale factor, i.e. an assumption of ݒܽݎሺݑ௜ሻ ൌ  ? must 
be provided (Maddala, 1983).  
The consumption functions for the two household types are written as follows: 
 ௨ܻ௜ ൌ ߚ௨଴ ൅ ෍ ߚ௨௜ܺ௨௜ ൅ ߤ௨௜௞௝ୀଵ  
௖ܻ௜ ൌ ߚ௖଴ ൅ ෍ ߚ௖௜ܺ௖௜ ൅ ߤ௖௜௞௝ୀଵ  
 
(8) 
Parameters are as defined for equation (5) above, however, the subscript ܿ represents 
constrained household and ݑ is unconstrained household. Inferring from the earlier 
discussion on endogeneity and sample selection, estimating parameters ߚ௖௜ and ߚ௨௜ 
in equation (8) using OLS yields inconsistent results as the expectation of the error 
term conditional on the selection equation is nonsingular (Maddala, 1983). Further, 
the error terms ߤ௖௜, ߤ௨௜ and ݑ௜ are assumed to be trivariate normally distributed 
having a zero mean and a non-zero covariance. Maximizing the likelihood function 
IRUWKLVPRGHOLVFXPEHUVRPHDVLWLQYROYHVDELYDULDWHSURELWHVWLPDWLRQKHQFH/HH¶V
(1976) simple two stage process is followed to estimate equations (7) and (8) 
(Maddala, 1983). 
)ROORZLQJ/HH¶VSURFHVVWKHFRQGLWLRQDOH[SHFWDWLRQVRIWKHHUURUWHUPVRIWKH
equation (8) are written and estimated as:  
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 ܧሺߤ௨௜ȁݑ௜ ൑ ܼ௜ߛሻ ൌ ܧሺߪ௨௜ݑ௜ȁݑ௜ ൑ ܼ௜ߛሻ ൌ ߪ௨௜ ߶ሺܼ௜ߛሻȰሺܼ௜ߛሻ ൌ ߪ௨௜ߣ௨௜ (9) 
and   
 ܧሺߤ௖௜ȁݑ௜ ൑ ܼ௜ߛሻ ൌ ܧሺߪ௖௜ݑ௜ȁݑ௜ ൑ ܼ௜ߛሻ ൌ ߪ௖௜ ߶ሺܼ௜ߛሻ ? െ Ȱሺܼ௜ߛሻ ൌ ߪ௖௜ߣ௖௜ (10) 
   
Where ߶ is the normal density function and Ȱ is the cumulative normal distribution 
function, subscripts are as already defined and, ߪ௨௜ and ߪ௖௜are the variances for 
unconstrained and constrained household consumption functions. The ratios defined 
as ߣ௨௜ ൌ థሺ௓೔ఊሻ஍ሺ௓೔ఊሻ and ߣ௖௜ ൌ థሺ௓೔ఊሻଵି஍ሺ௓೔ఊሻ are the inverse Mills ratio. These are included in 
equation (8) as an extra variable which is re-specified as; 
 ௨ܻ௜ ൌ ߚ௨଴ ൅ ෍ ߚ௨௜ܺ௨௜ ൅ ߪ௨௜ߣ௨௜ ൅ ߝ௨௜௞௝ୀଵ  
௖ܻ௜ ൌ ߚ௖଴ ൅ ෍ ߚ௖௜ܺ௖௜ ൅ ߪ௖௜ߣ௖௜ ൅ ߝ௖௜௞௝ୀଵ  (11) 
Where ߝ௨௜ and ߝ௖௜ are the new error terms which have zero conditional means 
(Maddala, 1983). This can now be estimated using OLS yielding consistent estimates 
of the parameters. A statistically significant lambda or inverse Mills ratio in the OLS 
regression of equation (11) indicates the presence of selection bias, otherwise the 
equations break down to a simple OLS model. 
However, before the OLS estimation is done, following Forio and Jenkins (2007) the 
functions from equation (11) are re-written as: 
 ௨ܻ௜ ൌ ߚ௨଴ ൅ ෍ ܩ௨௜ ൅ ߪ௨௜ߣ௨௜ ൅ ߤ௨௜௞௝ୀଵ  
௖ܻ௜ ൌ ߚ௖଴ ൅ ෍ ܩ௖௜ ൅ ߪ௖௜ߣ௖௜ ൅ ߤ௖௜௞௝ୀଵ  (12) 
 
Where ܩ௨௜ and ܩ௖௜ are composite variables corresponding to the product of each 
regression coefficient, ߚ௜ǡ and its characteristic or factor, ܺ௜. OLS estimation of the 
above equations yield the equations below which can then be decomposed; 
 ௨ܻ௜ ൌ ߚመ௨଴ ൅ ෍ ܩ෠௨௜ ൅ ߪ௨௜ߣመ௨௜ ൅ ߤƸ௨௜௞௝ୀଵ  (13) 
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௖ܻ௜ ൌ ߚመ௖଴ ൅ ෍ ܩ෠௖௜ ൅ ߪ௖௜ߣመ௖௜ ൅ ߤƸ௖௜௞௝ୀଵ  
 
These are estimated using OLS which is further used for the decomposition analysis. 
According to Krstic and Reilly the effect of each factor variable on consumption can 
be separated making it easier to measure the main determinants of inequality using 
the consumption function above (cited by Salardi, 2002, p. 14). Following closely 
6KRUURFNV¶ IRUPXOD ZKHUH KH SURYHG D QXPEHU RI D[LRPV UHVXOWLQJ LQ D XQLTXH
additive and exact decomposition rule (see Shorrocks, 2013), Fields (2003) estimated 
the determinants of inequality, thus, the contribution of each factor to inequality. 
6KRUURFNV¶IRUPXODXVHGWRGHFRPSRVHLQFRPHLQHTXDOLW\FDQEHH[SUHVVHGDV 
 ௝ܵሾሿ ൌ ܿ݋ݒൣߚመ௝ǡ ௝ܺǡ ൧ߪଶ ൌ ߚመ௝ כ ߪ൫ ௝ܺ൯ כ ܿ݋ݎ൫ ௝ܺǡ ൯ߪ  (14) 
 
Where ௝ܵሾሿ is defined as the share of the ݆ݐ݄IDFWRUWRWRWDOLQHTXDOLW\RUDV)LHOG¶V
terms as the relative factor inequality weight, ߚመ௝ captures the estimated coefficients 
from the OLS regression in equation (13), ߪ൫ ௝ܺ൯ is the standard deviation of the 
regressors and ߪሾሿ is the standard deviations of the dependent variable which is the 
estimated total inequality of the consumption. Also, ܿ݋ݎ൫ ௝ܺǡ ൯ captures the 
correlation between the factors and the estimated consumption variable.  
4.3.2.2 Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of Consumption 
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis attempts to decompose the mean gap of 
an outcome variable between, usually, two groups in a counterfactual argument 
which is based on linear regression models (Jann, 2008). This decomposition method 
is mostly applied in the field of labour economics and discrimination literature, but 
nonetheless can also be applied in other areas of economics. Analogously, this study 
follows a similar methodology used by Heitmueller (2006) and others in a Labour 
Economics related study. They do this by estimating an Endogenous Switching 
Model which estimates two separate equations for each group correcting for 
heterogeneity in the groups, as well as endogeneity and sample selection before 
applying the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. 
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Using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition methodology, the study attempts to 
determine how much of the difference in the mean outcome variables is explained by 
the group differences in the explanatory variables (Jann, 2008). For this study, a two-
part decomposition method is adopted in which the inequality mean gap between the 
credit constrained and unconstrained group is decomposed into: 
1) A part that is obtained from the differences between individual characteristics 
of the groups known as the endowment (explained) term, and  
2) An unexplained or residual part that is estimated from the differences 
between the estimated coefficients of the groups. 
The initial step is to formulate consumption equations for credit constrained and 
unconstrained households similar to that of equation (8). The estimations from 
equation (7) to equation (11) are adopted for the initial process of the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition. Subsuming the constant term into the general slope 
coefficients and ignoring the summation sign, gives the following expression of 
equation (11):  
 ௨ܻ௜ ൌ ߚ௨௜ܺ௨௜ ൅ ߪ௨௜ߣ௨௜ ൅ ߝ௨௜ 
 ௖ܻ௜ ൌ ߚ௖௜ܺ௖௜ ൅ ߪ௖௜ߣ௖௜ ൅ ߝ௖௜  
 
(15) 
Estimating equation (11) yields consistent estimates used for further analysis. 
Thereafter, the mean consumption gap between the credit constrained households 
and the unconstrained households is estimated using the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition method (Blinder, 1973 and Oaxaca, 1973). According to Neuman and 
Oaxaca (2004), correcting the selection bias yields a gap that can be divided into 
three parts and written as:  
 തܻ௨௜ െ തܻ௖௜ ൌ ߚመ௨௜ሺ തܺ௨௜ െ തܺ௖௜ሻ ൅ തܺ௖௜൫ߚመ௨௜ െ ߚመ௖௜൯ ൅ ሺߪ௨௜ߣ௨௜ െ ߪ௖௜ߣ௖௜ሻ (16) 
 
Where തܻ is the predicted mean log consumption, തܺ is the mean vector of the 
observed consumption determining variables, ߚመ  is a vector of the estimated returns to 
consumption determinants, and ߣ captures the estimated mean of the inverse Mills 
ratio. The first term is the Endowment or Explained term which captures the part 
attributable to the differences between the two groups stemming from the observed 
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characteristics, while the second term corresponds to the differences obtained from 
the estimated coefficients termed the unexplained term (or the discrimination term as 
popularly known in Labour Economics in the gender/racial wage gap analysis). It 
has not been very obvious as to how to treat the last term in the above equation 
(Nueman and Oaxaca, 2004) and it is common practice not to assign a particular 
interpretation to it. One way of treating this last term is subtracting it from the left-
hand side of the equation leaving one with the familiar Oaxaca decomposition 
(Heitmueller, 2006). 
4.4 Data  
This study restricts the analysis to rural farm households in Malawi which accounts 
for 9,477 households making up approximately 75 percent of the total sample. 
However, due to missing information for some households, final data used covered 
8,216 rural farm households. 
4.4.1 Variables  
There are several indicators of welfare when measuring poverty or inequality. These 
includes income, consumption, calories per person per day, food consumption as a 
proportion of total expenditure and nutritional status which is measured by stunting 
or wasting (Haughton and Khandker, 2009). This study uses the consumption.  
There is growing support among economists for the use of consumption as a superior 
measure of economic welfare than income (Hassett and Mathur, 2012). Hassett and 
Mathur (2012) argue that, unlike income, individuals and households are able to 
smooth their consumption over their lifetime, which makes consumption a more 
useful indicator in inequality studies. Further, consumption remains relatively stable 
over the course of life as households engage in borrowing during period of low 
income and save in periods of high income. In similar arguments, the World Bank 
development report of 2000/2001 explains that consumption is a much-preferred 
measure of welfare to income as it is more reliable and also able to capture the long-
run welfare levels (World Bank, 2001). In terms of measurement, Meyer and 
Sullivan (2003) show that poor households are much better in measuring their 
consumption than they do for income and therefore consumption is less likely to 
suffer from under-reporting.  
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According to the IHS3 report, calculating the consumption aggregate was guided by 
theoretical and practical considerations. The first consideration was that consumption 
must be very inclusive as much as possible per the available information and thus 
omitting certain component implies that it does not have any effect on household 
welfare. Further, both market and non-market transactions were included. Perishable 
goods like food were assumed to be all consumed while for other goods and services 
such as education, housing and durable goods had to be adjusted to capture their 
length of use. A reference period was chosen due to the frequency of purchases of 
some goods. For example, education had a 12-month reference period while food 
was the last 7 days. All components of the consumption aggregate were converted 
into annual figures and some consistency checks were performed to all the 
components so as to avoid including extreme figures. In general, the consumption 
aggregate was made up of four components which included; food, non-food, durable 
goods and housing. The consumption components were collected on the household 
level through face to face interviews. For this study, consumption per adult 
equivalent11 was used instead of consumption per capita so as to capture the 
differences between individuals, such as age, gender, and the economies of scale in 
consumption within the household.  
Variables included on the right hand side are presented in Table 4.1 and include age 
of the household head and age squared to capture the life cycle effect, a dummy 
variable for the gender of the household head, a categorical variable for household 
KHDG¶VOHYHORIIRUPDOHGXFDWLRQGHSHQGHQF\UDWLRWKHQXPEHURISHRSOHDJH-14 
and over 65 divided by the number of people between age 15 and 60 in the 
household) and household size, total farm area per adult equivalence cultivated 
during the rainy season, land tenure is a dummy variable indicating whether the land 
cultivated is securely owned (purchase with land title, inherited, etc.) or property 
rights over land are secure. Location of the household was also included in order to 
capture the geographical differences in Malawi. Other variables included the value of 
home assets per adult equivalence, the receipt of remittances, and a categorical 
variable for house dwelling type. 
 
                                                 
11
 The household consumption per adult equivalence was measured as the ratio of the total real annual 
consumption per household to the adult equivalent ratio. Both variables were provided in the data.  
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Table 4.1: Definition of Variables 
Variable Type Definition 
Credit constrained Binary 1 = Credit constrained, 0 = Credit Unconstrained 
Log consumption Continuous  Log consumption per adult equivalence 
Head age Continuous  Age of head of households 
Age squared Continuous Age squared of head of household 
Education Categorical  0 = No education, 1 = Primary, 2 = Secondary and 3 = 
Tertiary. 
Male Binary 1 = Male, 0 = Female 
Illness  Binary 1 = Suffered Illness, 0 = otherwise 
Household size Continuous  Number of members within the household 
Dependency ratio Continuous Ratio of the number of dependents age 0-14 and over 65 
to those between 15 and 64 within the household 
Location Categorical 1 = Rural North, 2 = Rural Centre and 3 = Rural South 
Remittances  Binary 1 = Receives remittances, 0 = otherwise 
Network (agric.) Binary 1 = Member of agriculture group, 0 = otherwise 
Farm size Continuous Hectares of land cultivated per adult equivalence 
Land secured Binary 1 = Secured land ownership, 0 = otherwise 
Log home assets Continuous Log home assets per adult equivalence 
Log livestock Continuous Log livestock per adult equivalence 
House type Categorical 1 = Permanent structure, 2 = Semi-permanent structure 
and 3 = Traditional structure. 
MFI Distance Continuous Distance to microfinance institution  
FI number Continuous Count of Financial institutions in each district 
 
4.4.2 Identification 
Finding good instruments for an instrumental variable estimation is a herculean task. 
The principle is that the variable(s) chosen as instrument(s) should explain or be 
correlated with the selection variable but not with the error term in the outcome 
equation. Two variables were identified as instruments for this study. Factors that 
influence the supply or availability of credit are expected to influence directly the 
demand for credit but not the household consumption 7KHUHIRUH KRXVHKROGV¶
proximity to financial markets and the number of formal financial institutions within 
an area could largely affect the demand for credit. The first instrument used is the 
distance to the nearest microfinance institution in the community. Distance to 
financial institutions limits the ability of households to borrow or the likelihood to be 
successful in obtaining a loan. It was concluded in a study by Pedrosa and Do (2011) 
that very poor households are more likely to be left out of the credit markets as they 
reside farther from economic centres and are largely involved in economic activities 
that are not deemed to be creditworthy, such as farming in this case.  
The second instrument used is the count of financial institutions within each district. 
It is postulated that the larger the number of financial institutions in a geographical 
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area, the greater the accessibility and availability of credit to households. This will 
eventually increase the demand for credit. These variables are not expected to affect 
the consumption of the household directly but possibly indirectly through household 
credit constraint status. The data for the number of financial institutions was 
obtained from the Financial Inclusion data base of the Microfinance Information 
Exchange (FINclusion Lab, 2014).  
4.5 Results and discussions 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics for each variable used in the analyses. 
There were 2,620 and 5,596 unconstrained and constrained households respectively. 
Majority of the variables are binary hence their means can be interpreted as 
percentages when multiplied by 100. A t-test for the continuous variables and a 
design based F-test for factor variables are also presented in column 4 of the table. 
These tests examine the differences that may exist between the credit constrained 
and unconstrained groups per factor. Though the number of observation is different 
from the previous chapter, the summary statistics are quite similar hence will not be 
in this chapter except for consumption.  
The comparison of the mean of the of household consumption per adult equivalence 
between the two credit groups reveals a difference of 10,491.01 Malawian Kwacha 
in favour of unconstrained households. Further, the test that examines the difference 
between the credit unconstrained and constrained groups was statistically significant 
at a 1 percent level. This suggests that in rural Malawi there is a significant 










Table 4.2: Summary statistics and test of explanatory variables 
 Variables Unconstrained Constrained  Pooled  Test 
Consumption 61,108.54 50617.53 53,966.31 6.81*** 
Head age 43.15587 42.95899 43.0218 0.44 
Age square 2133.715 2120.697 2124.853 0.26 
Education     
   No education 0.7408 0.8372 0.8065 76.55*** 
   Primary 0.1129 0.0795 0.0901 17.63*** 
   Secondary 0.1301 0.0794 0.0955 41.74*** 
   Tertiary 0.0162 0.0040 0.0079 27.52*** 
Male 0.7827 0.7403 0.7538 14.09*** 
Household size 4.7601 4.6454 4.6820 2.03** 
Dependency 1.2009 1.2723 1.2495 -2.63*** 
Illness 0.0420 0.0300 0.0339 6.24** 
Location      
   Rural North 0.1514 0.1049 0.1198 19.97*** 
   Rural Centre 0.5353 0.3707 0.4233 85.70*** 
   Rural South 0.3133 0.5243 0.4570 155.93*** 
Remittances  0.1203 0.0946 0.1028 9.13*** 
Network (agric.) 0.0594 0.0647 0.0630 0.53 
Farm size 0.2490 0.2110 0.2231 5.27*** 
Land secured 0.8496 0.8929 0.8791 23.09*** 
Home asset 6951.086 3109.332 4274.366 5.14*** 
Livestock  10,235.1 5240.387 6834.721 3.20*** 
House type     
   Permanent 0.3000 0.1793 0.2178 99.37*** 
   Semi-Permanent 0.2428 0.2496 0.2474 0.28 
   Traditional  0.4572 0.5711 0.5347 56.04*** 
MFI Distance 29.7765 32.0641 31.3339 -2.29** 
FI number 28.4847 21.2987 23.5925 7.19*** 
Observation 2,620 5,596 8,216  
Note: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10 %. a: t-test for continuous variables and a design-based F test for 
binary variables. 
4.5.2 Empirical Results 
4.5.2.1 Index Decomposition of Credit Constraint 
Table 4.3 presents the results from the GE index considering the three commonest 
weights, ሺߙ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ?ሻ, given to distances between the consumption at different parts 
of the consumption distribution. Thus, GE(0) is highly sensitive to changes in the 
lower tail of the distribution, GE(1) equal weights and GE(2) is more sensitivity to 
changes in the XSSHU WDLO RI WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ 7KH ILJXUHV LQ WKH UXUDO KRXVHKROGV¶
column in the table show that there is increasing consumption inequality from the 
lower part of the tail (0.20) to the upper part of the tail (0.28). This is more 
pronounced in the urban areas increasing from 0.34 to 0.71 being greater than that of 
the general population across all weights. This clearly shows that a change in 
consumption in the upper tail would have a greater increase in total inequality, thus 
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widen the inequality gap more, than a change in consumption in the lower tail. This 
is identified to be greater in the urban regions than the rural regions. The general 
indication from the data suggests that consumption inequality, in the rural areas 
compared to the urban areas of Malawi, was quite low in the period 2009-2010 as 
presented in Table 4.3 below. This is consistent with findings from Mussa (2013) in 
his study of spatial comparison of poverty and inequality in Malawi. This can be 
attributed to the low level of income and/or consumption across the rural areas of 
Malawi. According to the IHS3 report, 56.6 percent of rural households are poor12 
with almost 95 percent of the total population of the poor residing in rural Malawi. 
Due to this, it is not expected to see a wide gap in consumption among rural 
households. However, the expectation is that credit unconstrained households will 
have some (marginal) advantage over the credit constrained households due to the 
extra resources gained by credit. Additionally, there might be a greater level of 
inequality within unconstrained households due to the varying level of credit 
obtained. 
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of Inequality Indexes 
Inequality Rural Urban Population 
GE(0) 0.2053 0.3459 0.2424 
 (0.0051) (0.0000) (0.0088) 
GE(1) 0.2136 0.3825 0.2717 
 (0.0063) (0.0631) (0.0170) 
GE(2) 0.2845 0.7120 0.4794 
 (0.0132) (0.2454) (0.0963) 
No. of observations a 9,477 924 10,401 
Note: Standard Errors in Parenthesis. a. This table used the actual number of farm households within 
the data without deleting missing observations of other variables. 
6RXUFH$XWKRU¶VRZQFDOFXODWLRQIURPIHS3. 
This is confirmed by the decomposition of consumption into the credit constrained 
statuses. As seen in Table 4.4, the first two rows show that there is higher 
consumption inequality for unconstrained households than constrained households in 
rural Malawi. Further, observation from the decomposition of consumption 
inequality into within and between credit constrained groups shows that there is 
higher within-group inequality than between-group inequality for all weights of 
decomposition. This shows that there is greater level of heterogeneity within the 
groups than between groups. That is, there is greater consumption disparity within 
                                                 
12
 According to the IHS3 report, any population with total consumption below 37,002 MWK was 
classified as poor (NSO, 2012). 
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the credit statuses than between them. This could also support the argument of a low 
consumption disparity among rural households even comparing between credit 
statuses. Hence, for formulating effective policy implications, after the difference 
between the credit statuses have been considered, each group also has to be studied 
individually and policies should be drawn on the basis of factors that cause the 
disparity within each sub-group. Addressing the consumption inequality both within 
and between the groups would increase the efficacy of any policy to bridge the 
consumption inequality gap caused by credit. However, as this type of 
decomposition does not give information on casual effects, the results obtained may 
not be a perfect guidHIRUSROLF\PDNLQJ2¶'HQQHOOHWDO, 2008). Thus, results from 
the GE index are indications of where inequality is more considering a single factor 
such as credit status as shown in Table 4.4 but does not indicate the possible factors 
that contribute to the inequality that exist within and between the credit statuses. This 
necessitates a decomposable regression analysis that considers several causal factors 
simultaneously, which is incorporated in both decomposition methods used further in 
this study.  
Table 4.4: Decomposition of inequality by credit constrained sub-group in rural 
Malawi 
 GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) 
Credit Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
Unconstrained  0.2323 0.0092 0.2405 0.0112 0.3325 0.0240 
Constrained  0.1849 0.0047 0.1912 0.0056 0.2345 0.0086 
       
Within  0.1939 0.0051 0.2011 0.0063 0.2685 0.0132 
Between 0.0030 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 
6RXUFH$XWKRU¶VRZQFDOFXODWLRQIURP,+6 
 
4.5.2.2 Determinants of Household Credit Constraint and 
Consumption 
Table 4.5 presents the results from the Probit Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(column 1) which examines the determinants of the household credit constrained 
status and the OLS estimations (columns 2, 3 and 4) which examines the determines 
the causes of consumption. The results from the OLS regression are used as the 
bases for the decomposition process as explained in the methodology. The F-test of 
the probit model shows the overall significance of the model is statistically 
significant at 1 percent level.  
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Table 4.5: Determinants of Household Credit Constrained and Consumption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Probit Consumption (OLS) 
Variables Selection Unconstrained Constrained Pooled 
Head age 0.00987 -0.0226*** -0.00685** -0.0110*** 
 (0.00656) (0.00508) (0.00314) (0.00265) 
Age squared -9.18e-05 0.000170*** 1.72e-05 5.73e-05** 
 (6.47e-05) (5.10e-05) (3.07e-05) (2.64e-05) 
Primary -0.175*** 0.298*** 0.0526 0.142*** 
 (0.0583) (0.0474) (0.0336) (0.0243) 
Secondary -0.207*** 0.361*** 0.182*** 0.250*** 
 (0.0587) (0.0476) (0.0391) (0.0237) 
Tertiary -0.562*** 0.929*** 0.232 0.583*** 
 (0.187) (0.131) (0.191) (0.109) 
Male 0.00809 -0.0635* -0.00416 -0.0228 
 (0.0441) (0.0356) (0.0200) (0.0187) 
Household size -0.00349 -0.0985*** -0.112*** -0.107*** 
 (0.0102) (0.00817) (0.00543) (0.00473) 
Dependency  0.00988 -0.0494*** -0.0265*** -0.0324*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0146) (0.00846) (0.00752) 
Illness  0.204** -0.198*** -0.0224 -0.0889*** 
 (0.0898) (0.0663) (0.0448) (0.0341) 
Rural North -0.452*** 0.0739 -0.110* -0.0641** 
 (0.0740) (0.0859) (0.0574) (0.0319) 
Rural Centre -0.473*** 0.429*** 0.121** 0.201*** 
 (0.0524) (0.0890) (0.0566) (0.0270) 
Farm size -0.0579** 0.0939*** 0.0602*** 0.0734*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0203) (0.0133) (0.0108) 
Land tenure 0.0994* -0.131*** -0.0323 -0.0702*** 
 (0.0533) (0.0437) (0.0320) (0.0255) 
Permanent -0.346*** 0.451*** 0.197*** 0.275*** 
 (0.0501) (0.0578) (0.0456) (0.0208) 
Semi-permanent -0.0754* 0.0642* 0.0689*** 0.0586*** 
 (0.0448) (0.0369) (0.0196) (0.0179) 
Network (agric.) 0.110 0.0177 0.135*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0775) (0.0445) (0.0327) (0.0251) 
Remittances  -0.0961 0.208*** 0.0135 0.0833*** 
 (0.0646) (0.0471) (0.0329) (0.0263) 
Home asset -0.0264*** 0.0747*** 0.0446*** 0.0530*** 
 (0.00635) (0.00708) (0.00364) (0.00312) 
Livestock  -0.0136*** 0.0296*** 0.0153*** 0.0207*** 
 (0.00509) (0.00413) (0.00278) (0.00211) 
MFI Distance 0.00280***    
 (0.000824)    
FI number -0.00367***    
 (0.00105)    
Lambda   -0.730*** 0.453** 0.00550 
  (0.212) (0.213) (0.0103) 
Constant 0.279 10.74*** 10.99*** 11.36*** 
 (0.250) (0.282) (0.184) (0.101) 
Observations 8,216 2,620 5,596 8,216 
R-squared  0.427 0.398 0.405 
F(21, 603) 405.28*** 64.70*** 137.23*** 182.50*** 
Prob. > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chow Test  50.34*** 0.0000  




The OLS results, which are the second stage estimations in columns 2, 3 and 4 of 
Table 4.5, show that the explanatory variables in the unconstrained model explain 43 
percent of the variation in consumption, while the explanatory variables in the 
constrained model explain 40 percent of the variation in the model. Inferring from 
the F-statistics, the null hypothesis that all the estimated parameters are equal to 
zero, is rejected at 1 percent level for all three results. Hence, at least one of the 
explanatory variables is different from zero, as observed in the table. Judging from 
the results of a Chow test, the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the estimated 
models were similar in the constrained and unconstrained group was also found to be 
statistically significant at 1 percent level therefore we reject the null in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis that they differed between the two credit statuses. The two 
instruments (MFI distance and FI number) were not included in these equations in 
order to make the equations identified. From the estimated results, it could be 
noticed that the Inverse Mills Ratio (lambda) is statistically significant in all models. 
This suggests the presence of selection bias in the data which could have led to 
biased and inconsistent results had it not been accounted for. 
Across all estimation models, the age of the household head had a significant effect 
on the welfare of the household. Households with older heads had lower 
consumption than younger heads ceteris paribus. Male-headed households compared 
to the female headed households had about 8 percent higher consumption within 
constrained households but gender had no effect on the welfare within unconstrained 
households. It has been documented that women in developing countries are at a 
disadvantage due to their level of poverty and have less access to financial services 
which can be attributed to their limited social and economic mobility (Khandker, 
1998). This therefore raises another problem of gender inequality within Malawi as 
alluded to by the Gender, Equity and Rural Employment Division of the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO, 2011). According to the FAO report, a contribution 
to this problem may be from the fact that women own fewer resources than their 
male counterparts with an example that women own only 32 percent of farm lands 
and over half of them own less than half a hectare of land. In another study, also in 
Malawi, it was found that although women smallholders owned lesser land, their 
labour supply was 10 percent less than that of the males (Takane, 2008) with 
majority also requiring the help of male labour for ploughing (Gilbert et al., 2002). 
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These and many other constraints inhibit women from accessing external resources 
like credit. This calls for increase in the economic empowerment of women within 
Malawi to bridge the welfare gap between men and women. For example, credit 
programs targeting women, such as Concern Universal Microfinance Operations 
which specially targets rural poor women in Malawi, could be established to provide 
capital to women to engage in off-farm economic activities. Further, non-farm 
training programmes could be established for women with no or little non-farm skills 
so as to empower these women economically. These activities unlike farming can be 
engaged in throughout the year without only have to rely on farming which is very 
seasonal. 
Human capital plays a crucial role in increasing the welfare of households. As 
QRWLFHGIURPWKHUHVXOWVHGXFDWLRQLQFUHDVHVWKHKRXVHKROGV¶ consumption in credit 
unconstrained households with only secondary level of education being significant in 
the constrained households. More evidence is the fact that the higher the level of 
education, the higher the consumption of the household in the unconstrained and 
even in the constrained households though not all of the levels of education are 
significant. The impact on unconstrained households ranges between 30 to 93 
percent and 5 to 23 percent for the constrained households. This result supports the 
argument that investment in education reduces over time in households with limited 
resources and therefore exacerbates poverty (Kumar et al., 2013) as returns to 
education are expected to be lower due to lack of investment in constrained 
households. The positive effect of education on welfare is also corroborated in a 
study in Malawi by Matita and Chirwa (2009) who found that education increases 
the welfare of households. Another human capital variable is health, captured in this 
study as illness. It is found that if an unconstrained household member suffered any 
ailment during the period of the survey resulted in a fall in their welfare by about 16 
percent. However, this was inconclusive for constrained households as it was 
insignificant. As poor health, which could be an unforeseen shock, could cause farm 
households to divert production credit to a consumption purpose such as solving an 
immediate problem of treating the illness, it is therefore highly probable this could 
reduce the welfare of the household in the short-run. The diversion of production 




The results further suggest that increases in the size of the household and the number 
of dependants were contributing factors to the reduction in household welfare; the 
coefficients are significant and negative for all credit groups. It is expected that 
households with larger sizes have more members to feed. This put a strain on the 
KRXVHKROG¶V EXGJHW ZKLFK LQ JHQHUDO LV UHODWLYHO\ VPDOO 7KH ILQGLQJ FRUURERUDWHV
other studies. Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995) report a strong negative relationship 
between household size and consumption. Matita and Chirwa (2009) find a similar 
result for households in rural Malawi. It is recommended that the ministry of health 
in Malawi should initiate family planning and birth control campaigns in remote 
areas of the country so as influence especially young members in the rural 
communities to have lesser children. This will help families or households to have 
extra resources to provide the household a better quality of life as lesser family size 
increases household resource per person thereby increasing their standard of living 
hence bridging the inequality gap. Rapid population growth has been identified as an 
important development challenge in Malawi and curbing this through family 
planning would enhance the general wellbeing of the households (USAID, 2016). 
Location is an interesting factor as results on location could also explain the spatial 
development differences that exist within the rural country-sides. The nearer an area 
is to a developed location, e.g. a capital city, the better the welfare of households is 
expected to be. This is what was found for both credit statuses. Location in rural 
centre of Malawi, which is the closest to the capital, increased consumption by about 
43 percent for unconstrained households and 12 percent for constrained households 
as compared to the rural south. While rural north compared to the south had no 
impact on unconstrained households, it reduced the consumption of constrained 
households by about 11 percent. Government development policies should see to 
redistribution of wealth across the Malawi. Economic development programmes like 
the Malawi Growth and Development Strategies should give more consideration to 
the north and the south of the country so as to have these areas developed just like 
the centre of the country.  
It was also discovered that a percentage increase in land size cultivated during the 
UDLQ\VHDVRQZDVHVWLPDWHGWRLQFUHDVHWKHKRXVHKROGV¶FRQVumption by 0.09 percent 
for unconstrained households and 0.06 percent for constrained households. As land 
is the major asset of these rural households, a positive relationship between the land 
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area cultivated and the consumption is identified to be very important for improving 
welfare; this outcome is also observed by Mukherjee and Benson (2003). A striking 
result in the study however is that households with secured landholdings, acquired 
through purchase or inheritance, had a fall in their consumption by 13 percent for 
unconstrained households, but had no impact on constrained households although 
having a negative relationship.  
Among constrained households, those living in permanent and semi-permanent 
structures were found to have a better welfare compared to those living in traditional 
houses. Those in permanent house structure had about between 39 percent 
(unconstrained households) and 13 percent (constrained households) higher 
consumption than those in a semi-permanent structure. Households that were part of 
an agricultural group were estimated to observe an increase in their welfare in both 
households. For constrained households, this could be argued that, as they do not 
have credit they instead exchange information, knowledge and also receive support 
on their farms as a substitute to credit which enables them to have an increase in 
welfare. Further, only unconstrained households benefitted from remittances which 
were estimated to increase their welfare by about 21 percent.  
The value of home assets per adult equivalence of households was also a significant 
contributor to the consumption of households. This is estimated to increase by 0.07 
percent and 0.04 percent in unconstrained and constrained households respectively 
due to a percentage increase in the value of household assets. This was also true for 
value of livestock owned with unconstrained households having a higher increase in 
consumption than constrained households. The positive effect of the value of assets 
on welfare is also found by Matita and Chirwa (2009) for all rural households in 
general which is also found for our pooled estimate. Therefore, as assets could be 
deemed as a proxy for wealth of the household, households with more assets 
including livestock are able to increase their general welfare.  
4.5.2.3 )LHOG¶V5HJUHVVLRQ-Based Inequality Decomposition 
The above OLS estimates do not provide information about the share of each factor 
in explaining the inequality in consumption. To be able to estimate the factor share, 
the transformed or estimated variables from the OLS estimation DUHIHGLQWR)LHOGV¶
formula (equation (14)) presented in the methodology section which can then be 
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decomposed. This helps to answer the important question of ³how much of 
inequality in consumption per adult equivalence can be accounted for by the various 
charactHULVWLFVLQFOXGHGLQWKHPRGHO"´ Thus, this decomposition technique helps to 
estimate the contribution of each factor to the consumption. The decomposition 
technique is employed for each credit constrained status separately, which would be 
termed as a within-group decomposition. In doing this, the factors that contribute to 
consumption inequality within the credit groups are identified simultaneously. This 
is of much importance because of the larger within credit status inequality that was 
noticed from the GE index decomposition. Therefore, a detailed analysis of this 
finding using a regression based decomposition analysis is very useful for 
understanding which variables contribute more to the within-group inequality which 
is deemed important for policy purpose7KHUHVXOWVIURP)LHOG¶VGHFRPSRVLtion are 
presented in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6: )LHOG¶V5HJUHVVLRQ%DVHG'HFRPSRVLWLRQRI7RWDO,QHTXDOLW\ 
Factors  Unconstrained Constrained Pooled       
Head age 10.4185 5.6615     7.5436      
Age square -6.2110     -0.1411     -3.1380    
Primary Education 3.9756     0.5344    1.6949   
Secondary Education 8.3230       3.7499     5.6010       
Tertiary Education 7.2812      0.4486      2.5545      
Male -0.5589       -0.0291       -0.1924       
Household size 20.6187    35.8573      29.5855       
Dependency  3.5807    2.7073  2.9853 
Illness  0.3777     0.0292      0.1554       
Rural North -0.6210      0.2553    0.2409     
Rural Centre 6.3137     3.4507    5.2951     
Farm size 7.6826    5.7582      6.8081      
Land secured 2.3086      0.2741    0.8913      
Permanent 20.0527       5.7211      10.1695      
Semi-Permanent -0.8266    0.2773       -0.1449    
Network (agric.) 0.1003  0.7107      0.5400    
Remittance  1.6780       0.0502       0.4849       
Home asset 31.0140       18.6125       22.8393       
Livestock  8.2099   4.2618   6.0763   
Lambda  -23.7147      12.810      0.0099       
Total 100  100  100  
N 2,620 5596 8216 
6RXUFH$XWKRU¶VRZQFDOFXODWLRQIURPWKH7KLUG,QWHJUDWHG+RXVHKROG6XUYH\ of Malawi 
 
As these are factor shares, the coefficients in the table should be interpreted as the 
contribution of each factor to total consumption inequality. The signs of the factor 
shares give an indication of the direction of contribution. Thus, factors with positive 
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coefficients contribute to an increase in the total consumption inequality, that is have 
a dis-equalizing effect or widening the inequality gap, while negative coefficients 
imply a contribution to the fall in total consumption inequality, hence an equalizing 
effect or reducing the inequality gap.  
The first observation is that the factors included in the analysis account for about 40 
and 43 percent of household consumption for credit constrained and unconstrained 
households respectively. This is in reference to their respective R-squares in the OLS 
regression models in Table 4.5. These R-squares are consistent with other studies 
using similar methodological approach who also found relatively small percentages 
in their studies (see Fields, 2003; Cain et al., 2010; Manna and Regoli, 2012; 
Pandey, 2013). Further, Matita and Chirwa (2009) using consumption found the R-
square in their study on rural-urban welfare inequalities to be 41 percent for the rural 
household consumption equation which is very close to the R-squares found in this 
study. Finally, given that this is a cross-sectional data study, the low R-squared is 
common and does not imply that the OLS regression is not informative (Wooldridge, 
2013). 
The second observation is that the highest contributing factor to total consumption 
inequality in the credit unconstrained households is the value of home assets per 
adult equivalence (30%) followed by the size of the household (21%). This is true 
for the constrained households as well, however, with household size carrying the 
greater share of 36 percent followed by the value of home assets contributing 19 
percent. As already observed, a large household size puts a lot of strain on the 
limited resources of already poor households. It is also generally known that larger 
households are typically poorer (Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1995). Hence, it is not 
surprising that it is an increasing factor of inequality. As similarly recommended 
above, to reduce this effect, the ministry of health in Malawi should be tasked to 
increase family planning campaigns and services to especially the rural areas of 
Malawi. This in one way may reduce future fertility rates and consequently 
population growth rates and also reduce the pressure on the limited resources owned 
by these poor households. This increase in resources could enable poorer households 
to obtain some home assets which could bridge the inequality gap. Further, the 
government should create an enabling environment to attract formal institutions and 
development in the rural areas. This could create employment for poorer households, 
 142 
 
increasing their wealth hence assets and also reducing household size as being less 
poor is positively correlated with small household size. 
The educational levels of the household head (added together) contribute almost 20 
percent to overall consumption inequality for unconstrained households and about 5 
percent for constrained households. This is clearly seen as majority of households in 
the rural areas have no level of formal education therefore, the few who have some 
formal education would be in a better position to understand credit application 
procedures to access formal credit and also access formal jobs over the majority. 
Hence, the government through its education ministry should be tasked to increase 
access to education to rural areas through the provision of educational facilities and 
educational resources to increase child education. Further, adult education 
programmes should also be established to provide formal education including 
financial literacy programmes to older members of rural areas. This will increase the 
literacy rate of the rural areas of Malawi and potentially help them obtain non-farm 
jobs implying some diversity of their source of livelihood. Also, these poor 
households are more likely to understand formal credit application processes which 
could increase access to credit. This would further enable more households to obtain 
assets, due to increase in real income, to bridge the gap in consumption inequality.  
Regarding the house type, the inequality share of permanent house structures for 
unconstrained households also contributes about 20 percent of overall consumption 
inequality which is more than thrice the factor share in the constrained sub-sample. 
Dwelling structures also give a signal of the level of poverty of households. 
Permanent structures are made of modern building materials which can only be 
afforded by relatively non-poor households. Hence, improving rural development 
including provision of credit by the government and its development partners in the 
rural areas would increase the economic strength of these households which could 
translate into more poorer households being able to afford modern building 
materials.  
However, age squared, which is a proxy for experience, reduced overall consumption 
inequality by about 6 and 0.1 percent for credit unconstrained and constrained 
households respectively. Marginally reducing total inequality in the unconstrained 
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sample were also male headed households (0.56%), residing in rural north of Malawi 
(0.62%) and living in a semi-permanent structure (0.83%).  
Lambda, or the inverse Mills-UDWLRZDVXVHGDVDSUR[\IRUKRXVHKROGV¶FUHGLWVWDWXV
in each model. Therefore, an unconstrained household contributed to a decrease in 
overall consumption inequality by about 24 percent. However, a credit constrained 
household contributed to an increase in overall inequality by about 13 percent. This 
implies that there is greater benefit for being a credit unconstrained household over 
constrained households as this has the potential of reducing consumption inequality. 
Therefore, there is need for an increase in the credit access of rural households. The 
already established formal financial institutions should be encouraged to increase 
their outreach to rural households. However, the onus lies on the government to 
provide the enabling environment for these formal institutions to establish in these 
areas. As discouraged borrowers were identified to be more in the constrained group, 
factors such as collateral and high interest rate that discourages them from borrowing 
should be addressed. For example, group borrowing should be introduced which acts 
as a good deterrent for loan defaults as this is the main reason formal financial 
institutions avoid poor households or risky borrowers. In line with the group 
borrowing, individuals forming village savings and loans associations in the 
community as already explained in the thesis could be useful to obtaining credit 
through a collective effort. 
While majority of the factors were statistically significant in determining the levels 
of consumption or welfare, their importance in total consumption inequality differed 
substantially as observed in Table 4.6. According to Fields (2003), this relative 
importance would have been hard to appreciate from a standard regression analysis. 
Further, this helps to identify the causes of the within inequality that was observed in 
the within credit status using the GE inequality index. These results therefore have 
identified factors such as household size, home assets, education and permanent 
dwelling structure which were factors contributing to the increase in consumption 
inequality. These factors should therefore be given high consideration on the policy 





4.5.2.4 Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
Results from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition are presented in Table 4.7. These 
are results from the decomposition of the welfare gap between the credit 
unconstrained and constrained households. Predicted means of log consumption for 
the credit unconstrained households is 10.78 and 10.63 for the constrained 
households. These are natural logarithms, transforming these into the original scale 
of measurement shows that the (geometric) means are 45,860.18 MWK for 
unconstrained households and 41,479.93 MWK for constrained households. The 
estimated gap between the means is approximately 15.4 percent. The estimated mean 
gap between unconstrained and constrained households implies that unconstrained 
households have some advantage in consumption over constrained households due to 
their credit status. This finding contradicts that found by Diagne and Zeller (2001) 
whose study on the impact of the access to credit on welfare in Malawi concluded 
that households were left worse-off when they borrowed. However, as their 
conclusion was based on statistically insignificant results; the finding in this current 
study is argued to be more reliable. To corroborate this is the study by Matita and 
Chirwa (2009) in Malawi who found that, access to credit in rural part of Malawi 
contributed to a 9.38 percent higher welfare for borrowers. This is a little lower than 
what is found LQWKLVVWXG\+HQFHLPSURYHPHQWLQKRXVHKROGV¶DFFHVVWRFUedit is an 
effective tool in improving household welfare by providing households with 
resources for production and consumption smoothing.  
Though the between group inequality found using the GE inequality index was 
small, using a regression based approach reveals some significant level of difference 
between the credit constrained and unconstrained status on consumption inequality. 
Hence, this gap cannot be ignored in light of this finding. To make this more relevant 
policy-wise, the gap needs to be further discussed to understand what factors cause 







Table 4.7: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
Log Consumption Coefficient  Exp.(b) 
Prediction (Unconstrained) 10.78*** 47,860.18*** 
 (0.0149) (711.0908) 
Prediction (Constrained) 10.63*** 41,479.93*** 
 (0.00907) (376.4144) 
Difference (gap) 0.143*** 1.1538*** 
 (0.0174) (0.02009) 
Decomposition   
Explained 0.146*** 1.1567*** 
 (0.0170) (0.01969) 
Unexplained -0.00253 0.9974709 
 (0.00320) (0.00319) 
Observations 8,216 8,216 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The welfare gap between the two groups is decomposed into an explained and 
unexplained component. As mentioned previously, the explained component is 
attributed to the characteristics or endowment of the households, while the 
unexplained component is attributed to the unobserved characteristics and also 
possibly to discrimination in the credit market of rural Malawi. Doing this 
decomposition helps to identify the major cause of the gap between credit 
constrained and unconstrained households. The results indicate that the explained 
component is the only statistically significant component of the two. The result 
VXJJHVWV WKDW DGMXVWLQJ FRQVWUDLQHG KRXVHKROGV¶ HQGRZPHQWV OHYHOV WR WKDW RI
unconstrained households would increase the consumption or welfare of constrained 
households by about 15.7 percent. The results further show that there remains a 
negligible and insignificant component of the gap which is left unexplained. Hence, 
the differences in the observed characteristics of the households are more relevant 
than the differences in the unexplained component when determining the welfare 
differentials between constrained and unconstrained households. 
Table 4.8 presents the factors that contribute to the explained component of the gap 
and also the unexplained component. The coefficients from the explained 
components reveal that value of home assets and livestock, education, location in the 
rural centre of the country, permanent structure and farm size are the major 
characteristics contributing to the welfare gap. Matita and Chirwa (2009) found 
assets to be one of the largest contributors to the welfare gap in their study. Thus, the 
possession of factors such as home assets and livestock by some households 
increases their wealth which makes them better off than those without them hence 
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widening the inequality gap. Therefore, enabling most household to obtain such 
assets could bridge the inequality gap. It is recommended that increasing the access 
to credit and improvement in the development structures of the rural areas be a top 
priority on the government rural development agenda. This would enable high 
productivity on the farm as households are able to access productive farm tools and 
diversify their source of income. This may increase the wealth of most poor 
households enabling them to increase their home assets and livestock among others. 
Table 4.8: Detailed Results of the Explained and Unexplained Component of the 
welfare gap 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Explained Unexplained 
Head age -0.00218 -0.680*** 
 (0.00435) (0.241) 
Age squared 0.000746 0.325*** 
 (0.00228) (0.118) 
Primary 0.00475*** 0.0247*** 
 (0.00125) (0.00520) 
Secondary 0.0127*** 0.0198*** 
 (0.00220) (0.00593) 
Teritary 0.00713*** 0.00700*** 
 (0.00193) (0.00210) 
Male -0.000967 -0.0457 
 (0.000745) (0.0298) 
Household size -0.0123** 0.0642 
 (0.00552) (0.0439) 
Dependency  0.00231*** -0.0279 
 (0.000889) (0.0198) 
Married  0.00106* -0.345** 
 (0.000564) (0.142) 
Illness  -0.00298*** 0.0257** 
 (0.00105) (0.0102) 
Rural North 0.0331*** 0.152*** 
 (0.00337) (0.0377) 
Rural Centre 0.0106*** -0.0598 
 (0.00197) (0.0381) 
Farm size 0.00304*** -0.0855** 
 (0.00110) (0.0414) 
Land secured 0.0332*** 0.0667*** 
 (0.00360) (0.0159) 
Permanent -0.000400 -0.00119 
 (0.000607) (0.00913) 
Semi-Permanent -0.000545 -0.00713** 
 (0.000591) (0.00326) 
Network (agric.) 0.00214** 0.0216*** 
 (0.000856) (0.00561) 
Remittance  0.0444*** 0.187*** 
 (0.00438) (0.0424) 
Home assets 0.0182*** 0.0632*** 
 (0.00256) (0.0180) 
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Livestock  -0.00838 0.545*** 
 (0.0132) (0.175) 
Lambda  -0.00218 -0.680*** 
 (0.00435) (0.241) 
Total 0.146*** -0.00253 
 (0.0170) (0.00320) 
Constant  -0.252 
  (0.266) 
Observations 8,216 8,216 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4.6 Conclusion 
The study aimed at determining the factors that affect consumption inequality in 
rural Malawi with a major focus on the credit constrained statuses of farm 
households. Three main objectives were examined, these included: (1) investigating 
whether inequality was greater between or within credit constrained or unconstrained 
groups. This provides a summary of the distribution of consumption inequality by 
credit status using the GE index which matters for an initial examination of 
inequality before any detailed analysis is performed; however, to understand the 
causes of the consumption inequality beyond the summary results which only 
considers the credit status, objective (2) simultaneously determined the effect and 
contributions of possible factors to total consumption inequality within each credit 
constrained group; and objective (3) decomposed the consumption inequality gap 
between the credit constrained statuses into an explained or endowment component 
and a residual or unexplained component. )LHOGV¶  regression based 
decomposition method was used for the second objective and the Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition analysis was adopted for the third objective. The study used data 
from the Third Integrated Household Survey of Malawi concentrating on only rural 
farm households. 
One of the major findings of the study was that, after decomposing the GE index, 
consumption inequality was found to be greater within credit constrained and 
unconstrained households than between them. Thus, the inequality that exists in rural 
Malawi, considering the credit statuses of households, was mostly as a result of 
inequality within the credit groups. This implies that any policy that wants to target 
inequality should also focus on factors that affect inequality within the credit 
statuses. 7RLGHQWLI\WKHVHIDFWRUVIXUWKHUDQDO\VLVXVLQJ)LHOGV¶5%'DSSURDFKZDV
adopted. Results from using the GE index are considered to be descriptive giving an 
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indication of the distribution of inequality and where inequality is greater using a 
factor at a time. However, the RBD approach delved deeper to estimate the actual 
causes and contributors to increasing or decreasing within-group inequality. 
Some socio-demographic and economic factors were identified to influence the 
consumption of constrained and unconstrained households. The majority of the 
factors including educational level of the head of households, household size, 
dependency ratio, marital status, farm size, home asset among others were influential 
in explaining the welfare in both credit constrained and unconstrained households. 
However, male headed households only contributed to an increase in welfare in 
constrained households, including factors like semi-permanent residence and 
KRXVHKROGV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQDJULFXOWXUDOJURXSV%HLQJLQWKHQRUWKRIUXUDO0DODZL
reduced the welfare of constrained households only. For unconstrained households, 
only remittances played an important role in improving welfare while a member of 
the household reporting ill reduced household welfare. 
5HVXOWV IURP )LHOGV¶ GHFRPSRVLWLRQ VKRZ WKDW KRXVHKROG VL]H DQG YDOXH RI KRPH
assets were the two major contributors to inequality within both credit constrained 
and unconstrained households. This was found not surprising especially that of the 
household size as a larger household is mostly associated with poorer households. A 
large household reduces the wealth or resource per person within the household 
increasing the pressure on the limited resources of the household hence pushing them 
further into the poverty trap. On assets, very few households possess these durable 
home assets hence widening the consumption gap. It is recommended that the 
government through the ministry of health should intensify family planning and birth 
control programmes to reduce the fertility rate and consequently population growth 
rate of rural areas which could increase the wealth per person within the household. 
This is because there will be lesser individuals within the household to share the 
limited resource of the household. Further, government should enhance the economic 
development of the rural areas through the provision of credit and also creating the 
enabling environment for the thriving of both farm and non-farm economic activities 
especially in the formal sector. This would increase the wealth of household 
translating to increase in home assets.  
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Also, the education level variables together had a 20 percent contribution to 
increasing inequality in unconstrained households and a 5 percent in constrained 
households. Providing educational facilities and resources are recommended to 
increase the level of education in rural areas and that could empower rural 
households to find non-farm jobs and also understand credit application procedures 
increasing the access to credit which has been deemed to be an essential tool for 
rural economic development. This may therefore reduce the level of discouraged 
borrowers as through education more households may be willing to participate in the 
credit market or lenders willing to provide credit to more educated households 
instead. Also, education increases likelihood of obtaining off-farm jobs that increases 
real income and assets and would enable households to have collateral assets for 
obtaining credit. Further, experience, captured by age square of the household head 
reduced inequality by 6 percent for unconstrained households but only 0.14 percent 
for constrained households. This implies that the experience of household heads 
cannot be overlooked when considering reducing the inequality of households in 
rural Malawi. These experiences may be from farming or other non-farm activities.  
The study also identified that welfare inequalities existed between the credit 
constrained and unconstrained households. There was as much as 15.4 percent 
consumption inequality gap between unconstrained and constrained households 
using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analysis. Majority of this gap came from 
the endowment component of the gap. These endowments included home assets and 
livestock. Thus, the possession of these endowments widened the inequality gap 
between credit constrained and unconstrained groups. These endowments may 
enable households to be able to access credit as they could be used as collateral for 
applying for credit. Hence, creating an enabling environment for poor households to 
engage in productive economic activities could increase their purchase of home 
assets and livestock hence bridging the gap in consumption inequality. From the 
results, it is possible to conclude that if the levels of endowment of constrained 
households were adjusted to the level of unconstrained households, the welfare of 
constrained households would increase by as much as 15.7 percent. Thus, 
endowments of constrained households could be increased through the provision of 
credit. Where farm households are able to access credit, access to farm inputs may 
increase leading to higher productivity and income. Hence, they would be through 
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accessing credit increase the welfare of the households, increase their assets, raise 
the level of education, nutrition and health within the household. 
The findings from this study as seen hold some important policy implications for 
targeting inequality within rural Malawi. In brief, firstly, while it is recommended 
that policies should focus on both inequality within and between credit constrained 
groups, factors such as access to assets and education and household size should be 
targeted first if a major impact is to be made on reducing inequality. Secondly, credit 
market interventions by government and other agencies (NGOs) should be improved 
WRLQFUHDVHUXUDOIDUPKRXVHKROGV¶DFFHVVWRFUHGLWDVLWKDVEHHQHVWLPDWHGWKDWEHLQJ
credit unconstrained reduces total consumption inequality. This may further help 
more households to acquire assets so as to reduce the disparity that exists as a result 
of assets. However, results and recommendations drawn from this study should be 
taken with caution. This is because of the problem of invalidity of the instruments 
used in the analysis. The instruments were correlated with the outcome variable after 






Table C1: Correlation coefficient matrix  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Constrain 1          
2. Consumption -0.110*** 1         
3. Head age -0.0105 -0.0963*** 1        
4. Age squared -0.00815 -0.0752*** 0.983*** 1       
5. Education -0.112*** 0.271*** -0.180*** -0.180*** 1      
6. Male -0.0443*** 0.0544*** -0.203*** -0.212*** 0.176*** 1     
7. Household size -0.0254* -0.334*** -0.0244* -0.0958*** 0.0261* 0.223*** 1    
8. Dependency 0.0253* -0.250*** 0.111*** 0.121*** -0.104*** -0.199*** 0.329*** 1   
9. Illness 0.0289** -0.0256* -0.00995 -0.0137 0.0133 0.0410*** 0.0142 -0.00181 1  
10. Location 0.185*** -0.0729*** -0.0155 -0.00539 -0.105*** -0.0666*** -0.0942*** 0.0215 0.0397*** 1 
11. Farm size -0.0688*** 0.300*** 0.139*** 0.150*** 0.00622 -0.0110 -0.343*** -0.185*** -0.00453 -0.0595*** 
12. Land secured 0.0683*** -0.107*** 0.0709*** 0.0803*** -0.149*** -0.0684*** -0.0603*** 0.0300** -0.0134 0.0374*** 
13. House type 0.118*** -0.220*** -0.110*** -0.0897*** -0.212*** -0.0392*** -0.128*** 0.0205 -0.0109 0.0163 
14. Network (agric.) 0.000984 0.0634*** 0.0136 0.00580 0.0173 0.0257* 0.0349** -0.00452 0.0105 -0.00579 
15. Remittance  -0.0364*** 0.0386*** 0.425*** 0.422*** -0.0672*** -0.181*** -0.0787*** 0.00445 -0.0492*** -0.0550*** 
16. Home asset -0.132*** 0.344*** -0.00130 -0.0193 0.241*** 0.256*** 0.112*** -0.113*** 0.0204 -0.0997*** 
17. Livestock -0.114*** 0.160*** 0.0861*** 0.0601*** 0.0725*** 0.118*** 0.188*** -0.0184 -0.00212 -0.176*** 
18. MFI Dist. 0.0154 -0.0584*** -0.00185 -0.000646 -0.00854 0.0560*** 0.00583 -0.00482 -0.0157 -0.132*** 







Table C1: Correlation coefficient matrix (continued) 
Variables 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
11. Farm size 1         
12. Land secured 0.0379*** 1        
13. House type -0.0313** 0.0931*** 1       
14. Network (agric.) 0.0393*** -0.0462*** -0.0180 1      
15. Remittance  0.104*** 0.0399*** -0.109*** 0.0103 1     
16. Home asset 0.158*** -0.0978*** -0.329*** 0.0595*** 0.0429*** 1    
17. Livestock 0.170*** 0.0136 -0.162*** 0.0496*** 0.0894*** 0.311*** 1   
18. MFI Dist. 0.0865*** 0.0166 0.0523*** 0.00699 -0.00197 0.00725 0.0559*** 1  
19. Financial 0.0195 -0.0481*** -0.0481*** -0.0339** 0.0109 -0.0214 -0.0139 -0.0262* 1 
*





CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION  
5.1 Introduction  
This thesis contributes to the literature on the importance of access to credit and 
credit constraints on the process of economic development of the rural areas of 
developing countries in general, in particular Malawi. The importance of this work is 
seen in the fact that the rural areas of the developing nations are the home to a 
VLJQLILFDQWQXPEHURIWKHZRUOG¶VSRRU0DODZLSUHVHQWVDJRRGFDVHVWXG\FRXQWU\
due to its high level of poverty and its effort to improve the welfare of its citizens. 
Between 2002 and 2011 about three-quarters of Malawians were below the poverty 
line of $1.25 a day (UNDP, 2013). In addition, the World Bank reported that the 
lowest quintile of the population of Malawi had less than 6 percent of the total 
income while those in the highest quintile enjoyed more than half of total income 
(Povertydata.worldbank.org, 2015). This shows the level of income disparity that 
exists within Malawi. 
The rural part of Malawi has been the most impoverished with about 95 percent of 
the poor residing in the rural areas. Together with being an agricultural based area, 
with the agricultural sector still facing the traditional problems such as heavy 
dependence on rainfall, the rural areas are highly unattractive to formal institutions 
including the formal financial institutions increasing credit market failure. Hence, the 
domination of the rural areas by the informal sector.  
Credit has been identified as an important tool for improving welfare in rural areas. 
It provides farmers with the ability to purchase farm inputs and materials to improve 
production and productivity, and to also smooth consumption. Households who are 
credit constrained have lagged behind in production and other welfare outcomes like 
education, health, food security, and consumption. Nevertheless, the accurate 
measurement of credit constrained households is very important if the true 
magnitude and effect of being credit constrained is to be seen. In order to consider 
the power of rural credit to alleviate rural poverty and to improve other household 
welfare outcomes the three empirical studies in this thesis examined the decision 
taken by households as to whether to engage in the credit market, and how credit 
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impacts on farm crop productivity and consumption inequality. All three empirical 
chapters bring unique insights to the problems. The next section presents the main 
findings from each of the empirical chapters and their policy implications. 
5.2 Summary of results 
The first empirical chapter examined the characteristics of rural households who 
needed credit against those who did not. This work identified the characteristics of 
households who are discouraged from applying for credit against those who applied 
and considered which characteristics explain why some households are denied credit 
while others are successful in obtaining credit. This part of the study helps to fill the 
gap in the credit literature on discouraged borrowers in rural sub-Saharan Africa. 
In general, the overriding conclusion from the first empirical chapter was that 
discouraged borrowers ignored in the credit literature until recently were found to be 
numerically more important than denied borrowers in the scale of the problem of 
credit constrained households. The study found that there were about 7 times more 
discouraged borrowers than denied credit applicants. Some studies in developed 
countries (including Eastern Europe) found discouraged borrowers to be about twice 
the number of denied borrowers (Levenson and Willard, 2000; Brown et al., 2011 
and Freel et al., 2012). These findings compared to the current study support the 
prediction by Kon and Storey (2003) that discouraged borrowers were most likely to 
be more prevalent in developing than the developed countries. The implication of 
WKLVILQGLQJLVWKDWLQH[DPLQLQJKRXVHKROGV¶DFFHVVWRFUHGLWGLVFRXUDJHGERUURZHUV
should be given a special consideration as disregarding them may underestimate the 
credit constraint measurement. 
Another major finding from the first empirical chapter showed that the 
characteristics of borrowers differed from one borrower type to another. Hence 
showing the heterogeneity in borrower types. Those who needed credit included 
households with older household heads, large households, and those who resided in 
the rural south of the country. Further, those who applied for credit included 
households that had some level of education, membership in a social group or 
network, and households who experienced some household and natural shocks. 
However, characteristics of households who obtained credit included female-headed 
households and older household heads. In addition, households with a higher value 
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of home assets and livestock were more likely to obtain credit as lenders may be 
accepting these as collateral. 
The findings on the female-headed households obtaining credit is considered a key 
finding from the study. In a rural African setting, where women are usually 
underprivileged, this study showed that although women were discouraged from 
applying for credit, if they apply, they were more likely to obtain credit in 
comparison to men. According to literature, women are much poorer than men as 
they lack productive assets but they are better at ploughing back extra income 
obtained to imprRYH WKH KHDOWK DQG WKH QXWULWLRQ RI WKH KRXVHKROG DQG FKLOGUHQ¶V
education than the men (Burjorjee et al., 2002). Hence, economically empowering 
women through provision of credit could have a rippling effect on the welfare 
outcomes of households and possibly have a spill-over effect on the rural economy at 
large. Women, therefore, should be encouraged to apply for credit. The findings of 
this study suggest that lenders have noticed the commercial and developmental 
potential of this differential behaviour of the genders, even though peers and 
influential friends continue to discourage women from seeking credit. 
After augmenting the definition of credit constraint with discouraged borrowers as 
proposed in the first empirical chapter, it was essential to identify its impact on some 
household outcomes. The second empirical chapter simultaneously examined the 
likelihood of a rural farm household being credit constrained or unconstrained and its 
impact on farm household productivity. Further, expected crop yield, treatment and 
heterogeneity effects were employed to estimate the counterfactual conditions of 
being either a credit constrained or unconstrained household.  
The results from the second empirical study showed that, the presence of financial 
institutions in an area was more likely to make households in that area credit 
XQFRQVWUDLQHGDV WKHLUSUHVHQFHHQDEOHGKRXVHKROGV¶HDV\DFFHVV WR DQGDZDUHQHVV
of, financial services, including credit. The study found that households in areas 
(districts) with fewer financial institutions were more likely to be credit constrained. 
Further, the proximity of financial institutions to communities was also crucial as 
households in communities distant to financial institutions increased the likelihood 
of being credit constrained. The above findings were an indication of the importance 
of distance to lenders and borrowers in one way due to transaction cost. Distance 
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increases the transaction cost of credit application to borrowers. Presbitero and 
Rabellotti (2013) also found that GLVWDQFH LQFUHDVHG WKH FRVW RI 0),V¶ RSHUDWLRQV
hence, reducing the probability of households been approved credit. The government 
should therefore, improve the enabling environment that would increase the outreach 
of formal financial institutions within rural Malawi. This will first and foremost have 
the consequence of reducing the transaction of costs of borrowing which usually 
discourages borrowing or increases rejection rate. Further, it will enable rural 
households to access credit that could help them improve their welfare.  
Another major finding from the second empirical chapter was that there was a 
positive effect of credit on crop productivity. A randomly selected household from 
the population was likely to be less productive than an unconstrained household but 
more productive than a constrained household. The counterfactual arguments 
confirmed the importance of being credit unconstrained as it increased productivity. 
The effect of the treatment on the treated and the untreated showed that productivity 
would increase due to a household being credit unconstrained, thus indicating the 
significance of being credit unconstrained. Therefore, implementation of financial 
inclusion policies should not be taken lightly by the government as the expanded 
credit availability would have a significantly positive effect on farm productivity. 
In line with the second empirical chapter, the third empirical chapter further looked 
at the impact credit has on household welfare. The third empirical chapter employed 
three decomposition methods to determine the factors that contribute to differences 
in household consumption within and between credit constrained and unconstrained 
groups. This work contributes toward our understanding of the role of credit markets 
in the perpetuation or reduction of household consumption inequality in rural 
Malawi. One of the major findings was that consumption inequality was greater 
within the credit constrained and unconstrained group than between them. Thus, 
factors that contribute to increasing inequality within the credit statuses should be 
identified and addressed so as to reduce inequality and in effect poverty. Household 
size and total value of household assets were found to be the major contributing 
factors to consumption inequality within each credit group. The human capital 
variable (that is, educational level) was also a significant contributing factor to 
increasing inequality in the credit unconstrained group. Experience, proxied by age 
squared, however decreased inequality especially in the credit unconstrained group. 
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These variables therefore, are good targets for policy makers if they would like to 
reduce inequality. For example, as formal education is one of the main commodities 
that rural areas lack, the government should increase access to education by 
providing the facilities and resources to make schools affordable and attractive to the 
children of rural households. Formal adult education should also be introduced to 
older household members who could have some form of formal education which 
they missed out when they were younger. This would increase the level of literacy 
and increase the chance of obtaining non-farm jobs. Hence, households can diversify 
their source of income which may lead to increase in assets for majority of rural 
households with the possibility of bridging the inequality gap.   
Another major finding was that there is as much as 9.5 percent of the consumption 
inequality gap attributed to credit status. Majority of this gap came from the 
endowment component confirming that most inequality in consumption is derived 
from the endowment of households. The result suggested that if the level of 
endowment of constrained households were adjusted up to the level of unconstrained 
households, the welfare of constrained households would increase by as much as 9.7 
percent. This generally supports the call for credit to be used as a tool for reducing 
poverty since credit can be used to replace endowment. Therefore, the onus lies on 
the government to create the enabling environment to improve access to credit in the 
rural parts of Malawi. 
5.3 Recommendations 
The main objective of this thesis was to analyse the effect of credit constraints on the 
productivity and welfare of rural households in Malawi. From the analyses carried 
out interesting results which have policy implications were discovered. In this 
section I present a summary of these findings for policy formulation and 
implementation.  
A key finding from this thesis is that women are more discouraged than men from 
borrowing. Thus, since the objective of the government is to develop all sectors of 
the economy, it will be commendable to establish financial programmes targeting 
women. One such programme that is currently in operation is the Concern Universal 
Microfinance Operations, (an NGO), that targets remote areas and difficult-to-reach 
communities with special focus on women. Such important organizations should be 
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supported through financial assistance from the government and development 
agencies to enable them reach and promote financial literacy and credit among 
women and other marginalised and vulnerable people in the country more 
effectively.  
As the main driving force to economic disparity between the locations in Malawi is 
the difference in the level of development across the country, it is recommended that 
the government should increase its development programmes across Malawi paying 
closer attention to the more deprived areas of the country like the south of Malawi. 
Increasing physical infrastructure such as roads, electricity, water and 
communication across the country could attract formal institutions including 
financial institutions to all areas of the country which will help develop the areas 
further. This would help bridge the poverty and inequality gaps between the urban 
and rural areas of Malawi. Policies such as the Malawi Growth and Development 
Strategy, Medium Term Expenditure Framework and the Public-Sector Investment 
Programmes among others should have location specific development goals. 
Location-specific development goals will help promulgate bespoke developmental 
interventions. In addition, government should enhance the economic development of 
the rural areas through the provision of credit through the Malawi Rural Finance 
Company and also creating the enabling environment for the thriving of both farm 
and non-farm economic activities especially in the formal sector. This would 
increase the wealth of household translating to increase in home assets. 
Agricultural networks should be formed in areas in rural Malawi that are yet to have 
any shape or form of credit markets in their location, so that members could share 
resources, such as labour and farm inputs, among each other. Furthermore, it is 
recommended that financial social clubs such as the village savings and loan 
associations be encouraged among farmers in rural areas where financial literacy and 
credit will be given to members through some collective efforts. Thus, following the 
village savings and loan association, farmers could pool savings together which will 
be given to a different member as credit at some regular intervals. The financial 
knowledge obtained during the meetings could then be passed on from members to 
non-members increasing the overall financial literacy across the rural areas. This 
may further reduce the level of discouragement and increase participation in the 
credit market due to increased knowledge.  
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Households which are endowed with more resources should be encouraged to invest 
in assets such as livestock in addition to their crop farms. The findings from the 
study showed that these assets increase the chance of obtaining credit. This may be 
because lenders accept these as collateral to advance credit to borrowers. These 
assets are possibly a proxy for wealth and households with more assets are 
considered as less risky borrowers. Where farm households are able to access credit, 
access to farm inputs may increase leading to higher productivity and income, 
leading to improvement in the level of education, nutrition and health within the 
household. 
Another recommendation based on the findings from this thesis is that the 
government, through the ministry of education, should increase access to formal 
education by providing the facilities and resources to make schools affordable and 
attractive to the children in rural areas. Formal adult education including financial 
literacy courses should also be introduced to older household members who have no 
formal education. This would increase the level of literacy and increase the chance of 
obtaining non-farm jobs and also increase credit market participation. Hence, 
households can diversify their source of income which may lead to increase in assets 
for majority of rural households with the possibility of bridging the inequality gap. 
A related finding from this thesis suggests a strong and positive correlation between 
access to credit and productivity. Also, farmers with access to credit have higher 
productivity and are more likely to access more credit. Therefore, it would be 
beneficial to focus on improving the productivity of the farmers through extension 
efforts. Extension programmes or officers should propagate the benefits of 
intercropping as it has been identified to increase farm productivity. Nitrogen-fixing 
crops, such as soybeans and peanuts, should be intercropped with food crops like 
maize to increase the yield of the food crops and also gain extra harvest from these 
nitrogen-fixing plants. To achieve this, it would be beneficial that more extension 
officers are trained and extension programmes intensified in areas with little or no 
credit markets to increase the level of productivity among constrained households 
especially. Extension programmes could also include credit information as extension 
officers have regular contacts with farmers. ThHJRYHUQPHQWRI0DODZL¶VSOXUDOLVWLF
extension policies which have influenced an increase in the private sector 
participation in farm extension programmes in Malawi should be sustained and 
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promoted by continuously creating an enabling environment and also creating a 
public-private partnership.  
7KHJRYHUQPHQWRI0DODZL¶VIDUPLQSXWVXEVLG\SURJUDPPHZKLFKJLYHVVXEVLGL]HG
fertilizers and seeds to farm households should also be maintained and strengthened 
to be more effective. The evidence of the positive impact of the programme implies 
if well managed both credit constrained and unconstrained households would be 
more productive and thereby increase their welfare. It is therefore recommended that 
the government subsidy programme should be carefully managed and also directed 
to areas with little or no credit markets.  
5.4 Limitations of the studies 
The literature and empirical studies reviewed as part of this research showed a wide 
range of definition of key variables like discouraged borrowers and credit 
constrained households. Measuring discouraged borrowers using the Malawi data 
differed from other studies which has restricted comparisons to these studies. 
Measurement of discouraged borrowers in this research was expanded to include not 
only those who did not borrow because they feel they will be denied credit, but also 
those who did not apply for other reasons such as inadequate collateral, which the 
researcher thought could be a source of discouragement. Similarly, for credit 
constrained measurement, the definition for this study (given the data used) differed 
from several others as reviewed by Petrick (2005) who gave some summary of the 
definitions used in literature. This study could only use households who were denied 
credit together with those discouraged. However, it is possible that those who 
obtained credit may have not received the entire amount they requested and therefore 
still quantity constrained in credit.  
This raises an issue of omitted variable bias. Important variables not collected in a 
survey makes restricts the estimation of certain models. The major issue this could 
cause is the estimation biases. This could be confounding variables that when not 
included in an estimation could damage the internal validity of some estimated 
results. This therefore could raise issues of omitted variable bias or confounding 
bias. Some variables were deemed to be very important but were not collected in the 
survey. These variables included set of information on the credit history of the 
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households, credit limit, interest rates, collateral assets, household saving decision 
and earnings from non-farm work.  
&UHGLW KLVWRU\ SURYLGHV LPSRUWDQW VHW RI LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ WKH KRXVHKROGV¶ SUHYLRXV
\HDUV¶ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ WKH FUHGLW PDUNHW )URP WKLV ZH FDQ NQRZ ZKHWKHU WKH
household had defaulted or delayed in repaying a loan, been denied in the past, and 
their general experience in the credit market among others. This information would 
have properly help to put the estimation into proper context and these could have 
also acted as excellent instrumental variables for our econometric estimations. The 
data provided no information on the Amount of credit households needed and 
whether they obtained the full amount or a partial amount. The lenders credit limit 
below the amount borrowers requested raises further issues of credit constraint. 
However, since this information was missing, the study had a limited definition for a 
credit constrained household as already highlighted above. Also, information on 
credit interest rates were missing from the data including collateral assets requested 
by lenders, what these collateral assets were and their values.   
Another important information that could have been useful was whether the 
household operated a bank account and therefore had some savings or had some 
sought of financial insurance. This could possibly give much clearer understanding 
to why certain households did not need credit thus relying on these savings rather 
than borrowing :KLOH KRXVHKROGV¶ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ QRQ-farm economic activities 
was captured in the data, earnings from these activities were not collected in the 
survey which was limited estimating the effect of off-farm work on the credit status, 
productivity and consumption of households. Using a dummy for off-farm 
participation would have raised further sample selection and endogeneity issues 
which may complicate the analysis.  
Data was not obtained on any form of group borrowing. However, it was found in 
the literature that village savings and loans associations were one very important 
ways that groups of individuals meet regularly to pool some savings into a common 
pot which is then given to a different member at each meeting as a loan. This is seen 
as a limitation to the study as this has been identified to play a crucial role in 
providing the necessary credit and also increasing household food security and 
improving household income indicators (Ksoll et al., 2016). 
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5.5 Areas of further research  
While the effect of credit constraints on productivity and consumption was studied, it 
is recommended that the effect of the various credit statuses, such as no need for 
credit, discouraged, denied, and approved, on household outcomes should be studied 
as these statuses may be more homogeneous than when households are grouped as 
credit constrained and unconstrained. Also, the use of the cross-sectional data did not 
allow for time and dynamic effects to be considered. The dynamic gains of building 
on success from credit obtained in a previous year may not be accounted for using a 
cross-sectional data which could raise measurement issues about cause and effect. 
Hence, further studies can be explored using panel data to capture these dynamic 
gains. Although, panel data is currently available, the current studies did not use it as 
the study was in an advance stage prior to its release. An alternative is to employ a 
randomised control trial (RCT) to conduct a field experiment that seeks to answer 
the objectives of this thesis. An RCT has been identified as a powerful tool in 
measuring and comparing outcomes of two or multiple interventions. Though the 
researcher could have collected his own data which could have avoided the 
restriction in the definition of credit constraint, it would have fallen short of being 
nationally representative.  
Given the omitted variable issue identified as a limitation to the study, it is 
recommended that the next round of surveys should capture further important 
information in all aspect of the data. For the credit section of the data especially, 
information on credit history and credit limit especially should be gathered. Also, 
information on the interest rates of borrowing, collateral assets requested by lenders 
and used by borrowers should also be gathered in subsequent surveys. A broader 
section on participation in the financial market including saving with the bank or any 
formal or informal financial service and insurance could be useful in determining the 
level of financial knowledge or financial inclusion of households in the rural areas of 
Malawi. This could generally give good background information on households as it 
is also more likely participation in the credit market and other financial services like 
savings are correlated. Hence, for further research and provided broader financial 
market information are collected in future surveys, a study could be undertaken to 
determine if households¶ participation in the credit market is correlated with 
participation in other financial services like operating a bank account.  
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It is recommended first that future survey should also include information on group 
borrowing from both the formal source (following the Grameen Bank model) or 
from the informal source (following the village savings and loans association model 
where group members are both lenders and borrowers). This should provoke further 
research on how this influences credit market participation in Malawi and which 
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